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This thesis examines the increasing centrality of surveillance devices, themes and 
concepts from varying social, theoretical and philosophical points of view by analysing and 
comparing three films. These films examine the already realised possibility of a surveillance 
society, whose control and reach is exercised through the manipulation of visual culture. By 
mobilising concepts expounded by Hannah Arendt, Walter Benjamin, Michel Foucault and 
David Rodowick, I unfold a critique of contemporary visual culture, its dominant modes of 
representation and the construction of self that they serve.  
 
In Chapter One, I discuss the French film, Caché / Hidden, (2005), directed by 
Austrian Michael Haneke, a film which makes definitive statements about surveillance and 
the psychology of a surveillant society. Surveillance is established as a point of view in this 
film, taking on the quality of subjectivity. This point of view, in turn, helps reveal the hidden 
dimension of a conscience within the main character, and also that which, by implication, may 
be hidden beneath our increasingly digitised visual culture. I uncover a latent pattern of 
disconnections, guilt and culpability concealed below the surface of similitude that 
surveillance and its attendant forms and strategies construct and maintain. 
 
Chapter Two treats the American film, Minority Report (2002), directed by Steven 
Spielberg, whose central conceit concerns the possibility of surveilling the future — in other 
words, watching events in a future time, and first by monitoring, then by taking action, 
preventing their occurrence before they actually happen. Surveillance as a topic arises from 
the prophetic dreams of somnambulist savants who are able to predict future crimes by 
dreaming the future. 
 
Chapter Three looks at the German film, Das Leben der Anderen / The Lives of Others 
(2006), directed by Florian Henckel von Donnersmarck, a film which contributes many 
elements to the discussion of the genre of the “surveillance film.” Surveillance in this case is 
perpetrated by the Stasi, the government’s secret police force, in 1984, during the Cold War in 
East Berlin. In contrast to Caché, the figure in the film that undergoes the significant 
transformation is the perpetrator, Stasi operative Hauptmann Gerd Wiesler, who, rather than 
exposing the lives of others through surveillance, protects and conceals them. 
 
I identify these films as belonging to the surveillance film genre not only because of 
their classic use of surveillance, but also because they offer a unique model for the 
examination of certain social conflicts. The genre of the surveillance film postulated in this 
thesis constitutes an initial attempt to promote discussion about why we have accepted and 















I would first like to thank the University of Otago for awarding me a scholarship so that I was 
able to even consider beginning my thesis. I could not have written this thesis without the 
encouragement, support and humour of these important people: Dr. Charles Tustin and Dr. 
Constantin Grigorut, who convinced me that I had the ability to begin such an undertaking, 
and then professors Tim Mehigan and Simon Ryan whose genuine interest in my topic and 
enthusiastic supervision were a constant source of inspiration to me. 
 
As supervisors, Tim and Simon treated me and my work with respect and the kind of good-
natured collegiality that made doing the work something to look forward to. The superior 
intellect of these men never ceases to amaze and impress me, yet their positive style of 
conveying suggestions with a complete lack of stuffiness managed to keep our meetings down 
to earth rather than over my head. The best surprise was how much laughter we shared! 
 
The Department of Humanities, especially Donna Jackson, deserve appreciation for providing 
many of us with such a unique space to work. I would also like to thank the unusual collection 
of the varying fledging to mature academics that inhabit our little nest in the “humanities post 
grad pods.” I especially thank providence for my pod-mate and friend, Teri Higgins, whose 
support in times of uncertainty has been unwavering, and to our third musketeer in the pods, 
Pete Dulgar, the English major, who had an uncanny knack of being able to come up with just 
the right turn of phrase whenever I was stuck and needed one. 
 
Finally, I sincerely thank my family for consistently assuming that I was doing something 
worthwhile all those hours and weekends spent away from home researching and writing. I 
thank my husband Mark for dropping by my office with lovingly homemade lunches and tea, 
for looking after the bulk of the housework, and for rubbing my back when I finally made it 
home. To my eldest son, Walker, who must endure the eternal embarrassment of attending 
University at the same time as his mother, you have been a real sport about this, son, and I 
truly appreciate the respect you show me by not rolling your eyes as often as you could. And 
to my son Rory (aged sixteen), for all of the long, great talks we have before you drift off to 
sleep at night, I thank you for sharing your day with me and allowing me to share mine with 

























Table of Contents 
 
Title Page:                                                                                                                                   i 
Abstract:                                                                                                                                     ii                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Acknowledgements:                                                                                                                  iii 
Table of Contents:                                                                                                                      iv 
List of Figures:                                                                                                                            v 
 
Introduction:                                                                                                                                1 
 
 
Chapter One:  Introduction: Caché (Hidden) and the Desubstantiation Project:         45             
20 
 
Chapter Two: Minority Report:  
 

















  My aim is to examine the topic of surveillance as it occurs in three films set in 
different cultural domains and epochs. In order of treatment they are: Caché /Hidden (2005), 
set in contemporary France; Minority Report (2002), which illustrates life in a futuristic 
America circa 2054; and Das Leben Der Anderen / The Lives of Others (2006), which is 
located in East Berlin in 1984, during the waning days of the Cold War.  
I consider that these films belong to what I call the “surveillance film genre,” that is, a 
genre in which both the form of the film and its subject are concerned with the manipulation 
of reality through aspects of (the construction of) visuality. In each case, from this vantage 
point, to see is to manipulate and control. Furthermore, being surveilled or surveillant, that is, 
what they have experienced as a result of surveillance is what is worthy of debate in these 
films. 
The topic of surveillance is far too vast to be considered in isolation, and is discussed 
using critical concepts derived from several academic disciplines. I take the view that 
surveillance the tropes associated with it must be pursued in areas pertinent to cultural, 
political, film and media studies where it can be thoroughly debated. Various modes of 
surveillance that have been portrayed in popular culture usually place certain characters in the 
position of the voyeur, watcher and eavesdropper. On the whole, such modes are certainly not 
a new phenomenon. However, within the media texts of film, literature, television and other 
media, surveillance has become increasingly central — and I argue, for this reason, it should 






    
The bulk of the discussion of surveillance has thus far centred on policing, “social 
sorting,”1 and ethical questions relating to the collection of personal information, which are 
all growing areas of research and are most often located within the field of sociology. David 
Lyon, the author of Surveillance society: Monitoring everyday life (2001), and Gary Marx, 
who wrote “The Surveillance Society: The Threat of 1984-Style Techniques,” The Futurist:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
1985), are two sociologists who have contributed valuable studies on the subject. Both 
reference Foucault’s work, Discipline and Punish, The Birth of the Prison (1977), as the 
cornerstone of their theoretical framework. My thesis also considers these critical views.  
I also include here, a discussion of Walter Benjamin’s major essay, “The Work of Art 
in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction”  (1936), as it relates to distance and questions 
regarding the notion of authenticity in our increasingly digital age.  David Rodowick takes 
Benjamin’s discussion into more contemporary areas in his work, Reading the Figural, or, 
Philosophy After New Media, (2001). I also draw on the concepts of machinic assemblages 
and other ideas stemming from Felix Guattari and Gilles Deleuze that Rodowick synthesizes 
and expands upon in his book. The ideas of both Benjamin and Rodowick also help to support 
the argument I will set forth about the boundaries “blurring,” if not actually disappearing, 
between what Rodowick refers to as the “audiovisual culture”2 and an audiovisual regime, 
which may divert attention away from identifying the very presence of surveillance. 
 Hannah Arendt’s theory of action will weave a connecting thread throughout my 
thesis. I will demonstrate how perception is often achieved only through the type of “action” 
                                                 
1 See: David Lyon in: International Criminal Justice Review, “Surveillance, Security and Social Sorting: 
Emerging Research Priorities,” Vol. 17, 2007, 161.  “The ‘surveillance’ dimensions of (inter)national security 
arrangements have everything to do with ‘social sorting.’  That is, they are coded to categorize personal 
data such that people thus classified may be treated differently. . . . A lthough the category of ‘citizen’ is 
still used, for example in passports and IDs, this term is both broader and narrower than it at first appears. 
Even citizens with those ‘awkward’ aspects of identity may find themselves in a separate group from 
majority citizens. A nd some forms of identification relate as much to commercial as to conventionally 
state-generated criteria. Last, the ‘borders’ where they may be checked are digital. Actual checking occurs 
upstream of physical or territorial borders (in visa offices and consulates) as well as at those sites,”  
September 1, 2008, < http://icj.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/17/3/161>. 
 
2 Rodowick states on page 112 in his 1995 essay, “Audiovisual Culture and Interdisciplinary Knowledge*” that: 
“What I call the audiovisual is an important and global aspect of contemporary everyday life which, in 






    
discussed in her book, The Human Condition, (1958). Also vital to this thesis for framing my 
argument concerning the significant role that ideology plays in relation to surveillance and the 
audiovisual regime, is Arendt’s study of the Nazi and Stalinist regimes in The Origins of 
Totalitarianism, (1959). 
In Chapter One I examine the French film, Caché (Hidden). Made and set in 2005, this 
film takes place in the affluent suburbs of Paris, and deals with the effects of anonymous 
surveillance. The proliferation and digitisation of media is a background presence in this film. 
A deeper theme is whether or not there is a moral or intellectual “statute of limitations” on 
culpability and forgiveness.  Caché considers the choices people make when they think they 
are being watched, even if the observer is completely unknown. It is in this chapter that I will 
begin my discussion of alienation, distance, memory and most importantly, surveillance in 
relation to the conscience. 
Chapter Two discusses the American film, Minority Report (2002), which is set in the 
near future in Washington DC, and imagines the ability to observe and control the future by 
combining human perception with digital software technology. Adding to the notion of 
surveillance and the conscience, Minority Report also presents a post-September 11 debate on 
free will, shifting levels of determinism, and the freedom to make moral choices. Here the 
questions are asked: can we know what will happen through the use of surveillance, and will 
we or should we try to alter the future? This explores an important discussion of the idea of 
control: is it our place to prevent what we have determined will be future events? 
Chapter Three takes the discussion back to an era when surveillance was a daily 
reality and used without question to establish and maintain the totalitarian regime of East 
Berlin in the German Democratic Republic of 1984. Set in the waning days of the Cold War, 
the film Das Leben der Anderen / The Lives of Others, (2006) allows an historical treatment 
of surveillance from the point of view of the observer rather than the observed. It is in this 






    
for actions and relationships, rather than as the impetus behind the disconnection it seemed to 
cause in Caché and Minority Report. 
This thesis serves as the beginning of a particular discussion of surveillance and 
subjectivity by investigating what happens as a result of surveillance. Our interest in 
surveillance arises from our interest in the future: the way we behave and initiate action 
depends on how we “see the future.” To this extent, my discussion of surveillance is situated 
within a broader reflection or mode of perception and seeks to investigate how film, as an 





























Introduction: Caché 3(Hidden) and the Desubstantiation Project 
  
 Filmed in France, Caché was written and directed by Austrian filmmaker Michael 
Haneke. Given that it was filmed using entirely digital technology, it becomes necessary to 
look at Caché through the lens of digital culture. The very nature of the way it was filmed, 
where the distinction between the original and the copy has lost its relevance, I suggest calls 
for a new and more complete set of tools for dissecting meaning. David Rodowick, who 
approaches the study of film from a conceptual and philosophical point of view, employs the 
word “desubstantiation ”4 to describe a form of visual and phenomenological desensitisation 
brought about by the increasing disappearance of analogue forms of representation. The 
criterion of resemblance, he argues, is displaced by similitude. Perhaps this is why when 
watching the movie Caché, we often feel displaced. Something we see, which resembles 
something we expect or have known before, belongs to “an era of representation” which had 
previously derived its authority from something prior to it, an original (1995, 116).5  
According to the French theorist Michel Foucault, when resemblance based on the 
previous and familiar ordering of signs, or analogue forms of representation is replaced by 
similitude, the centrality of their designation has been lost.  How so? When the authority of 
the original is lost, so too is the model of authenticity from which rank and order stems (AC: 
                                                 
3 Caché. AU, FR, GR, IT, (2004). Dir. Michael Haneke won “Best Director Award” at the 2005 Cannes Film 
Festival for Caché. GB, USA, (2005). DVD, Madman Entertainment, Pty., 2005. 
4 David N. Rodowick, Reading the Figural or, Philosophy After New Media. Durham, London: Duke University 
Press, 2001. Subsequent referencing will take the form of RF, followed by the page number. 
5 David N. Rodowick, “Audiovisual Culture and Interdisciplinary Knowledge,” New Literary History. 26.1 1995, 






    
116).  By “similitude,” I am referring here to the technological transubstantiation of imagery, 
such as occurs in the case of photography. The French New Wave theorist, Jean Baudrillard, 
wrote of similitude in relation to photography (as well as other media, including holography) 




Consider the way the camera is used now. Its possibilities are no longer those 
of the subject who ‘reflects’ the world according to his personal vision; rather, 
they are the possibilities of the lens, as exploited by the object. The camera is 
thus a machine that vitiates all will, erases all intentionality and leaves nothing 
but the pure reflex needed to take pictures. Looking itself disappears without a 
trace, replaced by a lens now in collusion with the object - and hence with an 
inversion of vision. (56)6 
 
 
The discussion of representation crosses national, theoretical and epochal boundaries. In 1936 
the German philosopher and cultural theorist, Walter Benjamin, wrote about the new era of art 
and its mechanical reproduction7 ushered in by film in much the same vein. For Benjamin, 
however, that designated centrality and authority of the original was what he called the “aura” 
of the original, and his discussion was based on the possible effects on history and society as a 
whole should the importance placed on the aura be willingly let go of, and in turn, be lost 
completely. It can also be argued that the methods and techniques director Michael Haneke 
uses for creating what Catherine Wheatley refers to as a “meta-linguistic style”8, also work 
well as representing a current condition of our societal experience; the quotidian ‘mise-en-
abime’ of confusion that we are faced with in our own day-to-day reality, through the excess 
of digital and other media permeating our senses. 
                                                 
6 Jean Baudrillard: “The Transparency of Evil.” New York: Verso, 1993. 
 
7 Walter Benjamin: “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction:” (1936). Illuminations. Hannah 
Arendt, ed. NY: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1955. Subsequent referencing will take the form of WMR, 
followed by the page number. 
  






    
In Reading the Figural (2001),  Rodowick synthesizes the post-structuralism of 
Deleuze, Guattari  and Foucault, as he explains that there is a new merging of  “audiovisual 
culture and interdisciplinary knowledge,” placing emphasis on “how a new semiotic 
environment is being put in place by digital technologies in contrast to previous cultures” (RF: 
210). In order to adequately account for the layered motifs in Caché, I utilise Rodowick’s 
explanation as to how a “cybernetic society of control” can mask its true intentions and 
eventual outcomes by employing utopian discourse. Rodowick is most convincing when 
introducing future projects by linking them to a more familiar understanding of the present: 
“The representational aspects of digital culture, and indeed, every historical epoch may be 
confined by its own particular audiovisual regime, that is, a configuration of the expressible in 
relation to the visible as a way of organising knowledge in relation to power” (RF: 254). 
Both Benjamin and Rodowick look at some of the complex and contradictory ways in 
which we are individually and collectively affected by the increasingly technological and 
mediated restructuring of our contemporary conceptions of time, space and memories. As 
analogue forms of representation steadily decrease, their replacement is overtaken by the 
increase of digital representation. This begins my argument for defining a “surveillance film 
genre” within what has become not only our predominantly audiovisual culture, but more 
importantly, defining how surveillance is now an integral part of our particular audiovisual 
regime.  
There is a distinct difference in meaning between “culture” and “regime.” Culture in 
this case speaks of “distinctive customs, achievements, products, outlooks and the way of life 
of a society or group,” whereas a regime is better described as indicating “a system of rule or 
government,” and “an institution having widespread influence or prevalence.”9  Caché takes 
us from the analogue regime and progresses us to the digital, bringing us to the very tipping 
                                                 
 
9 The definition of “culture” is from the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principals, fifth edition, 
vol. 1, A-M, 575. The word “regime” as defined in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical 






    
point of what happens when visual culture and visual regime blend together and become 
indistinguishable. Video tapes, memories, dreams, television news broadcasts, even a camera 
man taping an onscreen television talk show within the movie, all flow into play on the same 
visual plane, cinematically mirroring our real life immersion in the daily media barrage. 
Ironically, this familiar condition of media “overkill” is played out in several parts of the film 
and is in part what fosters some sense of audience empathy for the characters.  
In this chapter of my thesis, I will explore what happens when that which is embedded 
in the central location of memory, dreams and most importantly in our conscience, becomes 
threatened by the introduction of surveillance. In Caché, the reality of what was hidden is 
revealed, yet rather than being properly recognised, this reality returns to its original hiding 
place where it will remain hidden and thus unresolved. Thus surveillance forces the way we 
look at things to become dislodged. I now wish to discuss how the regime of surveillance is 
linked specifically to the dominance of the digital code. 
 
“A Shift in Aesthetic Function”10 
The three main characters in the story of Caché are members of the financially 
comfortable Laurent family. Georges, (Daniel Auteuil) an intellectual celebrity, is the host of 
a public television talk show that features guests from the European literati, who, gathered at a 
symbolic round table, exchange witty and cleverly edited theoretical repartee. Georges’ wife, 
Anne, (Juliette Binoche) is characterised as being somewhat beleaguered. She is a book 
publisher who works for a company run by their family friend, Pierre (Daniel Duval), who 
seems happily married to Mathilde (Nathalie Richard). The two couples are friends, and often 
socialise, although it is Anne who uses Pierre’s shoulder to cry on far more than her 
husband’s. Pierre’s wife is the ideal, understanding friend and partner. Together, Georges and 
Anne have a twelve-year-old son named Pierrot (Lester Makedonsky), a name which we later 
                                                 
 






    
deduce may have been construed as a pun on the friend’s name of Pierre. Young Pierrot has a 
personality that shifts between that of a moody prepubescent loner and a little boy who still 
kisses his parents goodnight before bed.   
We come to notice that there is an excessive proliferation of books decorating and 
almost padding many of the interior shots in this movie, and clearly, there are far too many for 
even a life-time of reading. Outside, the street where the Laurent family resides is featured in 
the opening shot and is aptly called, ‘Rue des Iris’, a name that evokes the physiological iris 
in the eye, the camera iris, and connects to looking, the underlying theme coupled with 




 The opening shot of Caché is a static view of the Laurents' home.11 
 
 In the opening scene, film credits are silently typed in white over a long shot of an 
exterior view of morning in a quiet, leafy neighbourhood located on a well-maintained 
residential street dotted with tidy flower boxes. We can judge from the neighbourhood’s 
appearances that the residents of this street have achieved a high level of financial success. 
The shot is held unnaturally still and for so long that at first, it appears to be a still frame until 
                                                 
11 All movie still photographs contained in this thesis are courtesy of Sony Pictures Classics. All other 






    
at last we hear some birds chirping and notice leaves rustling in the distance. Somehow 
experiencing these normal sights and sounds brings to the spectator a feeling of relief.  
When the credits are finally completed, they vanish, but the camera remains static and 
we are allowed only a minimal amount of visual activity onscreen as we watch a bicyclist ride 
past and a woman leaving her home and getting into one of the parked cars. What are we 
meant to be waiting for? Our anticipation builds, but there continues to be no resolution, such 
as having a car explode, and we still feel as though we are waiting for something to happen. 
According to our cinematic foreknowledge, the inner clock internalised for setting our 
attention span to read properly the Classic Hollywood narrative, we feel that something 
should have happened by now to indicate the film’s genre. 
 While we are still mesmerised and focused on the same scene, our transparent 
perceptual bubble is burst rather abruptly and an unexpected hermeneutic layer is revealed 
when an off-screen male voice interjects asking: “Well?” And a woman answers, “Nothing.” 
The voices seem to be in the same predicament as the audience, wondering why they too are 
staring at an uneventful scene. 
What happens next is indicative of how the entire movie operates. A closer shot 
immediately brings our gaze to a door, and we watch a man and woman leave yet from the 
spectator’s perception the shot “feels” unbroken from the almost static opening scene. In this 
particular shot, however, it is nearly night-time, and the camera unleashes itself from the 
moorings of the still shot, tracking the man as he crosses the street. He appears to be curiously 
looking around for something, but when the woman’s voice we had heard previously calls out 
for him to come back inside, he returns to the door where the woman is waiting and both of 
them go back inside.  
We are returned to the opening shot. Again, no perceptible break is discerned when 
now minus the credits, we experience the jiggled, white, mediated lines scratching across the 






    
of non-diegetic dialogue, is Haneke’s way of informing the audience that we have 
transcended the place of our spectatorship and have been magically watching along with the 
Georges and Anne the first of several surveillance video tapes, in which their lives appear to 
be the object of surveillance. 
Through ensuing dialogue between the characters of Georges and Anne (now filmed 
in a classic conversational diegetic style), we learn that this and subsequent video tapes have 
been mysteriously filmed from seemingly impossible angles, delivered to their home 
anonymously, and with no accompanying note of explanation or demands. Through their 
initial verbal exchange, we are also given a glimpse of an undercurrent of dissatisfaction 
between the two, perhaps the result of the everyday tension and stresses felt by the career 
driven upper middle class couple. These are typical of the moments of bracketed “normalcy” 
that Haneke allows throughout the film. 
This way of involuntarily steering our senses from the position of semi-passive viewer 
to one of becoming an active participant in some intra-diegetic moment is an unsettling 
experience, one that is quite different from sitting safely and physically distanced from the 
movie screen, enjoying a story unfold on film. Although the audience eventually 
comprehends the situation, Haneke pressures the viewer to contemplate the origin of control 
in the production of the image being both shown to us and viewed by them. In this sense, by 
continuing to share a mood of seeming “directorial alienation” with his audience, he briefly 
relinquishes a certain degree of his own directorial control over the film and exposes the 
artifice. 
We can sense that part of Georges’ unsettling discomfort, however, stems from being 
out of control. Although he is regularly on TV, the medium is under his control, as the show 
is planned, taped and edited completely by his choice and he is, of course, paid to be in 
control. The video tapes that arrive at his house do not contain any lurid, incriminating acts 






    
their dilemma, such as paying off a blackmailer. Instead, the less the tapes reveal, the more 
the characters reveal themselves, but the parts that they reveal are unexpected, even for them. 
The lack of control stems from the inability to determine the source of the videotapes or the 
surveillant behind the camera, leaving Georges and the of the Laurent family rudderless, not 
only in terms of how to react to such a mysterious situation, but also who to blame. 
Haneke’s opening sequence in Caché highlights several important themes for the 
audience to consider, not the least of which is how short our attention span has become after 
years of watching television and films. Temporally and visually the first shot is atypically 
long, as three minutes are taken up by white lettered credits typed one by one across the 
screen. Another two minutes go by after the credits fade until we finally hear human voices. 
By the fourth minute, a tension that has been building from our impatience begins to produce 
potential situations in our imagination that might occur onscreen. Sensing that something was 
missing, I myself wondered if the visual stillness was an ominous foreshadowing, and began 
to brace myself for one of the cars parked on the street to explode from a terrorist’s car bomb. 
An explosion however, is not the surprise that Haneke produces for the audience. 
The surveillance camera is already introduced into the film before we are aware of it, 
but we are not visually informed until after the credits fade from the screen, when we finally 
learn only by listening to a non-diegetic conversation introduced through voiceover. Through 
this disconcerting (and sense dislodging) method, we discover that the family’s home has 
been surreptitiously videotaped by an impossibly (or invisibly) positioned camera across the 
street. What we, the heretofore uninitiated audience have been watching (along with Georges 
and Anne) for the first five minutes, is actually a videotape of their home, which has been 








    
Defining surveillance: “Distance is the opposite of closeness.”12 
Historically, the first “surveillance” photograph ever taken was in fact produced in 
1839 by the French inventor of photography, Louis Daguerre. Shown below is a mid-day 
street scene of Paris, but the photograph shows very little human activity, because the length 
of exposure needed in those days “erased” their movements as they were too quick to be 
recorded. Here we see only one man, shown on the left in an enlarged inset, who had 
apparently stopped long enough to have his shoes shined and therefore his image recorded. 
The distance needed to take in the scope of the street is such that it is doubtful anyone would 
have known that they were being photographed at the time the picture was taken. The 
physical impossibility of being able to see the camera or the photographer would have to be 
replaced by prior knowledge given to the subject, because without that knowledge, the 






An aerial photograph of a supposedly empty Paris street taken in 1839 by Louis Daguerre.  
See magnified inset on left side. Copyright, Paul Baumann, 2001. 
 
 
                                                 






    
To refer to being “under surveillance” is repetitious, according to the Shorter Oxford’s 
English Dictionary, as the definition of the word which is French in origin, comes from 
surveiller; “sur,” meaning over and above, and “veille” meaning: “watch or wakefulness,” 
which originated previously from the Latin, vigilare; “keep watch” (3126).   
Amongst many variations, the form of surveillance that I am looking at in Caché 
insists that the subject be unaware at the time that they are being watched, and by whom. To 
go even further in defining surveillance it is helpful to designate what is not surveillance. 
Even if the subject of another person’s gaze is unaware of being watched — such as the man 
in the above photo having his shoes shined — this act of one person knowing (the person who 
is looking), and the other person not knowing, I categorise as a form of voyeurism because 
there is still a pair of human eyes watching the subject.  
Only in the case of surveillance is it completely unnecessary for another human being 
to be present to watch someone. I consider this to be a principal of mechanical surveillance.  
Examples of this are innumerable when one considers the proliferation of CCTV13 cameras 
operating continuously in public and urban spaces worldwide. An unmanned camera 
recording another person for reasons unknown, where one would reasonably assume that there 
is no realistic justification for any state, corporate, or even private security cameras to be 
present, and without that person’s knowledge or consent is the unsettling type of mechanistic 
surveillance regime that is invisible and yet prescient in Caché. 
The central subtext in Caché is how the characters react after they watch the tapes that 
have been delivered to their home. In fact, the fuel that drives the engine of the film is derived 
almost entirely from their reactions. In the very beginning of Caché, when Georges and Anne 
first become aware that they are under some kind of surveillance through the videotape left 
anonymously at their door, we watch as their perceptions slowly begin to shift. Once the 
audience is made aware shortly thereafter, we notice our own perceptions shifting as well, 
                                                 







    
because, as the concept of Bentham’s panopticon14 presupposes, the characters and the 
audience will react in kind to the existence of an invisible surveillance system. We assume, as 
they assume, that they are possibly under surveillance at all times, and so our reaction as 
viewers is to become hyperaware of the mise-en-scene in the film as we try to determine the 
origin (solve the mystery) of the surveillance tapes.  
One of the most significant responses by the family to the situation is that rather than 
drawing closer together in a protective family mode, they begin to experience an increasing 
distance from each other, and then take steps to exacerbate it. This peculiar reaction of the 
family distancing themselves from one another is both brilliant and disturbing in its 
articulation of a disconnection brought on by the knowledge of being under surveillance. I 
find in this distancing a strong comment on how Haneke views a societal reaction to living 
under constant surveillance as well. It does not bring us closer together to know that we are 
being watched: it seems to drive us apart. 
Haneke also interpolates real television news images, loudly blaring in the mid-ground, 
with Georges’ memories, interfacing them intermittently throughout the course of the film’s 
narrative streams. These function to construct what Walter Benjamin described as a 
“dialectical image,” in other words, coming to the present through the past. This is again 
demonstrated when images of urgent political immediacy commingle quite freely with some 
of the characters that seem to be placed in order to represent the colonial past, present and 
future of France and the Franco-Algerian population within the film. The character of Majid 
(Maurice Bénechou), illustrates the lower-class life-style of the now middle-aged children of 
the original French-Algerian immigrant. A scene containing an angry confrontation between 
                                                 
 
 
14 Jeremy Bentham. Panopticon, or the Inspection House, Preface. Dublin, (1791). In his own words from the 
preface, Bentham described the Panopticon as “a new mode of obtaining power of mind over mind, in a quantity 
hitherto without example.” Bentham designed the Panopticon as a type of prison building in the late eighteenth 
century. The concept of the design is to allow an observer to observe (-opticon) all (pan-) prisoners without the 







    
Georges and a young French-Algerian bicyclist represents the barely controlled, seething 
hostility within the black and white population of present-day France. The tenaciously 
assertive character of Majid’s son (Walid Afkir), symbolizes a problem that will not easily 
disappear. Each represents recent historical time-frames throughout France’s actual past, 
present and future, punctuated by additional hints of the outcomes (consequences) of actions 
taken within these timeframes, featured on the television news clips. This technique also 
illustrates how we are conditioned to media noise in the background of our own lives, and that 
we allow it to distance us from what is important in our lives. 




Georges and a Franco-Algerian bicyclist have an angry confrontation over right of way on a Parisian 
street. 
 
In Caché, the annoying background distraction of the television news din is in part 
what urges us to seek refuge, by separating and delineating the analogous representation from 
the digital reproduction being used to distance us from what is important in the film. Haneke 
manages to include his viewers to the point of making them complicit in the transpiring 
events, in part by including the transmission of images which inform our collective 
conscience. If this is how the viewer reacts, we can assume that the characters in the movie 
will feel the same. Or at the very least, in our most basic reaction and understanding, the 






    
they are being watched. It is all a matter of perception, in other words, now that they have it in 
their minds that there is the possibility of being under surveillance. It becomes a significant 
distraction in their lives as their perceptual and intellectual boundaries blend between the real 
— “here is a tape, real proof we are being watched,” and the unreal — “I imagine myself 
being watched.” 
When the real and the unreal cross our perceptual boundaries, the effect can be likened 
to mixing paint; two colours combine to make a third. The physical introduction of the video 
tapes arriving, and the perceptual knowledge that a disembodied “Other” is observing them 
and bearing witness to their lives, combine to create the third reaction of Georges, Anne, and 
even Pierrot. Now the observed are compelled to look within their own lives, at certain 
uncomfortable aspects of their existence which up until that point, have been hidden. 
 
Interiority and Exteriority, “The unique phenomenon of a distance, however close it 
may be.”15 
 
Interior and exterior imagery mixing and interchanging throughout the film is another 
common theme and style of visuality in Caché. Haneke’s exclusive use the HDV16 camera in 
the filming of Caché  records and produces all of its images in perfectly reproducible pixels, 
and seems to bear much of the responsibility for this new, disquieting version of the unknown 
and potentially terrifying sense of the indiscernible. Here digital technology erases the 
outlines of difference, so there are no longer the visible folds in our map of indexical signals 
to alert our senses to differentiations between our visual, temporal and technically mediated 
planes. 
Furthering my argument as to why this film is worth discussing is Haneke’s use of last 
century’s distanciation techniques, some of which originated in theatre, and are combined  
here with twenty-first century contemporary digital technology. The HDV version of Caché, 
                                                 
15 Walter Benjamin, WMR: 224-225. 
 






    
meaning the “film” where there is no film present, “the work of art” in this case, has traveled 
beyond Benjamin’s concept of mechanical reproduction to the point of being virtually and 
thus infinitely exactly reproducible. The idea of digital reproduction has at times been almost 
vilified by Baudrillard,17 because of his concern over what the loss of the image’s basic 
referent means to our visual culture, and therefore the impact it may have to our wider, over-
all cultural experiences. Baudrillard explains: 
 
 
The same can be said about synthesized and digital images, images that are 
pure creations, with no real reference, and from where the negative itself 
has disappeared - we are not only talking about the negative of the 
photograph but about the negative moment at the core of the image, an 
absence that makes the image vibrate. A digital image is technically perfect. 
There is no room there for fuzziness, no tremor either, or any space left for 
chance. Is it still an image then? (2005) 
 
 
And yet, the process within the HDV camera is only another light registering medium, albeit 
photons expressed through pixels rather than chemicals. But it is not the lack of photo-
chemistry that disturbs Baudrillard; it is the ease of reproduction, and the potential for infinite 
reproduction that is difficult to comprehend not only as a mathematical construct, but also 
because it calls into question the use-value of the image. 
 Once digital imaging became a technological reality, analogue imaging has been 
displaced to make way for a shift in aesthetic function. In 2001, Rodowick's theory of 
desubstantiation regards digital representational forms as being “levelled to the algorithmic 
manipulations of binary code,” rendering the changing properties of semiotics, wherein “all 
space becomes an abstract computational space.” He calls this the “insubstantial image” (RF: 
255). How can true recognition take place when the image is insubstantial?  
                                                 
 
17 Jean Baudrillard. “Violence of the Virtual and Integral Reality.” Vol. 2, no. 2: (July, 2005). From the original 
text of a paper given at the “Light Onwords / Light Onwards: Living Literacies Conference.” York University, 






    
In 1936, Benjamin’s discussion on the “loss of the aura” from mechanical 
reproduction relates to another version of “value,” and that is the origin and history of a single 
image, and how the making of many reduces the value of the original. Beyond not only the 
reproduction of one to many, but the production of many different images, in the case of film 
for instance, where so much imagery is laid out for the spectator by the film maker, the 
imagination of the spectator is in many ways simply replaced by the film maker’s vision. 
Furthermore, the speed in which the imagery passes by leaves little time for any meaningful 
absorption by the mind or the mind’s eye. Benjamin: “Let us compare the screen on which a 
film unfolds with the canvas of a painting. The painting invites the spectator to contemplation; 
before the movie frame he cannot do so.”    
Rodowick speaks about digital culture in a similar fashion, “with respect to the digital 
creation, manipulation and distribution of signs,” he says that representation can no longer be 
measured using the equivalence of space, because reading and writing have become 
“graphical, temporal and non-linear” (RF: 254). Sixty-five years before Rodowick, Benjamin 
was saying much the same thing: “No sooner has the eye grasped a scene than it has already 
changed, it cannot be arrested” (WMR: 240). When Benjamin quotes the prolific French 
writer Georges Duhamel18 as saying: “I can no longer think what I want to think. My thoughts 
have been replaced by moving images,” the words convey to us now a familiar angst. Haneke 
asks us to consider this: if we have grown accustomed to living lives in which time is being 
falsified, and images are being desubstantiated, what affect is this having on our perception of 
other events in our lives? 
Benjamin’s and Rodowick’s conceptualising of the fast moving stream of images in 
comparison to the static canvas painting can be linked with ideas in the works of Paul Virilio. 
A French writer and theorist, Virilio’s anxiety about what appears to be a general “speeding 
                                                 
 
18 Georges Duhamel. Scènes de la vie future, Paris: (1930), 52. Duhamel was born in Paris in 1884, and died in 
1966. He was the editor of the literary journal, Mercure de France from 1935 to 1938, and also in 1935, was 






    
up” of society, in part stems from the instantaneity of digital image reproduction and its lack 
of physicality, thus endowing the image with an ability to leap over temporal and cultural 
borders without impediment, which is another description of the disturbance Haneke causes in 
Caché.  
Virilio writes in his essay, “Speed and Information: Cyberspace Alarm,”19 that we are 
now experiencing what he refers to as a: “fundamental loss of orientation,” whereby: 
 
            Cyberspace is a new form of perspective. It does not coincide with the 
audio-visual perspective which we already know. It is a fully new 
perspective, free of any previous reference: it is a tactile perspective. To 
see at a distance, to hear at a distance: that was the essence of the audio-
visual perspective of old. But to reach at a distance, to feel at a distance, 
that amounts to shifting the perspective towards a domain it did not yet 
encompass: that of contact, of contact-at-a-distance: tele-contact. . . . For 
the first time, history is going to unfold within a one-time-system: global 
time. Up to now, history has taken place within local times, local frames, 
regions and nations. . . . If history is so rich, it is because it was local, it 
was thanks to the existence of spatially bounded times which overrode 
something that up to now occurred only in astronomy: universal time. But 
in the very near future, our history will happen in universal time, itself the 
outcome of instantaneity - and there only. (1995) 
 
It appears that Benjamin from the modern era and the post-modernists Paul Virilio and Jean 
Baudrillard all agree that certain technological changes produce an effect on society, and that 
media technology in particular is capable of erasing the uniqueness and individuality required 
for making art. Benjamin’s “fast moving images” — typical of the “film montage” technique 
for moving a story forward by visually skipping sections of events taking place, is what 
causes this conceptually speeded-up, and thus falsified time. 
                                                 
 









    
Rodowick’s stance from a new media perspective is more concerned with creating 
concepts that can make intelligible links and relations from the present to the future. 
Synthesizing Deleuze and Foucault, he observes that “each age articulates perfectly the most 
cyclical element of its politics” (RF: 25). This is precisely what happens in Caché, when 
Haneke presents us with past and present French and Algerian politics that threaten to unravel 
the tightly woven lives of the film’s characters. Someone from Georges’ past seems to appear 
out of nowhere, only because Georges has avoided recognising the existence of this person for 
so long that his childish method of “ignoring it until it goes away” fails miserably. This works 
in complete parallel with France’s earlier method of importing cheap labour from French 
Algiers by the thousands in the 1940’s and 1950’s only to ignore their later progeny and 
despair that the problems created by the importation of migrant labour would not simply 
disappear. 
     Furthermore, there is a concern with distance. Benjamin’s concern also notes that 
although the arrival of film meant a larger collective audience was able to experience what 
only a few had before, the problem became that the audience could not engage with the actors 
in the same  way as one can when seeing a live play in the theatre. This concern in Baudrillard 
and Virilio become concerns of ever greater distance — the digital or cyber distance — 
further removed than ever from the analogue referent. However, I argue that what Haneke 
manages to achieve through this combination of elements is to bridge the artistic, 
technological and theoretical components between Caché and our public reception and 
perception of surveillance. I contend that by spanning the portrayal of surveillance 
(conceptually) from the public sphere of politics into the private life-worlds of the Laurents, 









    
Visual Culture: Our Relationship with Images 
In Part III of Benjamin’s essay, he speaks of how and why art — in this case, film as 
moving pictures — reflects the world’s different technologies, socioeconomic and cultural 
systems within an historical context: 
 
During long periods of history, the mode of human sense perception changes 
with humanity’s entire mode of existence. . . The conditions for an analogous 
insight are more favourable in the present. And if changes in the medium of 
contemporary perception can be comprehended as decay of the aura, it is 
possible to show its social causes. (WMR: 224) 
 
 
Continuing with Benjamin’s theory, when, in 1936, he was speaking of photography and the 
advent of film, his references to changes in the medium that include devices such as the cut 
and use of montage, illustrate that the “decay of the aura” is a process that arguably continues 
with the arrival of the digital camera replacing the analogue (celluloid) film camera in recent 
movie making. It is the very use of the digital camera however, that allows Haneke the 
directorial control and creative freedom to achieve many of the effects of the visual  
contradictions striated and embedded throughout the film.  
Digital visual technology has arrived and flourished without any specific invitation 
from the audience, and Haneke expresses some of its darker possibilities in Caché. Without 
the conventional cinematic warnings of typical genre iconography, we are therefore also 
without foreknowledge, and so we cannot freely give our “consent,” as we become Haneke’s 
manipulated viewer and unwitting participant in a universe of seamless surveillance. As 
slippery as the move may seem, the very technology we have unwittingly grown accustomed 
to throughout contemporary visual culture is used to drive home the points that Haneke is 
trying to make.  
 Our attention is drawn by the distraction of a variety of mismatched yet seamlessly 






    
the possibility exists that someone or something is constantly watching. If we as spectators 
sense this, how do the characters themselves react? There is a point in the film when the 
intensity of Georges’ onscreen physical reactions becomes noticeably paranoid. He appears to 
have developed a feeling similar to being haunted, but only in the most private and 
supposedly impenetrable places within his mind, in his memories and dreams. The physicality 
of his character is foregrounded when the technology is in danger of becoming too seamless, 
or visually slick. Haneke switches our gaze to the character’s physical reaction, from pictorial 
digital “flits” (representing memories or dreams) to physical (perspiring, laboured breathing) 
which I would argue symbolise “analogue” fits. Haneke is using Georges’ body as the 
physical referent to the real. 
Because Haneke’s economical style of shooting makes the real and the unreal look the 
same, it causes a relief to both the spectator and Georges to be shocked into the present by his 
intensely vivid nightmares. Indicated by his flushed face, his panting and profuse sweating 
upon awakening, his subconscious memories cause the same physical reactions present in the 
“fight-or-flight” mode. Bringing the audience back to a physically oriented reality allows 
them the hope of reconnecting with a more familiar mode of understanding the narrative. 
The narrative labyrinth laid out before us by Haneke in a variety of dead-end pathways, 
however, does not allow us to arrive at an end because there is no definitive conclusion to the 
story. This ambiguity is another “clue” that the foregrounded story is not the most significant 
cog in the machinery of the film. Haneke’s direction of Caché defines and confounds the 
experience of viewing it because his approach to the audience does not come as an invitation 
to “solve the mystery,” although we may try to play detective at first by looking for clues to 
determine the culprit behind the camera. By the end of the film we can however, acknowledge 
the freedom that we have to look at the film from different, albeit often disconnected angles, 






    
The challenge of locating and defining the attached and the detached amongst the 
different levels of surveillance in this movie is like trying to establish the definition of what 
constitutes truth. Examination of some of the ubiquitous and ethereal aspects of surveillance 
may be difficult, so it is important to determine how the differing levels of surveillance are 
portrayed in Caché. Also, it does not matter where we situate our perceptions of surveillance, 
because what is at stake is the common thread running through the different forms of 
surveillance, and that is the control of others. Whether seen or unseen, control of others means 
having some form of power over others. Whether that power is real or imagined, like the aura 
of the original, the perception of its existence is there to be reckoned with. 
Watching Caché subtly induces a pervasive phenomenological discomfort that seeps 
throughout the senses of the viewer, in large part from the equivocacy of the mise-en-scène 
and the ambiguity about the source of the surveillance. But what exactly is it that causes our 
discomfort? Haneke creates a situation within the first shot by putting us in the uncomfortable 
role of hyper-vigilance; the state of being unblinkingly conscious of the camera’s position, 
forced to inwardly question the potential of differing and shifting perspectives in every visible 
moment of the movie. Here is the twist; that potential car bomb in the beginning never 
materializes, and whatever we begin to suspect of a conventional narrative movie never takes 
place.  
“The shock,” says Mattias Frey, in an essay written on Haneke in 2006,20 “is 
ontological rather than graphically violent” (32-33). Because Caché is shot in its entirety 
using the HDV camera, it becomes central to my argument about how feeling the permeation 
of surveillance is created; not so much “portrayed,” as are other aspects of the film, but how 
this “feeling” of  the location of surveillance can be an interior experience as much as an 
exterior positioning of it. After further examination of this “ontological shock” in the same 
                                                 
20 Mattias Frey. “Benny’s Video, Caché, and the Desubstantiated Image.” Framework: The Journal of Cinema & 






    
essay, Frey positions this concept referencing our “new relationships to images.” He 
paraphrases Rodowick: 
 
               Because of the consistency in medium it is always, initially at least, 
impossible to differentiate between the various perspectival niveaus, whether 
TV, home video surveillance tape, or Haneke's film Caché itself. Thus, in 
this film, destabilization of the spectator is in fact created by the consistency 
of medium and one might venture, the new mode of perception of the viewer 
in 2005 grown accustomed to a new relationship to the image (Frey, 34).  
 
Touching briefly here on Rodowick’s theory of desubstantiation helps to explain one of the 
more disturbing yet engrossing aspects of viewing Caché, a negative side-effect of 
experiencing an absence — not necessarily and not only of the real — but more so, the 
connective seams between what is supposed to be “real” and the dream, memory and unreal, 
all of which seem to be undone by the desubstantiation of images. 
The “new mode of perception” reaches beyond just a different way of viewing the 
image however, as the narrative conventions we may have previously absorbed and 
selectively naturalised into our unconscious for linking typical plot-lines also seem to 
unnervingly cancel each other out. The standard methods used for deciphering cinematic 
meanings on the basis of previous experiences do not engage cleanly enough to connect or 
disconnect our spatial sense of here from there, and so we begin to lose what were once 
reliable means of arriving at temporal comprehension, or simply discerning “then” from 
“now.” Put another way, the phenomenon of seamless consistency in digital media causes a 
dislodging of the senses. Frey continues: 
 
In particular, Rodowick foregrounds the “transformation of the orientation of 
the eye” (2001) as an important effect of desubstantiation. In other words, in 
an age when the digital photograph has lost its direct indexicality and has 









    
Much of the mystery and intrigue that is sensed throughout the story originated in large part 
from the vague feeling of instability in Haneke’s technique of shooting the film, and from the 
apparatus he chooses for filming. The driver behind the visual enigma in Caché is the HDV 
camera, a purely digital tool, and not only because of the certain conflated, indistinguishable 
look of the images it creates, but also because of the unbreakable connection that digital 
audiovisual  technology now has with contemporary society, and this, I maintain, is a fact that 
cannot be overstated.  
Could this connection be at least in part responsible for the “new relationship to all 
images” that Rodowick speaks of and that Haneke so artfully employs? Regardless of the 
answer, it is beyond irony that digital technology is also unarguably behind the virus-like 
spread of the visual and audio surveillance devices that increasingly permeate our social, 
political, and economic lives. The way Caché is brought to the screen, and therefore to our 
attention, may be one of the key elements in establishing a visual taxonomy for the 
surveillance film genre.  
In this case, I would say that the invisibility, seamlessness and ubiquity of being 
observed (and being the observer) throughout this film help not only to create our relationship 
to the images, but also to classify the film within this genre. If, as some genre theorists believe, 
genres, like myths,21 are the means by which a society can work through some of the changes 
and dilemmas inherent in being a society, then the way that Caché portrays the intrusion of 
anonymous surveillance as a fact of life — albeit a disturbing one — dropped in the lap of the 
Laurent family, may be signaling a shift in our point of view. How so? By shifting our point 
of view from one that originated in audiovisual culture, such as simply watching television or 
enjoying a film, to one that is steadily changing to that of an audiovisual regime, such as 
                                                 
21 See Will Wright, Six Guns and Society, a Structural Study of the Western. Berkley: University of California 
Press. “[T]he Western, like any myth, stands between individual human consciousness and society. If a myth is 
popular, it must somehow appeal to or reinforce the individuals who view it by communicating a symbolic 
meaning to them. This meaning must, in turn, reflect the particular social institutions and attitudes that have 








    
being watched on CCTV by state employed observers, within what is becoming a surveillance 
society. 
 
Hidden Behind Cinematic Deviations 
The surveillance camera as icon is removed, but the results of the observation remain. 
There is not a single public or private security or surveillance camera, nor placement of any 
ultra high-tech spying devices in the entire movie that we are made aware of, which is oddly 
intriguing. We know there must be a surveillance device somewhere because of the existence 
of the videotapes in Caché, and since the film is set in contemporary urban Paris, the absence 
of these techno-cultural signifiers in itself is quite striking. Nor are we are ever given a scrap 
of information or explanation as to why or how a camera is filming the Laurent’s house, and it 
is difficult to make sense of how Georges or we, for that matter, could possibly miss the 
presence of a real camera located only metres away from where Haneke has placed it, hanging 
just above Georges’ car. Like an ode to the increasing practice of “photoshopping,” whereby 
one simply digitally removes or replaces parts of a picture at will, it is as if Haneke digitally 
erases the existence of the surveillance camera from the movie, yet what he leaves behind are 
the images it produces. And so, although there is a sense that something is missing, it is 
disconcertingly difficult to detect what it is, simply by the very fact that it is not there. 
So too is the feeling of slight imbalance we experience from the missing narrative 
filmic clues in the beginning sequence. Absent are the typical cinematic deviations that 
foreshadow time and place sequences; for example, switching to a grainy resolution in the 
film stock which is a common and almost classic signaling for the introduction of a 
surveillance video camera as the point of view.  Only through Haneke’s dedicated use of 
digital cinematography are these visual connections made or not made, in the mise-en-scène, 
from the past to the present, from real to unreal. Therefore, through this technique, and in 






    
deploys the imagery, illustrate both the societal and sensory side affects of living with our 
massive, and ever-increasing proliferation of mediated digital images.  
Haneke’s treatment of surveillance is unique, and quite outside of the conventional 
norm of Hollywood’s recent techno-fantasy oriented “action thrillers” based on seemingly 
predictive surveillance technology.  This is because Haneke prefers not to glamorise 
technology or valorise the spectacle of violence, a technique that the use of surveillance in 
cinema often seems to fuel, as John. S. Turner II22 argues: 
 
 
By converting the technologies and practices of surveillance into highly 
seductive cinematic images, images that border on fetishisation of such 
technologies and practices, popular cinema effectively frames an uncritical 
celebration of panopticism. . . Interestingly, when films use different 
surveillance technologies as part of the narrative substance of the films 
diegesis, this usually serves as a prelude to violence. In this manner, a 
surveilling episode is more often than not framed as a “suspense mechanism” 





Georges Laurent, thetelevision talk-show host is at ease in his role, where he is literally in control as he 
“calls the shots." Note the false book props in the background that also echo his home décor.              
 
                                                 
 
22 John S. Turner II. “Collapsing the Interior / Exterior Distinction: Surveillance, Spectacle, and Suspense in 









    
In contrast to this convention, surveillance is presented by Haneke as a conceptual process 
existing within all levels of human perception, including the innermost part of us which may 
be “hidden” from others but never leaves us — our conscience. In Caché, the invisible 
surveillance camera, and the anonymously delivered videotapes portraying an innocuous view 
of the outside (the external), the front of the Laurents’ home, are the mechanical instruments 







Haneke places the audience as looking over the characters shoulders, as he simultaneously shows the 
distance between Anne and Georges in his placement of the characters, physically and visually. 
 
By locating the spectators’ point of view behind so many onscreen props and objects, 
Haneke employs the cinematic technique of “distanciation”23 in the direction and shooting 
style when filming Caché. This way, Haneke also brings us into the wobbly situation of trying 
to control physically the rapid shifting of our gaze to align with our attempts to comprehend 
what is happening. We are placed behind the surveillance camera, the director’s camera, the 
eyes of Georges, and the furniture. Even the visual glimpses from what we gather might be 
the characters’ subconscious mind or memory are never resting long enough to create a firm 
                                                 
23 Paraphrasing Susan Hayward in Cinema Studies: The Key Concepts Third Edition. London, New York: 
Routledge, 2000. It was Bertolt Brecht who first coined the term “distanciation” (as in distancing) in relation to 
his own theatre productions in the 1920’s. He based it on the Soviet cinema / school’s principle of alienation.  By 
distancing the audience and “denormalising” theatre, Brecht, and others since him, hoped to influentially 






    
connection, let alone allow a single, definitive narrative trajectory to take hold or lead us to 
any natural conclusions. 
 
The Broken Hermeneutic Circle: Distanciation, Majid, and the “Long Take” 
In his article, “Haneke, the Long Take, Realism,”24 John David Rhodes quotes André 
Bazin’s views on what the use of cinematic long takes achieves: 
 
 
The long take, in André Bazin’s famous terms, performs a variety of labours, 
among them this one: a forcing of spectators to assume a more active role in 
interpreting the representation of reality before them. No longer are spectators 
guided by the close up, the edit, the montage sequence; instead they are 
“forced to discern . . .”25 Oddly, this same foisting of an ethical-hermeneutic 
project squarely onto the shoulders of the viewers which is affected by the 
long take (and deep focus), also delays the same activity. 
 
 
Many of the techniques of film distanciation such as non-diegetic inserts, characters speaking 
off screen and unmatched shots inserted into the mise-en scène, are employed by Haneke to 
distance the audience. Throughout Caché, however, this distancing is achieved predominantly 
by his paradoxical urging us to scrutinise his images far more closely than we were expecting 
to, especially when he brackets the entire film within two long-take shots, one at the 
beginning and again at the end. We feel that we are meant to discover something pivotal in 
each of these scenes, only because of the distance and the unusual length of time that the 
camera, and therefore our gaze are allowed to linger on them. We are the surveillant of each 
moment and somehow by watching these scenes we conclude that we are meant to gain 
insight. Is this how we justify surveillance in our everyday lives as well? Haneke asks the 
question, but does not answer it.  
                                                 
 
24 Framework: The Journal of Cinema and Media, 2006, 17-21. 
 








    
When one of the video tapes shows the camera’s point of view from behind a car 
windscreen driving in the rain to the family’s estate where Georges grew up and his mother 
still lives, again we’re not sure if we are watching the movie or a videotape being played 
within the movie. Nevertheless, this onscreen action carries us forward to the bedside of 
Georges’ mother who still lives in the family home. This brings us to the film’s introductory 
discussion of the character Majid26 from Georges’ childhood, an Algerian boy not much older 
than Georges.  Originally, Majid was the child of the farm workers employed on the vast 
estate of Georges’ parents. Georges speaks of dreaming about him to his mother, but she 





The silhouette of Majid as a boy at the door of the barn of Georges’ boyhood home, as seen in Georges’ 
dreams and memory. 
 
 
Georges has believed it to be, deep in his heart all these years. Through their somewhat 
awkward and tentative discussion, in which Georges also reveals himself through simple 
small talk to be an accomplished liar, we discover that Georges’ parents briefly considered 
adopting Majid. This act of mercy had been considered after Majid’s parents were killed in 
                                                 
26 The significance of what the name “Majid” translates to in English should be noted. From the African 






    
the infamous Franco-Algerian riots of October 17, the 1961 “Massacre of Paris.”27 Majid was 
an orphan, Georges was an only child, and their estate had plenty of room for both boys. 
During the night of his visit to his mother, Georges has a nightmare that explains 
much of what may have happened, albeit still rather obscurely and opaquely. The nightmare is 
at least “the truth” as seen from Georges Laurent’s sublimated point of view. The HDV 
camera combined with the filming technique again takes us to the curious world of being 
visually destabilised, because even if we know it is a dream, we cannot be sure whose dream 
this is, or who is behind the surveilling eyes, watching the dream unfold. We see that Majid 
has been kept at a great distance from Georges’ consciousness, but as the film progresses we 
see that the boy is, however, quite embedded in what we take to be the area of Georges’ 
conscience. 
In addition to these unclear starts, stops, and visual interjections, it is never revealed 
who is filming or who is sending the video tapes. Instead, secret events that refuse to remain 
hidden are revealed no matter how “innocent” the characters have convinced themselves these 
secrets are. In fact, to people outside the main characters of Georges and Anne (the audience, 
for instance, Georges’ boss, Majid, Majid’s son, Pierrot: even Georges’ mother seems to 
know something is not quite right), the secrets reveal themselves quite easily, and to the 
outsiders, they are anything but innocent. It is as if the introduction of the images in the 
videotapes sets off the reaction of revealing something that is submerged beneath the surface 
of each character’s persona. 
                                                 
27  See Charles Masters, Sunday Times: October 12, 1997. “In 1961, during the Algerian war of independence, 
Maurice Papon, then chief of police, imposed a curfew in the capital after the murder of 11 of his officers by 
nationalists. The Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN), which had orchestrated the attacks, responded by 
organising a protest march. Up to 40,000 Algerians answered the call to demonstrate on the night of October 17. 
What happened next has never been established precisely. The official version was that three people died in 
clashes between police and demonstrators. At a cabinet meeting afterwards, President Charles de Gaulle 
described the deaths as a matter of “secondary” concern, by comparison with a resolution of the Algerian crisis. 
The reality, according to Constantin Melnik, an adviser on police matters to the then prime minister Michel 
Debre, was that at least 200 - and probably closer to 300 - people were slaughtered by Papon's police, who were 
intent on avenging the deaths of their colleagues. His claim is supported by demonstrators, observers and police 







    
A short summary addressing the larger question surrounding the current concept of the 
conflation, proliferation and assembling of digital imagery helps to explain why so many 
scenes in Caché contain varied modes of digital representation. Caché brings the fore-
grounded and back-grounded together, by mixing and infusing the diegetic with the extra-
diegetic, and in short, by using counter-cinematic techniques. Catherine Wheatley theorises 
this as Haneke’s narrative device in Sight & Sound: 
 
 
Hidden sees Haneke’s first use of high definition video cameras which allow 
him to set up a narrative device that will mix the images from the videotapes 
with the images of ‘Georges life’. In this way, the director formally achieves 
the maturity of a meta-linguistic style . . . the image itself a central character of 
his movies. (2005, 35) 
 
Wheatley’s comments on Haneke’s image mixing and his “meta linguistic style” are relevant 
to the way Caché must be approached theoretically as well. Definitions of digital visual 
aesthetics are evolving, thanks to the seemingly unavoidable take up of digital technology, 
which is itself evolving (or “morphing”) even more rapidly. Also undeniable, is the influence 
that digital technology has on almost every other aspect of contemporary civilisation, 
especially popular culture entertainment media. And even though Haneke disapproves of 
over-indulgence in popular culture media, he is not immune. This influence ironically flows 
over, as Caché might be found under a sub-heading of: “Digitally shot movies presented for 
consideration to the jury at the Cannes film festival.” 
There is almost no other choice then, but to use a “meta-theoretical” approach to 
critique Caché. Compared to traditional filmmaking, the technological capabilities housed 
within the HDV camera mean that digitally shot scenes can be created, deleted and re-shot in 
a fraction of the time and cost for cinematic distribution. A multiplicity of discrete image 
streams taken up by the camera will reappear as a visually seamless construction, or even 
disappear through techno-visual manipulation. The seamless deconstruction of imagery is 






    
engage in deconstructing, resequencing, or reconstructing any part of the movie is now free 
for creatively portraying more complex concepts. The transformation of time/space, self/other, 
body/mind and a host of other philosophical and theoretical dualities28 are made possible by 
the visually fluid nature of digital cinematography, because there are no physical cuts or 
splices on any film material. Every image the camera takes in is reduced to pixilated 
information, virtually stored, and can therefore be easily accessed and perfectly copied. The 
significance of an aesthetic function with unbroken sameness is what Mattias Frey refers to 
previously in this chapter, when he spoke of the theory outlined by Rodowick. Synthesizing 
concepts from Deleuze, Foucault, and William Mitchell,29 Rodowick frames a discursive 
“theory of desubstantiation,” which applies directly to the current way our readings of 
representation are devolving; when he compares these changes to those in other periods of 
socio-cultural and technological change.  Discourse has moved from a “linguistic activity” to 
a “multimedia activity,” pushed on by the “digital revolution:”  
 
 
Forms of expression and reading, can no longer be considered as simply 
spatial or temporal, or distinguished by simultaneity and succession. Rather, 
digital culture presents us with mixed, layered, and heterogeneous audiovisual 
images unfolding in nonlinear space and time. . . . Compared to the analogical 
arts — which are always instantiated in a fixed, Euclidian space — the digital 
arts seem abstract, ephemeral, and without substance. Digital representation is 
defined as “virtual” owing to its desubstantiation: the disappearance of a 
visible and tactile support for both image and text. (RF: 212) 
 
 
Rodowick’s concept of desubstantiation helps to explain the feeling of displacement 
when viewing Caché, within the realm of what he is calling “digital culture,” it is as if a 
virtual “fourth wall” has been penetrated, thus paralleling the absence of any closure 
mechanism in a binary coded data file — digital imagery — leaving a medium with an open 
                                                 
28 Anne Everett and John Caldwell take up this issue and refer to it as “digitextual deconstruction” in their collaboratively 
written introduction and throughout several author’s essays in New Media, Theories and Practices of Digitextuality. 
“Introduction,” Lon., NY: Routledge, 2003, xii. 
 
 
29 These three are highlighted in RF in the chapter, “An Uncertain Utopia — Digital Culture.” Rodowick refers to a wide 






    
ended invitation for modification and endless reproduction. The positive side for filmmakers 
is that present day technology can portray the virtually imagined worlds of dreams, memories, 
time, and personal perceptions, for instance, the point of view from the eye of a beholder, 
much less clumsily. The type of computer generated imagery (CGI) that digital technology is 
capable of producing may enable filmmakers’ to create entirely different metaphoric 
representations and visual signifiers. 
There is of course, a negative side to this imaging technology. This may be 
demonstrated by the ease with which the viewing aspect of the surveillant is often portrayed 
in entertainment media.  Creatively brilliant and very “real” looking but simulated fantasy 
models of devices and situations surrounding surveillance technology may create a banality in 
our perceptions, and an unquestioning acceptance of today’s real but less exciting-looking 
versions of surveillance devices and situations (cameras put in place with alleged promises of 
security), to the point that they are subsumed and normalised in our culture. In other words, a 
digital regime of surveillance predicated on the assurance of safety is the very world we are 
entering today and one which will intensify in surveillance more so in the foreseeable future. 
One may wonder how strong the framework can be when Wheatley’s description of 
constructing the “twin pillars” of the narrative and the structure points to a process of 
“simulation and dissimulation.” Perhaps this is why Rodowick’s theory of desubstantiation 
seems to work well when attempting to explain the varied effects of the virtually represented 
commonalities in our lives. As Wheatley describes this effect in Caché:  
          
            In Hidden, centred on the epistemological conundrum of  who is persecuting 
whom and why, the fast forward functions as a warning to the spectator not to 
get too involved in what they see on screen, to be distrustful or at least 
sceptical. For it is introducing a film in which simulation and dissimulation 








    
As we watch, we feel some hope that we will get to the bottom of solving some of the 
mysteries in Caché, because there is something oddly familiar in doing that much, as we 
attempt to maintain our loyalty (or inadvertent, naturalised subservience) to the Classic 
Hollywood narrative. We become a perceptively discombobulated spectator because we are 
placed at a distance and yet we also become transformed into participants, still carried along, 
no longer by a classical narrative structure, but by the storyline and an old fashioned need to 
reattach ourselves to an outcome. The problem is that once the promise of the “hermeneutic 
circle” is broken in the opening scene, Haneke does not provide us with the expected threads 
of coherent textual content to close that circle again. The solution may be to locate the hidden 
threads, and then proceed to weave the narratives that make sense to us. 
 
Revealing the Hidden, Hiding the Revealed  
From the very beginning of the movie we observe (ironically) the effect that being 
under anonymous surveillance has on the family. Coinciding with each mysterious arrival of 
another videotape, Georges, Anne and Pierrot become increasingly agitated and unnerved. 
This could be seen as an odd reaction because Georges is, after all, an erudite television talk- 
show host on a show that features writers, theorists and other literati, and he is quite 
comfortable being video taped. However, because of the unknown origin of the surveillance 
tapes, the family has lost its sense of orientation, and so their fear and anxiety turns inward, 
where they take aim at each other.  
For the most part the tapes do nothing more than provide commonplace images such 
as driving sequences from the camera’s fixed point of view inside the car or the outside of 
their family home, and Georges’ childhood home. Yet even though there is nothing shown on 
the tapes that could possibly be construed as threatening, the private and specific but entirely 






    
considered to be highly privileged information. The more banal the information is on the tapes, 
however, the more the family feel compelled to reveal unsavoury portions of their lives. 
Interestingly, when one of the tapes showing a drive into one of Paris’ seedier suburbs 
is played, Georges seems instinctively to ascertain the location although he has never been 
there. He has a hunch (that he does not share with Anne) that this is the home of Majid, now a 
grown up man who, as we learn much later, is someone Georges betrayed in their mutual 
childhood. When the videotapes begin to include Majid, again filmed from an impossible 
angle within his apartment, it would be easier on the audience if we, along with Georges, 
could attribute all of these tapes to a vengeful Majid. Perhaps then we could get on with 
experiencing the kind of narrative sequence we are trained to read, but this is not the case, this 
is not how director Haneke operates. Tapes featuring Majid arrive at the Laurents’ house, and 
no longer portraying the mundane, display intense emotions and finally, shocking violence. 
Rather than react in a way that we might expect, such as revealing his own emotions, Georges 




Majid experiences what he assumes is a completely private and intensely emotional moment in his own 
shabby apartment, but instead he becomes another character in the mysterious videotapes sent to the 
Laurent’s upscale home. The audience along with George has been inside Majid’s apartment moments 
before this scene was shot, yet there was no evidence of a camera anywhere, let alone from this viewpoint. 
 
What is I found most revealing and inexplicably unnerving, is being able to hear 






    
reaction to or experience of guilt, or shock, or at the very least, extreme psychological 
discomfort. Georges’ face is not onscreen, but you can hear the throat constrict and the mouth 
go dry, and thus easily imagine the adrenaline rush that is causing restrained panic in his voice.  
Haneke briefly inserts the digitally seamless visual (and silent) vignette of a small, 
frightened boy, bleeding from his mouth, hiding and cowering on a window seat in the dark. 
Somehow, we can deduce this as a scene which is in fact emanating from the space within 
Georges’ memory, spliced right into the diegesis of the film. However, it is as though this 
foreknowledge is phenomenological, signifying a knowledge that is felt, and not placed so 
much as a visual clue on the map of the narrative. By placing it within the videotape, or in 
what we think we are watching, which is the night-time surveillance videotape of someone’s 
home, Haneke reminds us of the intensified reality produced in a nightmare. This is 
desubstantiation in action; dislodging a familiar analogue referent —a memory, and re-
placing it with similitude, the digitally filmed portrayal of a memory within the visual space 
and temporality of watching a videotape in the present. 
Haneke graciously allows us a break from this effect when he shows Georges (who 
appears as confounded as we are at times) during his visit to his mothers’ house, taking a long 
look at the day-time “real” version of the window seat in his memory. The seat is actually 
located in the family living room of his childhood. But before his eyes rest upon the now 
empty window seat, they stop at a large, worn leather chair, likely to be his father’s chair. 
Here again are the “brackets” hemming in the reality of a piece of furniture that still exists in 
the present, but furthermore, we see that Georges is making sure that the father’s chair, which 
belongs in the living room is still there, and the little boy, who Georges clearly thinks does 
not belong there, is  gone. 
 Further invading the Laurent family’s lives are drawings of several disturbing images 
which begin to appear separately, either as the wrapping of a videotape sent to their home, or 






    
drawing is of a rooster with a severed head, with bright red blood drawn as if gushing across 
the page. Is it symbolising the political decapitation of France or is it of personal significance 
to Georges?  Haneke is using the surveillance film genre to enable us to look at it both ways. 
Another drawing is of a small boy with blood flowing from his mouth, which I assumed at 
first was to lead the audience onto the narrative path into assuming a future kidnapping. Then, 
the most grisly image is one of a boy with his throat slashed, again with blood gushing across 
the page. All of the pictures are techniques of foreshadowing, but the events they foreshadow 
are unimaginable at this point in the film. The drawings, sent as anonymously as the 
videotapes remind us again that someone is watching the family, and even though we still do 





 Disturbing drawings on paper begin to appear along with some of the videotapes delivered to the Laurent 
home, as well as on their own at Pierre’s school and at Georges’ office. 
 
 
Alienation Effect and the Transformation of Perspective 
In one scene midway through the film, Anne arrives home late after a long, tearful and 
unusually intimate lunch with her boss, Pierre. Georges and Anne suddenly realise that 
neither of them knows where Pierrot is, and they begin to worry aloud. This is a red herring, 






    
of drawing the audience into a self-reflexive voyeurism, when in the background, non-stop 
on-screen footage of violence in the Middle East, or of riots in the streets of France by Middle 
-Eastern people appear in the television news, which is turned up to a noticeably high volume. 
Here Haneke quickly illustrates how we are often disallowed the time to discern who is Israeli, 
Palestinian, and so on, almost as if it does not matter. In other words, more information does 
not always mean better information. By switching our focus back and forth between “real,” 
news footage and Georges’ and Anne’s growing panic over their missing son, Haneke breaks 






The interior of the Laurent’s home is presented as an environment of layers, obscuring the windows, 
which are barred like a prison. The expensive television blaring noisy news footage of seemingly random 
Middle Eastern violence is ignored by the couple. Books are stacked like protective sandbags in a foxhole. 
 
 
The news images are played on Georges’ and Anne’s contemporary, expensive flat- 
screen television, a further signifier of their bourgeois life style. The television screen also 
appears to be nested in a sort of geometric seamlessness, built on the same plane within the 
fortress- like wall of books in their living room. Above and behind the bookshelves are barred 






    
television, books, the real world, each being increasingly obscured by the next. Here we are 
also shown the Laurents’ truly insulated existence away from the outside world of real 
suffering and victims, which is another one of Haneke’s recurrent themes. The audience 
cannot help noticing the annoying background din of the television news violence, but it is 
being completely ignored by the fore-grounded characters of Anne and Georges, typifying 
what Western society’s world perception through the audiovisual digital culture circa 2005, 
has become.  
Benjamin’s essay mentions the ability to master tasks in “the state of distraction” as 
proof that being able to do so has become “a matter of habit” (WMR: 251), Rodowick says 
this is a “transformation of perspective,” indicative of the new relationship between humans 
and machines, or what Virilio alluded to as “splitting the viewpoint,” by a “sharing of 
perception” between the human and the “seeing machine.”30 Haneke himself claims in 
interviews that his films are used to expose the “coldness” of Western bourgeois society, both 
caused and represented by the proliferation of violent images through television. I argue that 
is also reads as the spreading intrusiveness of our audiovisual regime. 
Other than the cacophony of the television news, however, Caché is in many ways 
quite a spare movie, curiously devoid of all music of any kind, and is judiciously edited so 
that we feel we must pay precise attention to the action or we will lose track. Haneke’s use of 
the HDV medium and its inherent quality of visual seamlessness throughout the film create an 
oddly unnerving, rather than soothing consistency in what is visually perceived as sameness. 
This may be referring to an increasingly common motif reflecting the public’s dichotomous 
levels of comfort and discomfort regarding our cohabitation with the multitudes of 
surveillance cameras, many of which are tucked into contemporary urban architecture, so as 
to become physically invisible or, even where they are obviously present, so normalised in 
our consciousness, that they have reached the point of being invisible.  
                                                 







    
 Cinematically portrayed modes of surveillance can be seen as representational models 
of visibility that are capable of making over-arching allusions about where we as human 
beings feel we can place ourselves within the transitory and increasingly alienating realm of 
digital culture. The use of alienation31 works well for Haneke in Caché, because he appears to 
be urging us to drop our old way of experiencing cinema, and most importantly, of the way 
we perceive the world. By doing so we can begin to experience what Bertolt Brecht referred 
to as, “mitdenkend statt mitfühlend,” (“contemplation rather than compassion”) in the 
theatrical form Brecht called “Das Epische Theater,” (“Epic Theatre”) which are partly from 
what the Soviet cinema / school of the 1920’s called the “alienation effect.”32 We are placed 
into the position of being unable to remain passive, forced into viewing the film critically and 
analytically, removing any chance of being mindlessly entertained, but one might also say that 
Haneke stubbornly refuses to disclose any of the conceits and contrivances necessary to 
disrupt the illusion. 
Here, I disagree. Haneke indeed gives us all the clues we need, as long as we are 
willing to accept them and their limitations. By digitally flattening the images in many of the 
films sequences, and by inserting nearly subliminally brief flashes of images into the mise-en-
scène, and by using a large number of unusually long, static takes and long shots in his 
technique, we must learn to see via the flatly continuous visuality within the movie. This 
curious impression of destabilisation is brought on not only by Haneke’s use of a single type 
of camera, but also by a meticulous reflection throughout his direction. Haneke even chooses 
his use of tracking and panning sparingly, because he feels that a tracking camera may create 
a dynamic of its own that overtakes the character’s intent.  
Some of the videotapes in Caché, all of which are delivered anonymously, contain 
images not of the family members themselves, but of other aspects of their lives. For instance, 
                                                 
31 See Bertold Brecht, “alienation effect” in Brecht on Theatre, Ed., trans., John Willett. New York: Hill and 
Wang, 1964, 91. 
 






    
the large estate that is Georges’ boyhood home, and where his mother still resides, is naturally 
a place that is “historical” for him, in that it represents the history of his upbringing, and for 
us it also informs us of a history of financial comfort for Georges. The drive to this home, 
which is filmed from behind a rain-spattered (and therefore view-obscuring) windscreen, 
brings us to a location that is important in Georges’ life but we, the audience, and even 
Georges are still separated from the actual experience of being there. We see the place but the 
meaning of the place is lost to us through this videotape, which is another step removed from 
the real experience of being there. Before Georges returns physically to the estate, the 
meaning of the place, or as Benjamin puts it, the aura of its “unique existence,” returns to 
Georges only through his memories and his dreams. Here, through these cognitive events, he 
makes use of his complete body, because there is no separation between his physical body and 
the neurological patterning in his brain that recaptures the memories and causes the dreams 
(and his nightmares) that in turn create his physical reaction of panic. 
Within the consciousness of Georges, as Benjamin maintained, the significance of: 
“its presence in time and space . . . at the place where it happens to be” (WMR: 222), still 
resides in relation to the reproduced image on the videotape, as an original referent of sorts. 
However, because of surveillance in its portrayed invisibility, invasiveness and insistence, the 
permeation of both inward — connected and inseparable — and outward —disconnected and 
separated — versions of it throughout much of the film, does little to assist us in determining 
the origins of the surveillance or the reasons why this family is being watched and who, if 
anyone, is actually engaged in carrying out the surveillance.  




Commitment is not a service; it is not something one can choose to have. One 
either is engaged or is not. And if filmmakers are not committed, I don’t think 
they should be reproached. It’s simply a different way of dealing with the 
world, to approach their art. I think what is essential to film so that it is taken 
seriously is that it represent not only social concerns, but also debate its very 






    
serious art form. The question is, is film merely entertainment, or is it more? If 
it is art, it has to be more. Art can be entertaining . . . it is more than diversion, 




Although some may find Haneke’s approach condescending, I argue that he is actually 
respectful of his audience. We know for instance, that in reality, memories and dreams 
are not accompanied by harp music and watery, blurry visuals as they have often been 
signified to us through earlier cinematic conventions, so Haneke, who even mentions 
in the accompanying DVD to the film that shooting convincing dream sequences is 
quite difficult, does not belabour us with these tropes. Rather, we work out for 
ourselves what represents now and what is the past for those onscreen characters. 
 
Detaching the Pearl 
The common element throughout all of Haneke’s films is his penchant for making the 
audience uncomfortable by using a variety of cinematic techniques, and one is by causing 
them to doubt or question the visual veracity of what they are seeing. Social morality on a 
broad political scale is another theme in Haneke’s films, which he plays out within the 
microcosm to represent or demonstrate a large, macrocosmic issue. In the case of Caché, 
Haneke seems to be calling up the memory of what has been called “The Paris Massacre,” 
referring to October 17, 1961. On that evening, it was reported that 30,000 unarmed French 
Algerian Nationals gathered in a peaceful demonstration to protest against Muslims being 
targeted for meeting unrealistic curfews. They were met with clubs, batons and general 
brutality by a force of 20,000 Parisian Police who knew they were unarmed and who took 
“advantage” of the situation.  
It has been estimated that as many as 300 Algerians were left to die, or, already beaten 
and knocked unconscious, were thrown over bridges and then left to drown in the Seine River. 
                                                 






    
There was an infamous cover-up and general disavowal or refusal to acknowledge, much less 
take responsibility for this event until recent years, most likely due to the children of the 
victims, and their relatives becoming old enough to seek retribution for the situation. Haneke 
reminds the audience that consequences will result from issues that have been left unresolved, 
such as the flooding of France with cheap labour from the foreign nationals of  colonial 
Algeria in the 1950’s, and their eventual population of offspring who must be housed, fed and 
educated. When Georges’ parents attempted to make things right in their own small way 
within the microcosm of their family by attempting to adopt Majid after his parents were 
killed, Georges’ lies stopped them from doing so. We see in very small glimpses the 
differences in outcomes for the two men as a result of what one small lie can to do to a man’s 
entire life. But in the case of surveillance, we also see the power that both the disconnected 
mechanical version of surveillance can do in reawakening what the original, authentic inner 
surveillance system recorded long ago in Georges’ conscience, and had kept stored perfectly 




Algerian foreign nationals (AFN) demonstrating in Paris, October 17, 1961, (AP). 
 
Unfortunately, Georges’ way of dealing with his conscience is to continue to deny the 
reality of what he saw and what he was told. In fact, near the very end, in the penultimate 






    
his eyelids and dreams about Majid as a boy being hauled away screaming to the orphanage, 
as Georges’  parents retreat into their home. This was the conclusion the boy Georges dreamt 
of, and the adult Georges carries on dreaming the same dream, except that Majid, who 
commits a brutal and visceral suicide by cutting his own throat in front of Georges, has been 
sent much further away than the orphanage this time. 
Georges chooses sleep rather than face the consequences of his actions. Of course in 
Georges’ mind, since the actions were those of a six year old child, he feels no remorse for 
what he has done, and considers that he has no duty to repair any damage that had occurred as 
a result. His conscience, it seems, is sufficiently buried under the layers of years that have 
passed between then and his present. He is more annoyed than anything else when Majid’s 
son arrives unannounced at his office, and Georges assumes he is there to call him to account 
for his father. Before Majid’s son can reveal to him what he wishes to speak to him about, 
Georges angrily tells him: “You’ll never give me a bad conscience about your father’s sad or 
wrecked life. I’m not to blame! Do you get that?” He then adds, “Do you expect me to 
apologise?”  Georges refuses all culpability for any part his action may have played in 
Majid’s (and now, his son’s) life, and yet, refusing his part and taking no blame does not 
release him from his suffering. Never at any time in the movie does Georges seem particularly 
happy or fulfilled. Because he will not accept blame, or apologise or allow his conscience to 
be “bad,” he therefore opts out of any chance to seek forgiveness for his deeds.  
 
Conclusion: The Desubstantiation Project Reveals our Loss. 
One cannot ask forgiveness when no responsibility is admitted for taking an action, 
and in Georges’ case, as in much of Caché, no responsibility can be admitted if one cannot 
differentiate between what they have done and what they ought not to have done. When the 






    
videotapes, I equated them to the analogue “real” past, meaning the physical marks made on 
paper material represent a real time and activity in Georges’ history.  
What is important is that the aura of authenticity that Benjamin speaks of exists in 
Georges’ memory which, like a pearl to the two halves of its shell, is also attached to both his 
consciousness and his conscience.  When an unexpected and uninvited memory manages to 
break the surface of his consciousness, Georges becomes perceptibly alarmed over a clue that 
he was obviously not expecting, yet it is instantly referential and painfully meaningful for him. 
Georges recognises the clue but does not recognise his own part or responsibility in relation 
to the clue. It is profoundly disturbing however, that whether or not a thing has meaning, a 
history or an aura attached to it, there is a complete absence of any palpable or lasting affect 
on Georges. 
He stands before Majid who, without warning, slits his own throat, cuts off his own 
face, so to speak, before Georges, and we, the audience along with George watch as his blood 
splashes across the dirty walls of his shabby apartment. Georges then feels a little sick, but he 
leaves Majid bleeding on the floor of his apartment, and then goes to watch some movies. 
One supposes that he does this to forget what he has just witnessed in the flesh. He seems just 
as comfortable with his manufactured similitude of an innocent version of history, despite the 
shocking evidence of the outcome presented to him on videotape, and later filmed invisibly 
and impossibly from within Majid’s apartment. Obviously, what the observer sees and records 
no longer stands for the ultimate truth, almost as if the truth has become unrecognisable. 
Mirroring the disturbing style of the opening sequence, the final scene in Caché also 
consists of a long, static shot with credits rolling across it. Entering on the left hand side of the 
screen is Majid’s son, who was introduced to us midway through the film but never named. 
Suddenly, although they have never met within the context of this film, he speaks (although 
we cannot hear what they are saying) with Georges’ son at Pierrot’s school. In the director’s 






    
it. The body language between the boys tells us that even though they have no connection in 
the movie’s plot or storyline whatsoever, it now appears that in this dimension, they had been 
friends for many years. What does this mean? Haneke refuses to tell. Each person must take 
away with them their own interpretation of this last scene.  
The interpretation that I finally came away with was that Georges’ dream of getting 
rid of Majid has melted into a dream about an alternate conclusion. What if Georges had 
accepted Majid as his brother and the two grew up together, enjoying the same social 
privileges that come with such an upbringing? The outcome might then have been that 
Majid’s son and Pierrot would attend the same school and have the same friends. In fact, they 
may have been like cousins and as close as brothers. Perhaps the last scene of the movie 
would have been indicative of this other, seemingly far happier outcome. But the reality is 
that Majid’s son is unnamed, he is unrecognised and since no mention is ever made of his 
mother, he appears almost as a cipher manufactured from thin air, yet even with his father 






The two sons: Left: A confrontation between Georges and Majid's son, in which Georges refuses any 
responsibility for his own or Majid’s actions. Right: Georges’ son Pierre in front of his school. 
 
Haneke claims that what he is really seeking in making this film is a presentation of 
the truth. Previously, in speaking about his films he has said, “They are an appeal for a 
cinema of insistent questions instead of false (because too quick) answers, for clarifying 






    
and consensus.”34 What interests him is how many different ways the truth in any situation 
can be construed and is dependent on each witness’ or participant’s perception of it, which is 
what will inform their version of it. The story in Caché is used only as a framework on which 
to hang the different points of view from each person’s concept of the truth, and the particular 
frame Haneke presents for us in Caché is meant to be the microcosm of a family representing 
the macrocosm of a society which is kept in line by both an interior and exterior system of 
surveillance. 
Exposing the conditions of our ‘audiovisual regime’ by means of highlighting 
similitude as resemblance and using digital versus analogue technology, Haneke creates 
Georges as a reactive character rather than an active subject. Our audiovisual culture seems to 
have digitally replaced itself, and it is in this sense that the “loss of aura” is experienced; 
because the subject is missing in that there is a fragmentation of the subject, and so a loss of 
perceptual continuity. Georges has no active conscience because he has no continuity of 
moral events in his visual field, and therefore no activity shades his presence of mind. Even 
though the people around him and his memories and dreams prompt him to react, he chooses 
to ignore all and retreat.  
All of these responses are aspects of the surveillance film genre, complete with an 
embedded problem: How do subjects reinsert themselves into the scheme of visibility and 
become active, with an embodied conscience? How do subjects become an ‘ethical subject’ in 
Hannah Arendt’s sense of the term?  The dilemma is contained first in whether or not we are 
even aware that we have removed ourselves from the scheme of visibility. In our audiovisual 
regime, are we watching or being watched? In becoming desensitised to surveillance, we risk 
the loss of our conscience, and if this is true, what will take its place? When these ethical 
                                                 
34 Michael Haneke, “Film als Katharsis.” Austria (in)felix: zum österreichischem Film der 80er Jahre, 







    
questions are revisited in Chapters Two and Three, I will call upon Arendt’s theory of action 
to tease out some of the potential answers. 
Haneke uses his unique artistic style of direction and combines it with both startling 
new technologies and older theatrical methodologies to bring us to a point of discomfort so 
intense that one would hope we will take note of the disturbing subjects he addresses in Caché. 
Because digital filmmaking allows the desubstantiation and reassembly of images as well as 
their infinite reproduction, Haneke has chosen to use this technique to illustrate the existence 
of these possibilities. By presenting us with characters who perceive that something is wrong, 
but who are unable to wholly define exactly what that something is, we are further awakened 



























Introduction: Minority Report:35 “Forgiveness is Freedom from Vengeance”36   
 
When the desubstantiation of imagery that Haneke employs to conflate the real and the 
unreal in Caché is elevated to the level of filmic fantasy, it appears that in the near future-
world of Steven Spielberg’s film Minority Report (2002), digital technology has reached an 
apex and become a near art-form combined with the practical capabilities of crime detection. 
The film is set in Washington DC in the year 2054, when a government slogan aimed at a 
fearful American population promises: “That which keeps us safe will also keep us free.” The 
dreamed, desubstantiated mental images of the future that appear in a downloaded form of 
visual montage back up this claim by using the images as justification for state-sanctioned 
pre-emptive strikes against pre-designated murderers who appear within these visions.  
Promoting this ideological concept of “safety,” (meaning “control”) as equalling  
“freedom” (which means “being monitored”), allows a mechanistic regime of surveillance 
that has already been accepted by the public to be further embraced by the judicial system. 
When the concept becomes reality, it will be utilised to prevent crime and therefore erase guilt 
before it can ever be experienced.  
Underpinning my argument against this preventative concept, are the ideas contained 
in Arendt’s theory of action. Regarding freedom, Arendt writes: 
 
 
                                                 
35 USA, 2002, dir. Steven Spielberg, adapted from the short story by Philip K. Dick, entitled, “The Minority 
Report,” (1956), The Philip K. Dick Reader. NY: Kensington, 1997, 323-354. 
 
36 Hannah Arendt. The Human Condition. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958, 241.  Subsequent 






    
Man’s inability to rely upon himself or to have complete faith in himself (which 
is the same thing) is the price human beings pay for freedom; and the 
impossibility of remaining unique masters of what they do, of knowing its 
consequences and relying upon the future, is the price they pay for plurality and 
reality, for the joy of inhabiting together with others a world whose reality is 
guaranteed for each by the presence of all. (HC: 244) 
 
 
For Arendt, “relying upon the future” means that people are called upon to bring an element 
of faith into their thinking, their behaviour, or in other words, faith must become a functional 
part of their everyday lives. Attempting to create the future by “keeping [it] safe” does not 
guarantee freedom, but rather installs pessimism about human ends and ambitions. 
The film employs as its source narrative Phillip K. Dick’s 1956 science fiction short 
story called “The Minority Report,” including the construct of the placement of authority for 
maintaining social control by restricting freedoms. In the film version of Minority Report, the 
central conceit concerns the possibility of surveilling crimes in the future via the visually 
accessed premonitions of three chemically modified human beings. Just as in Caché, we 
realise that through this visual access, we are in fact within the diegesis of the movie because 
we are simultaneously viewing what the Precrime police are seeing. Surveillance here 
operates as a “technique,” suggesting that crime has no moral content and that within the law 
technique appears to triumphs over both the letter and the spirit. In addition to having “real-
time visual access, the police (and only the police), have the technological ability to “play 
back” and view the crimes before they actually happen, which enables the opportunity to 
change their outcome. The police, who are know as the “Precrime Unit,” have thus been 
charged with a power that nears omniscience.  
Unlike Arendt’s underlying principles in her theory of action, in Minority Report, 
there is no allowance for the subject to be either reactive or active, because the state has taken 
on the mantle of ordaining preventative (or taking “pro”) actions. I discuss Arendt’s concept 






    
the unexpected, and cause a rupture, perhaps, where one is needed. Central to this concept is 
the notion that “the smallest act in the most limited circumstances bears the seed of the same 
boundlessness, because one deed, and sometimes one word, suffices to change every 
constellation” (HC: 190). 
Applying this to the concept of the existence of the human conscience, a question 
might then be asked: If guilt is wiped out in society, will people forego the development and 
maintenance of a conscience? Without conscience, there is no insight, and with no insight, 
any perspective beyond one’s own view is lost, meaning that the possibility of taking 
perspective itself has been lost. The lessons taught in Minority Report show how easily these 
attributes can fade away, and what happens when the state attempts to find substitutes to 
replace them. 
Minority Report belongs squarely in the surveillance film genre. When we examine  
the film from a theoretical foundation of panopticism and social control, it is clear that  
Minority Report prompts discussions on law, political ideals, media technology, the recent 
and on-going “war on terror,” and the radical notion of “changing the course of history” by 
“foreseeing” and manipulating certain events in the future. The concept of combining human 
foreknowledge with a mediated technology for preventing crimes in the future creates an 
opening for a wide variety of critical interpretations on a number of different levels. 
Interestingly, each of these aspects tends to revolve around the core issue of contemporary 
society’s apparent reliance on (and disturbingly affirmative propinquity with) various systems 
of surveillance, which is also discussed in a similar manner to Caché through the means of  a 
privileged or “diegetic” point of view. 
In his essay, “Tell Us What’s Going to Happen, Information Feeds to the War on 
Terror,” Samuel Nunn writes: “We want to know things before they occur. Anticipate, react, 






    
produced by television and cinema.”37 Nunn, speaking in the American context, supports the 
notion of film and television being: “self-reflexive mirrors of the U.S. war on terror,” with the 
ultimate goal of “complete deterrence.” In Nunn’s view, this goal can only be achieved in 
“real time” through the coalescence of the vast volumes of data located within the criminal 
justice technology systems: “It is a process identified by Richard Grusin as premediation: a 
shift of focus to controlling the future and stopping attacks before they occur, or more simply, 
profiling the future.” 
In Richard Grusin’s article, “Premediation,” (2004), he defines “remediation” in which 
media “refashion prior media forms” by incorporating several aspects of media to create other 
media. Grusin expands on this by explaining how media (such as film, television and video 
games) pre-mediate the future, signalling technological devices yet to come (author’s italics). 
Regarding Minority Report, he comments on the technology of precognition: 
 
 
Spielberg imagines a technological medium that works by recording sensory 
or neural experience for playback. But in Minority Report, rather than 
capturing the past neural experience for playback in the future, the technology 
captures “precognitions” of the future for playback in the present —for the 
purpose of preventing the recorded events from becoming actual history , to 
prevent the future from becoming the past. 2004, 1938 
 
 
Although Grusin captures the elements of bio-technology and the time manipulations that are 
salient to the technicalities of the film, he fails to make any subjective connections between 
the events that never happen, the consequences that do not result, and what effects might be 
felt by the individual or an entire society living under this system. 
Minority Report occupies a crucial position in the surveillance film genre, because it 
responded to the social and cultural concerns stemming from the immediate aftermath of 
                                                 
37 Samuel Nunn. “Tell Us What’s Going to Happen, Information Feeds to the War on Terror” 2004. 1000 Days 
of Theory, www.ctheory.net/articles, Arthur and Marilouise Kroker, eds., (pub. 12, Sept., 2006). 
 






    
September 11th 2001 and the subsequent feelings of public and private regret.39 Beyond 
grieving the very public loss of lives, there was considerable grief over the loss of control, as 
a sense of control it seemed, that had been a fantasy all along. Surveillance had failed 
miserably as an effective system of deterrent security, and the public could only watch the 
painful CCTV “re-runs” of the perpetrators as they boarded the airplanes that flew on to 
change the world. Although Minority Report supplied the mourning public with a fictional 
surveillance solution with the theme of control, it also reminded people that freedom in fact, is 
not “free”. 
In this chapter, I discuss how a state security system that links surveillance to the 
assumption of guilt and the subsequent prevention of events ultimately fails in its aim of 
achieving freedom. I attribute this failure to what Hannah Arendt refers to when laying out 
her premise for the theory of action as “the new” appearing in “the guise of a miracle.” One 
cannot assume that a person will follow through with what has been divined or prophesised 
by others because human actions are, in so many ways unpredictable: “The fact that man is 
capable of action means that the unexpected can be expected of him, that he is able to perform 
what is infinitely improbable” (HC: 178).  
According to Arendt, there is also a genuine necessity to prove to oneself that the 
freedom to make a moral choice exists, and when the wrong choice is made, there must also 
be the freedom to forgive, and finally, “the function of the faculty of promising” (HC: 244). 
Minority Report reminds us that at best, we prefer exalted examples of how to make our 
choices, rather than the safety of having a pre-determined “right” outcome chosen for us, even 
if it is supposedly on our behalf. Without this freedom, we have little motivation for having 
even pure intentions. Perhaps it is because we are a species burdened with the knowledge of 
our impending and undeniable mortality that we desire the unpredictability of making new 
                                                 
 
39 There is a point in the film when the date of September 11 is symbolically referenced as 1109. This is the 






    
beginnings without the knowledge of absolute certainty as to what the consequences will be. 
Again, as Arendt puts it:  
 
This character of startling unexpectedness is inherent in all beginnings and in 
all origins. . . And this again is possible only because each man is unique, so 
that with each birth something uniquely new comes into the world. With 
respect to this somebody who is unique it can be truly said that nobody was 
there before. (HC: 178) 
  
The underlying premise of the Precrime programme contradicts Arendt’s notion of “startling 
unexpectedness” in that the outcomes are supposedly predetermined, but the methodology of 
the justice system suggests that the police are operating under a “conditioned free will.” The 
assumption is that unless stopped by police, the perpetrator has no choice but to act as 
predicted. Prediction, however, cannot be nor should be a legal fact, for in the case of law and 
jurisprudence there must be a sufficient causal link in order to hold a defendant liable for a 
crime. 
In “Precrime Never Pays! ‘Law and Economics’ in Minority Report,”40 Senior law 
lecturer William P. MacNeil discusses popular culture and the law by examining how 
Minority Report  presents “such an interesting example of. . . the way in which law is 
reflected in, but also refracted by, popular culture” to produce what he calls, “lex populi— or 
popular law” (201). MacNeil explains the “predictive theory of law,” which was advocated 
and coined by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.41 in the early nineteenth century. His theory 
follows the path of “law in action” emphasizing the law’s processes. Here, “predictive” means 
being able to reasonably predict the outcome of a court’s decision, because that decision will 
be determined by prewritten laws, rules, and regulations. MacNeil points out that this is 
entirely different from the “predictive laws” at work in Minority Report, where the 
                                                 
40 William P. MacNeil, (Senior lecturer in law). Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies, vol. 19, no. 2, 
2005, 201-219. 
 
41 Oliver Wendell Holmes (1841-1935), U.S. judge and jurist, b. Boston Mass., taught law at Harvard in 1881, 
and eventually rose to Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, 1902-1932. Holmes is regarded as one of the 






    
government “circumvents the courts altogether in order to predict, and nip in the bud, the facts 
of crime, rendering the rule system supernumerary” (204).  The danger in this of course is that 
when the rules are circumvented, they may as well cease to exist. Another danger to be 
examined in the political society of Minority Report is that of a growing totalitarianism. For 
instance, rather than specifically identifying the police as government agents, they are 
“branded” as the Precrime unit. Meanwhile, the state uses television commercials to promote 
their Precrime ideology. In The Origins of Totalitarianism,42 Arendt explains how the early 
Nazi regime used “ingenious” similar techniques: “It is interesting that even in their 
beginnings the Nazis were prudent enough never to use slogans which, like democracy, 
republic, dictatorship, or monarchy, indicated a specific form of government” (OT: 357). 
In Minority Report, the murder rate has increased to the point where the police cannot 
possibly control it. People feel unsafe and insecure, and in reaction what they long for is 
safety and consistency. By making the claim that they are able to view the one true and real 
future, Precrime offers the promise of the consistent control of murders by prevention, thereby 
insuring each individual’s safety, which in turn, should ensure society as a whole. However, if 
that promise is false and there exists an alternate future, the entire system would disintegrate. 
What we see in Minority Report is that when one system ends, another one begins to take its 
place. 
 
Directing in a Liminal Space and the Art of Reconstructing the Scene of a Crime 
Spielberg presents Minority Report as a science-fiction story set in the near future 
using what he refers to as the “ugly, grainy, rough and gritty look of film noir” visual effects. 
He accomplishes this by filming predominantly in cool blues by using a bleach by-pass 
system to remove much of the film’s original colours. Spielberg says his intention in creating 
                                                 
42 Hannah Arendt. The Origins of Totalitarianism, London: Allen & Unwin, 1958. Subsequent referencing will 







    
the film noir atmosphere was to take something from the past and apply it to the future. The 
stylised visual effects also help to create a dream-like ambience, which in turn creates a 
feeling of distance. Although we recognise some architecture and a number of common 
objects from contemporary times, we are meant to sense that the distance is temporal rather 
than spatial. 
The movie begins with two objectives: to put us at the scene of a crime illustrating 
how the “Precrime” system works, and to establish how unreliable our eyes can be. At first 
we are presented with a deconstructed visual assemblage combining familiar albeit disturbing 
imagery. From what appears to be a nondiegetic view, we see two lovers, a man and a woman 
kissing, overtaken by the image of a pair scissors fading into it, and then suddenly whisked 
away. Throughout the scene, flashes of a house built in the classic style of the old, red-brick 
Georgetown architecture appear. Next we see a man struggling to leave a bathtub filled with 
water, then the director cuts to a different man tentatively climbing a stairway, scissors in 
hand. Jumping to a different view, we see the original man and woman through the lenses of a 
pair of eyeglasses on the nightstand near the bed, and the man from the stairway suddenly 
standing over them. The male lover scrambles off the bed and runs to the bathroom, while the 
other man begins to slash the scissors towards the woman who screams in fear and yells out 
his name. Finally, we are abruptly brought to a scene where the lover is being forcibly 
submerged in the bathtub by the arm of the other man. Although the framing is quite jumpy, 
this scene has up until now been shown in sections of forward temporal motion, however, at 
this point it becomes an abstractly reconstructed scene, shot in sepia and washed out blue 
tones, appearing from the perspective of several temporal and visual view points. What is 
remarkable is that the scenes have been technologically rendered from the minds of three 
precognitive human beings, and played out on a large glass screen. 
The three are referred to as “Pre-Cogs” for short, and they consist of a pair of male 






    
single female named Agatha (Samantha Morton). Their formal namesakes originate from the 
authors of detective fiction novels; Sir Arthur Conan Doyle (or Arthur C. Clarke), Dashiell 
Hammet, and Agatha Christie. They are presented to us not as people with personalities, but 
more as modified shadow creatures, floating in a container of an embryonic-like fluid. 
 Pre-Cogs, we learn, are capable of intuiting (or “receiving”) thousands of jumbled 
dreams and mental pictures, but only those that indicate acts of murder are considered worthy 
of viewing. The premonitions of the Pre-Cogs resemble a combination of almost colourless 
prismatic images as seen through a broken, sometimes out of focus kaleidoscope. Left without 
the ability to sort these images into any coherent narrative stream, the power to interpret their 
information lies only with the detectives who are conducting, sorting and deleting the discrete 
visual fragments.   
Besides the Pre-cogs floating in liquid substance, there is a preponderance of symbolic 
destabilisations of imagery throughout the film by Spielberg’s use of water as metaphor. In 
“Minority Report, A Dystopic Vision” from Senses of Cinema, Lester D. Friedman explains in 
some detail:  
 
. . . the water sprinkler in the Marks' front lawn rotates throughout the crime 
sequence; the Sprawl is filled with puddles and often seen through rain 
showers; Lara's hologram image wants Anderton to “watch the rain” with 
her; Anne Lively (Jessica Harper) is drowned in a lake; Anderton and 
Agatha leave the shopping mall in a downpour; Dr. Iris Hineman (Lois 
Smith) waters her exotic plants as she converses with the frustrated 
Anderton; Anderton and his now-pregnant wife Lara (Kathryn Morris) 
watch the rain outside the windows in their final scene; and the Pre-Cogs 
eventually live in a cabin alongside water. When Anderton seeks to escape 
from the surveillance 'spiders,' he immerses himself in a bathtub filled with 
ice water, though a single air bubble betrays him to the invading horde of 
mechanical spies. Most crucially, Anderton loses his young son while 
underwater: playing “how-long-can-you-hold-your-breath” with Sean 
(Spencer Treat Clark) at a public pool, he sinks to the bottom and, when he 
resurfaces, finds the child gone, abducted by an unknown and never-found 
kidnapper. . . As such, water functions as both positive and negative 
imagery throughout the movie, a component of meditative creation or 
psychological destruction.43 
                                                 






    
What Friedman is saying is that Spielberg seems to be relying on the physical symbolism of 
water to demonstrate how the desubstantiation of imagery through manipulation via digital 
technology can lead to their “potentially disastrous misuse.” In other words, what we were 
forced to surmise (eventually) on our own through Haneke’s use of digital technology in 
watching Caché, is a conclusion we are led to somewhat by the hand through a maze of both 
digital and “physical” (analogue) imagery in Minority Report. 
What we are witnessing is a unique mode of surveillance, operating through the 
prophetic dreams that emanate from a trio of somnambulistic savants, endowed with what the 
state alleges are “perfect” predictive powers. Their dreams combine and project outside of 
their hive-minds’ eye and appear as a jumbled, audiovisual montage. Once the visions are 
identified as being the scene of a future murder, the entire event is streamed as digital images 
onto a transparent screen. It is left to the Precrime police unit to unscramble the puzzle within 
this visual and temporal assemblage. The murder is presented within a non-linear sequence of 
visual snippets, quite similar to the experience of watching an event before, during and after it 
happens simultaneously on several separate CCTV screens. At this point, a process known as 
“scrubbing the image” takes place, where the Precrime unit focus on the pertinent data, and 
then act upon it accordingly. 
At this moment we are formally introduced to the film’s main character, Chief John 
Anderton (Tom Cruise) of the Precrime unit. The early scenes of Anderton disassembling the 
images, discarding what he finds unnecessary, and then reassembling them is by far the most 
brilliant. Again Spielberg combines past and present by using classical music played against 
futuristic technology. With Franz Schubert’s Unfinished Symphony (No. 8) swelling in the 
background, Anderton’s physical movements gesturally interfacing the visions into temporal 
linearity create the appearance of conducting both the symphony and the imagery, seen 
flowing as downloads from the three minds of the Pre-Cogs.  
                                                                                                                                                        














Detective John Anderton engages in gestural interfacing to reassemble scenes from a future murder, as 
the images dowload from the hive-mind of the three Pre-Cogs to an interactive screen called a  
“holosphere”. 
 
In this narrative within a self-reflexive narrative, Spielberg presents the Pre-Cogs 
visions of future moments in the more “natural” way that we perceive memories. The world 
outside their minds looks far more “Sci-Fi” than it does within their predictive visual output.. 
It is also clear in this scene, that as allegedly perfect as their dreams of murder may seem to 
be, without the interpretation by the specialised Precrime unit, the haphazard linearity of their 
output is almost useless visual static.  
The audience is given the connection between the Pre-Cogs and their neural output 
when, perhaps in homage to Alfred Hitchcock and the end of the famous shower scene in the 
movie Psycho,44 the camera zooms from above, descending down into an extreme focus on 
the iris of the eye of Agatha, followed by a rapid zoom shot of her entire ethereal face, 
floating in an enormous tank of filled with a liquid, milky substance. Technological 
embodiment is evidenced by the various wires and the head -phone like apparatus attached to 
her and the other Pre-Cogs. Agatha speaks haltingly as if she is talking in her sleep, 
pronouncing quite deliberately: “Murr - derr.” Slowly submerging herself, with her eyes 
remaining open under the bluish white liquid, air bubbles from her mouth rise slowly to the 
surface as if to prove that she is a living, breathing human being.  
                                                 






    
Just as in Caché when Haneke introduced drawings on paper to create an “analogue 
connection,” it is interesting that at this point Spielberg brings us back to an earthly and 
earthy reference using natural materials. Agatha’s pronouncement triggers a hyper-speed laser 
machine lathe to carve out two reddish wooden balls from two separate blocks of wood, each 
engraved with the word, “VICTIM,” burnt into distinct wood grain patterns. After each ball 
has travelled through transparent plastic tubes and come to a rest at one end, we see the names 
of the two people who are meant to be killed spelled out before us. Cutting to Agatha’s face 
once again, we find her still submerged, with her mouth and eyes open (in silent horror), and 
appearing visibly uncomfortable. Next, we watch as another ball goes through the same 
routine, except that the word: “PERPETRATOR” with the killer’s name engraved into the 
wood grain of the ball. We learn that although premeditated murder has all but been 
eliminated, murder occurring as a “crime of passion” still exists, and is referred to as a “red-
ball.”  
           Wearing gloves with tiny built-in projectors, Anderton selects and moves each piece of 
the visual data stream puzzle on a large, curved glass wall called a “holosphere,” giving the 
impression of both grace and control with his performance. He creates a collage of images 
that he can manipulate in a temporal-visual way, reminiscent of the backwards and forwards 
hand-winding of a reel to reel audio tape. Unlike the Schubert symphony, however, the 
background audio of the precognitive dreams combines an asynchronous mixture of sounds 
made up of words, echoes, weeping, metallic squeaking and voices screaming. In a time that 
has gone far beyond transcending Benjamin’s age of the mechanical reproduction of art, 
perhaps this is where the new art is created — in the form of expressive techno-visual 









    
 
 




 “You can choose,” Free Will, Determinism and Causality 
The premise is that the Precrime unit, being synonymous with the state, has access to 
the future by means of a mode of surveillance that is accessed from the human mind and 
produced outside the mind using a digital wet-ware technology. Built into this technology is 
another human interfacing accessibility that enables the quick deconstruction and 
reconstruction of the events which, presented visually, may be reassembled to pinpoint their 
correct spatial-temporal location. The Precrime squad must assemble a correct picture of the 
future event before the event occurs if they are to reach it in time to stop it from happening. 






    
The Precrime unit sorts through information previously known about the future, unlike 
the methodology used by contemporary policemen who in most cases, must react to each 
individual crime scene only by poring over clues left after the fact. Precrime judgements are 
made about what is or is not relevant to both the crime and the scene of an event that has not 
yet occurred. In some way this judgement is aided by an objectivity created by distance and 
the disconnection between the present and the future, but the objectivity is then cancelled out 
by the “knowing” used in making judgements. This is because any one person’s “knowing” is 
constrained by that person’s unique perception of what it is they presume to know. 
Although there is a limited amount of time between the “pre-visions” and the 
occurrence of actual murder, the members of the Washington DC Precrime unit usually have 
just enough time to reach the crime scene in time to prevent the murder. In other words, they 
must arrive at a crime scene in the present, before the future event occurs. The Pre-Cogs are 
extremely accurate about predicting the exact time of a crime, so the unit takes full advantage 
of this by setting their watches as count-down devices in order to assist them in their task of 
pre-empting crime. In an early scene when the police do not have much time to apprehend the 
“future perpetrator,” an anxious policewoman urges haste by saying, “We’re catching up to 
the future.” What is interesting about this statement is that the present seems to be largely 
overlooked, and not particularly missed. Having been promoted as “never being wrong” to the 
point of a perceived perfection, the Pre-Cogs act as the supplanted conscience of a frightened 
population. Safety, not privacy becomes the most valued commodity in a society both weary 
from crime and driven by fear. As Anderton, who relies on their visions in order to do his job 
states, “The Pre-Cogs don’t tell us what you intend to do, they tell us what you will do”. 
The task of Precrime is to prevent the murder from occurring by reaching the crime 
scene and arresting the perpetrator before the act is commit. In short, the police are charged 
with removing a pre-determined event from its assigned temporal location in what should 






    
left open by the prevention of what should have been a pre-determined event is never 
adequately resolved in Minority Report. In other words, how is it that Precrime can get away 
with making an unarguable claim that something will happen, and then not only take the steps 
to prevent it, but actually complete the task of preventing it? Rather than answer this question, 
the question is simply removed from the discussion and replaced with propaganda in the form 
of a television commercial with an ideological slogan: “That which keeps us safe, keeps us 
free,” which is easier to swallow for a population worn out by fear of violent crimes than 
reasoning out the alternatives. The fact that Precrime’s stance is one of “hard determinism:”  
 
. . . implying that at any time the future is already fixed and unique, with no 
possibility of alternative development. Logical versions of determinism 
declare each future event to be determined by what is already true, specifically, 
by the truth that it will occur then. Typical theological variants accept the 
predestination of all circumstances and events inasmuch as a divine being 
knows in advance (or even from eternity) that they will obtain.45 
 
 
However, their methodology is contradictory, because the actions they take on the 
potential outcomes are based more on “soft determinism.” They act on the assumption that 
the perpetrator will commit murder if they are not stopped by the Precrime unit. But the very 
act of them stopping the murder from happening, thus preventing the death of another person, 
proves them wrong on the spot. Furthermore, allowing the potential victim to live or die 
holds within that act an infinite chain of other events that stem from a person’s existence or 
non existence. Therefore, the saying, “That which keeps us safe, keeps us free” is proven to 
be false by the action that is taken for maintaining the “safety.” How so?  The perpetrator is 
denied the liberty to do other than that which the Precrime unit has decreed, by way of 
obeying premonitions of three Pre-Cogs, and taking it upon themselves to intervene 
accordingly. 
                                                 







    
It is Hobbes, Locke and Hume who spoke of liberty in this way: 
            . . . as the power of doing or refraining from an action according to what one 
wills, so that by choosing otherwise one would have done otherwise. An agent 
fails to have liberty when constrained, that is, when either prevented from 
acting as one chooses or compelled to act in a manner contrary to what one 
wills. Extending this model, liberty is also diminished when one is caused to 
act in a way one would not otherwise prefer, either to avoid a greater danger   
(coercion) or because there is deliberate interference with the envisioning of 
alternatives (manipulation).46 
 
How does this work? If the outcomes of major events are deemed to be known in advance, 
and those outcomes are prevented from occurring, something else must fill this void. If one 
event does not occur, something else will happen to take its place. In order to continue the 
control of events, I argue that the state must continue to manufacture other pre-determined 
outcomes to fill that void. There are themes at work in Minority Report focussing 
predominantly on man’s attempt to control final outcomes by using information pre-
determined by others.   
Surveillance is used for both identification and prevention by removal; as in 
identifying events in the future and then removing them from existence by state sanctioned 
decision. However, by erasing everything that happens before it can occur, the state operating 
the surveillance system is also obligated to find a replacement for the area of time that was 
erased. Later in this chapter, I look at how surveillance systems assist the state in identifying 
and categorising the general public, while simultaneously aiding in filling the various voids 
left by Precrime’s systematic erasure of people and events. 
 
 Action, Narrative and Memory, the Temporally Deferred 
Located under the wider umbrella of the surveillance film, Spielberg’s film combines 
a number of aspects from different genres; crime, mystery, action and science fiction, creating 








    
a dual visual presentation. Minority Report is shot with traditional film stock which he has 
chosen to make appear as consistently over exposed and cold, which is helped by removing 
the predominantly warmer colour tones. Spielberg’s aim to place Minority Report’s look in 
the visually cool, dark and gritty genre of film noir is achieved. Although visually effective, it 
is an awkward technique to match the look of the film at times with the “feel” of the story. 
Spielberg still maintains his almost pathological trademark of sentimentality in his portrayal 
of motherhood, the precious fragility of childhood, and as he calls it, “the sanctity of the 
family.”   
 Deviating further from Dick’s original short story, Spielberg places a number of 
characters within his ideal “movie family” dynamic. Lamar Burgess (Max von Sydow), as the 
paternal head of Precrime, acts as a father figure to (Chief) John Anderton, often referring to 
him as “my boy.” Burgess is fiercely protective of Precrime and has placed Anderton in the 
position of being the Precrime “poster boy,” where Anderton can be seen as the embodiment 
of a virile protector with a righteously vengeful axe to grind. Anderton represents a recurring 
character in the detective fictions of Philip K. Dick and functions here as the classic film noir 
character of the typically hard boiled cop with a troubled past. His hardness acts as the 
protective shield that he uses to cover the intense pain of having lost his only son in an instant 
when he looked away. His dedication as a police officer is fuelled somewhat feverishly by his 
vengeance towards anyone who would cause such sorrow to anyone else. The energy it takes 
to mask his sorrow with revenge, however, is painfully exhausting. 
Anderton thus dulls his pain with the illegal mind-altering drug “Neuroine,” known 
casually on the street as “Clarity.” Anderton purchases Clarity in the run down semi-criminal 
area called the “Sprawl,” a name that references an earlier, but now built-over area of “urban 
sprawl.” He gets the drug from a dealer who has had his eyes surgically removed most likely 
to prevent him being “bio-identified” by the multitude of bio-metric surveillance devices 






    
identify Anderton by referring to him as “Chief.” When Anderton, realising he has been 
recognised turns to him, the dealer says, “Oh don’t worry none, your secret’s safe with me” 
and then concludes the transaction saying, “In the land of the blind the one-eyed man is king,” 
perhaps suggesting the irony that Anderton who has two eyes still seeks “clarity” from a blind 
man. This Oedipal foreshadowing also signals a gruesome scene that comes later in the film.   
Regardless of Anderton’s numbing use of Clarity, he still emerges as a dedicated hero 
to the relatively new Precrime system of stopping murder — and therefore destiny — before it 
happens, as an antidote to both private and public suffering. He doesn’t stop to consider the 
consequences of altering the future because he is too busy concentrating on stopping crime 
before it happens. It is as if the number of criminals he stops will at some stage nullify the 
quality of his personal experience of suffering. 
The Pre-Cogs, who began their infancy as research experiment subjects in an attempt 
to cure defects caused by foetal drug damage, have been continuously monitored and altered 
neurologically, to focus their brain waves towards an enhanced production of precognitive 
dreams and visions. They are already physiologically predisposed to having predictive 
nightmares as the result of birth defects and have been groomed even further by the state 
through the introduction of chemicals to enhance their dreams of future murders. The birth 
defects in the Pre-Cogs were developed in vitro and caused by their mother’s over use of 
illegal hallucinogenic drugs. Ironically, these drugs were the stronger, rougher versions of the 
drug “Clarity” that Anderton now seeks on the street.  The murderous visions they see in their 
dreams are touted as “a gift to society,” but they are of course, a dreadful curse for the three 
individuals who must endure the phenomenological experience of continuous nightmares. 
Lara (Kathryn Morris), John Anderton’s still loyal ex-wife who is artistically creative 
and stoically sophisticated, is in the back-ground for much of the film. Near the end of the 
movie, she is called upon to defend and redeem Anderton. She represents the couple’s 






    
abducted six-year-old son, Sean (Spencer Treat Clark), the victim of an unimaginable and 
unsolved kidnapping, presumed dead for six years since the inception of Precrime. The other 
predominately film noir character is Danny Witwer (Colin Farrell), a fast-talking, gum-
chewing investigating officer from the Justice Department, who arrives on assignment as an 
unwelcome overseer for the Precrime project that Anderton and Burgess have been 
developing. Witwer has been “sent by Justice” to usurp Anderton’s position, if not shut down 
the project completely, an assignment which is bolstered by his somewhat esoteric view of 
human imperfection. He informs Anderton early on: “If there is a flaw in the system, it’s 
human. It always is.” 
By setting the story in the near future, Spielberg enables us to imagine a somewhat 
realistic or at least believable place and time to reflect on some of the societal issues we face 
in the present. Minority Report also offers a platform for considering the concept and the 
consequences of a society’s complete acceptance of surveillance as a substitute saviour. This 
would not be difficult to achieve when the people want to believe that those predictive 
prophets who dream the future are located in a perfectly closed system and that their 
predictions are never wrong. However, by disguising predictions as true knowledge, 
combined with the use of “pre-knowing” and pre-set goals to control events that should be 
allowed to occur free of outside coercion, they will achieve limited success, and  for a limited 
time. 
After identifying the suspect /perpetrator with a portable biometric “eye-dent” device, 
the Precrime officer reads the criminal their rights under the familiar U.S. Miranda Act. 
However, they arrest the suspect as if they have already committed the crime, changing the 
phrase from: “I am placing you under arrest for the murder of. . .” to: “I am placing you under 
arrest for the future crime of murder. . .”  Removing guilt before it happens allows the state’s 
Precrime system to look as though the state is protecting its people. However, by removing 






    
identities. It is also imperative that the state perfect this system of substitution and 
replacement before any feeling of loss can set in. Although much of life is predictable, when 
free, living amongst others in a pluralistic society is unpredictable. As Arendt puts it: “The 
reason why we are never able to foretell with certainty the outcome and end of any action is 
simply that action has no end” (HC: 233). When the state claims it can predict and control the 
future, the people let go of their ability to trust “not knowing,” which finally translates to a 
loss of faith. The notion of trusting the unpredictable and understanding the irreversibility of 
action is replaced instead by a fear of the mere potential of action. 
 
Loss of Faith is Replaced by Commodities 
In my discussion of memory in Caché, I proposed the metaphor that just as a pearl is 
attached to the two halves of a shell, human memory forms an attachment to two of the 
bearers of what I relate to here as Benjamin’s aura of authenticity; the conscience and 
consciousness. By this I mean that in nature, a true pearl is created only when the protective 
substance of nacre is released in reaction to an irritation within the oyster’s shell, in that what 
was originally an irritation is eventually transformed to a rare thing of beauty. My argument 
here is that the conscience also develops like the authentic pearl and will similarly form only 
after the irritation of guilt is introduced. The irritation of guilt occurs when there is knowledge 
that a wrongful act has been committed, and the protective reaction is, (or should be) that the 
wrongful act be rectified in some way. Guilt is the catalyst which begins as an irritant, but 
also holds the power to transform and become something above and beyond its origins — like 
an authentic (albeit “imperfect”) pearl. 
 For a jeweller there are two types of pearls, natural and man-made. Natural pearls are 
deemed to hold more beauty and are therefore more valuable. Ironically, the imperfections in 
a pearl are the cause of its beauty and worth. The random (and therefore imperfect) patterns 






    
until the eventual formation of an authentic pearl. The process takes many years, but the effect 
is that the pearl’s natural lustre produced by the uneven layers causes an inner ethereal glow, 
combined with an array of translucent colours that reflect and refract light off the surface of a 
pearl. Perfect in its imperfection, the natural pearl is so rare and mesmerising to the eye that it 
is utterly prohibitive in cost. 
Conversely, man-made pearls are not nearly as costly. Their manufacture is controlled 
by pre-set systems and cheap materials for mass production. The inauthentic look of the 
cultured pearl is easily identified as by its different type of surface shine. There is no natural 
lustre glowing from within because true pearl nacre is not present. The point is that regardless 
of its increased proximity to uniformity, the more man interferes in the production of a pearl 
the less it will be a true pearl, and the less it will be worth. 
In 2054, the state works towards nullifying unpredictability by removing the human 
equivalent of a nacre substance, the protective substance of guilt that causes the process of the 
imperfect or random layering that is vital to the production of the “lustre” or conscience in the  
individual. Eventually, people yearn to live with their imperfections (their unique identities), 
as they find more contentment or “value” in striving for the possibility of perfection rather 
than experiencing it first-hand, but only on a surface level. There is more fascination in 
contemplating what might happen (experiencing hope and placing faith in the unpredictable), 
than in knowing what will happen. And there is something else; by having the freedom to take 
action, a choice can to be made to commit a right or wrong act.  
Here is how Arendt describes this process: 
 
While the strength of the action process is never exhausted in a single deed but, on 
the contrary, can grow while its consequences multiply; what endures in the realm 
of human affairs are these processes, and their endurance is as unlimited, as 
independent of the perishability of material and the mortality of men as the 








    
In Minority report, the state appears to replace faith with promises of predictability and safety 
and then offers in trade for their unique identities, which include their ability to make moral 
choices, a previously created persona from a carefully maintained data bank of citizen 
identities. This data bank is mined by an advertising regime, which in turn, triggers more 
surveillance and data collecting systems. Billboards with gigantic talking faces that appear as 
“interfacing advertisements” are so pervasive in the environs of Minority Report, that there is 
little or no personal space left for an individual to experience an original thought. Rather, 
public spaces become venues for constant reminders of recent shopping purchases. And so, in 
the name of safety, because the citizens of a “Precrime” (but now fear-based) society have 
been conditioned to give up making new or original purchasing decisions on their own, 
making complicated moral choices becomes far too burdensome. What develops in response 
to this constant conditioning is the citizens’ growing acceptance and dependence on the state 
to take action on their behalf, a dependence that may cause the eventual atrophy of their 
ability to view things from the perspective of others. What replaces this loss of the ability to 
take perspective is their passive acceptance of mechanical surveillance 
 
Machinic Arrangements in the Audiovisual and Advertising Regime 
In Minority Report, the control mechanisms found in Foucault’s thinking and his 
application of Bentham’s all-seeing panopticon to societal hierarchies of power,47 knowledge 
and language come into play when at the pivotal point in the film the system seems to turn on 
Anderton when the Pre-cogs predict that he will be the perpetrator of murder. He is now 
compelled to stop himself from doing something he feels he has no intention of ever acting 
out. Here is where the narrative shifts, creating a context where the audience can now identify 
with the assumed (innocent) “criminal” and thus begin to criticise this technique of 
surveillance.  In this plot twist, when Anderton discovers that he has been identified by the 
                                                 






    
Pre-Cogs as the perpetrator of a murder, his first instinct is to flee police headquarters before 
being arrested. Hoping to lose himself in the crowd, Anderton rushes to a shopping mall 
where it quickly becomes apparent that surveillance exists in a multitude of forms at every 
turn, most especially in enormous screen advertisements that call out his name in recognition. 
This identity recognition occurs because of the invisible and ongoing exchange of information 
between bodies and machines. Although this section of the movie is brief, its meaning is 
repeated several times in the film and acts as a critical commentary on today’s growing use of 
digital point to point digital communication. What appears at first glance as the blatant over-
use of gigantic product placements for cheap props, or perhaps a tongue-in-cheek reference by 
Spielberg to American consumerism is better read as a darker view of our future.  
As Anderton and the general population walk through buildings and streets, or ride on 
public transportation, invisible bio-mechanical connections are made, information is 
coalesced, sorted, stored and then dispersed in a rhizomatic48 fashion throughout the various 
databases and audiovisual architectures of the society that Anderton lives in. Further 
definitions of this phenomenon may be found by returning to Rodowick’s examination of 




In its most fundamental definition, an agencement is “machinic” in that it 
continually articulates, connects or constructs in the pursuit of desire. Desire 
itself is machinic in that it seeks to produce: collectivities, organisations, 
territories; in short, “assemblages” (RF: 219). Machinic relations are social 
relations or networks expressing force and organising desire. An assemblage 
machiniques is thus a collective organism characterised by a particular will to 
power and conceptualisation of force. (RF: 220) 
 
 
                                                 
 
48 I use the word “rhizomatic” in the sense of Guattari and Deleuze to indicate that a great deal of the world is 
layered, striated, and often full of invisible or “underground” connections. To paraphrase Patricia Pisters in her 
work The Matrix of Visual Culture, Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2003, “Multiple forces, movements 
and rests, powers and affects constitute it. It is fundamentally related to an immanent world, surrounded by 






    
 So it is that everywhere Anderton goes, personal recognition by cheerful digital billboards 
seems to follow. The advertising techniques featured in the film functions as both bait and 
mirror in a dataveillance oriented system that masks the growing totalitarianism behind its use. 
Culturally and aesthetically, audiovisual culture has finally been overtaken by an audiovisual 
regime, replacing art created by individuals for the purpose of expression, with desire, by 
algorithmically directed advertising visuals that interact on an individual level.  
In the time and place set forth in Minority Report, people have become comfortable 
conducting themselves in quasi-social interactions with human simulacra, and cosily interface 
with technology on such a quotidian level that eventually they bargain away their privacy and  
their freedom in exchange for “security.” Surveillance assemblages are generously striated in 
public settings, as advertisements, gimmickry and security check points. As the distance 
between humans and technology decreases, where might “the social bases” of Benjamin’s 
aura (and its “contemporary decay”) be located in this future world, if they exist at all? 
Benjamin’s concern was the concept of the aura of origin or authenticity versus a celluloid 
version of its portrayal for the masses in film and photography: 
 
 
It rests on two circumstances, both of which are related to the increasing 
significance of the masses of contemporary life. Namely, the desire of 
contemporary masses to bring things “closer’ spatially and humanly, which is just 
as ardent as their bent toward overcoming the uniqueness of reality by accepting 
its reproduction. (WMR: 224-225) 
 
 
In Minority Report, however, reality may be further away than it appears, and the task 
of recognising the aura concerning authenticity in this film is particularly challenging because 
we are taken beyond simply determining the “real” in present time.  Relationships with real 
people may be replaced by the synthetic sociability of a talking billboard. Technology creates 
the illusion of intimacy regardless of the actual distance of real human touch. The 






    
database information and holographic advertising, and result in sophisticated simulacra. 
Camera surveillance is automatically triggered by human biometric face and eye identification 
and demonstrates how dataveillance interfaced with lurid visual graphics creates a seductive 
and dangerous superpanoptic49 imbroglio of information. It is in this way that the billboards 
are employed as feedback loops, both for control by the state and amplification by the 
advertiser.  
Foucault’s theory of discipline and power through panopticism applies to this 
futuristic world of data collection disguised as advertising: 
 
The Panopticon functions as a kind of laboratory of power. Thanks to its 
mechanisms of observation, it gains in efficiency and in the ability to penetrate 
into men’s behaviour; knowledge follows the advances of power, discovering 
new objects of knowledge over all the surfaces on which power is exercised. 
(1997): 20450 
 
The advertisements in Minority Report seem friendly and sociable, and should serve as a 
warning bell for the contemporary audience. As we are presently driven by consumer 
capitalism, it should not be a far stretch for our imagination to comprehend the idea of 
accepting talking billboards as believable and perhaps even to judge them as a potential form 
of art. There is no argument about whether the “audience” for these billboards is “active or 
passive” because the audience is in fact rendered “interactive,” which gives them the 
impression that they are in some sense, “in control.” As Foucault also noted in Discipline and 
punish, there is a definite imbalance of power between the observer and the observed (DP: 
223). The observed are not privy to the degree of observation they are under, nor are they 
aware of the type and amount of information being gleaned about them during observation, 
therefore they have no way of knowing what is being alone with this information once it is 
                                                 
49 “Superpanopticon” as coined by Mark Poster in: The Mode of Information: Poststructuralism and Social 
Context. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990. 
 
50 Michel Foucault. Discipline and Punish, the Birth of a Prison. London: Penguin, 1997. Frequent referencing 







    
gathered. So, although seemingly benign and alone not sufficient to be considered true 
“ideologies,” the eye-catching advertising billboards nevertheless pave the way for more 
insidious forms of control.  
Minority Report may be seen as a making a comment on many of today’s deceptively 
engaging, clever and creative advertisements. Posing as music videos, some of contemporary 
society’s most sophisticated television commercials are technically and audiovisually as 
accomplished as small, independent films. As forms of mixed audio and visual art, music 
videos are intensely discussed and critiqued with an almost scholarly fervour. The audience, 
often youthful and impressionable, possesses a complete and knowledgeable familiarity with 
their subject. What may possibly be overlooked by this passionate young audience is that the 
television channels devoted entirely to playing their music videos exist for the sole purpose of 
creating the desire to purchase a variety of different products. By selling the viewer CD’s, 
DVD’s, downloadable songs, movies and any other products advertised between each music 
video played, the television channel remains a viable commodity for the owner. The young 
audience may be so subsumed in their fascination of viewing an audiovisual “work of art,” 
that the economic motives of the television channel’s unknown owner remains of little or no 
interest to them. 
 In the film’s society of 2054, just as it is in 2008, individual consumer preference is 
gleaned by using their electronically stored historical purchasing patterns in the hopes of 
urging (ordaining) future purchases.  The concept of product placement in the future is turned 
upside down however, because products now use “people placements” to advertise 
themselves. Through these friendly and familiar means of machinic arrangements, 
information is mined invisibly from within the individual’s electronic history, and then spread 
silently and rhizomatically throughout the entire state system. In Minority Report it is not 
difficult to understand the problems of resisting the beautiful, friendly faces of models 






    
“personal” messages to subjects passing by. These “messages,” however, are actually 
purchase suggestions created by advertisers by accessing and activating information culled 
from a collection of massive digital databases.   
As history has shown, to encourage pseudo intimacy from within systems and in this 
case, the electronic information systems of our present and in the future of Minority Report, is 
dangerous. Here Spielberg mirrors the public’s growing sublimation of familiarity with this 
very methodology of information collection and use. This same technique is also one of the 
chief ingredients in the recipe for creating a totalitarian regime. Similar techniques are used to 
create a collective fear emanating from a world within a world. In the film, it is the world of 
an ideology which holds that prediction is necessary for the prevention of all murders.  
In The Origins of Totalitarianism Arendt explains some of the true goals of Fascism: 
 
Totalitarianism is never content to rule by external means, namely, through the 
state and a machinery of violence: thanks to its peculiar ideology and the role 
assigned to it in this apparatus of coercion, totalitarianism has discovered a 
means of dominating and terrorizing human beings from within. (OT: 325) 
 
 
The digital audiovisual regime set forth in Minority Report does not subdue its population by 
marching in with jackboots or breaking down doors in the middle of the night and taking 
prisoners; rather, the population is subdued and soothed through its increasing, almost 
symbiotic cooption through ubiquitous advertising. Rather than presenting a future so far-
fetched that it would be considered a complete fantasy, Minority Report maintains one foot in 
contemporary society by referencing currently fashionable and globalised consumer goods. 
An audiovisual assemblage of recognisable advertising brands created with a collage of 
materials gathered from both data and biometric surveillance tools is somewhat reminiscent of 
the mise-en-abime of visual constructs present in Caché, where one finds the boundaries 






    
sees himself in the minds eye of the Pre-Cogs committing a murder and in the reflection of his 
face on the holosphere screen where he is watching it. 
By layering current real TV news footage imagery in Caché, Haneke created a 
phenomenological striation of media and memory. Here Spielberg uses “universally” familiar 
— familiar to global consumer society — product placements  in his film to ease us into a 
future which seems eerily comfortable, in the same reductive way that one may equate what is  
familiar with being harmless. He also includes Anderton’s face on someone’s television 
screen in a commercial for the American television show, Cops, and as a fluid image 
photograph on the back of a USA Today newspaper.  
Sometimes our fear of the unknown overwhelms us when in fact the danger really lies 
in a known entity we can identify and so therefore, with misplaced confidence, we choose not 
to avoid. Rodowick examines the way misrepresentation of dystopia is created through the 
visions of a capitalistic utopian dream (RF: 230). Internet technology has made the once 
exotic or forbidden quite familiar. Rodowick also discusses the concept of value as it relates 
to the virtual: “The value of access to information is determined not by spatial quantity 
(weight, volume, or number); rather, it is measured by units of time” (217). 
Minority Report demonstrates the potential results of our growing familiarity with 
commerce via open-ended virtual exchange, which both eases and erases the social and 
economic consequences of being in the place where the thing is made, and not using the local 
currency funded to purchase it. Allowing unfettered global access to a localised and therefore 
intrinsically cultural commodity effectively dissipates the uniqueness of a commodity, which, 







    
At the present time, we are already bound to accept the growing desubstantiation of 
culture, as new-media historian Lev Manovich states in The Language of New Media51, 
(2001):  
 
As distribution of all forms of culture becomes computer-based, we are 
increasingly “interfacing” to predominantly cultural data - texts, photographs, 
films, music, [and] virtual environments. In short, we are no longer interfacing 
to a computer, but to culture encoded in digital form. (69) 
 
 
I suggest that beyond the simple digital storage of data, the transformation of language into 
code may take a further step, which detaches meaning further from its original truth-context. 
Desubstantiation takes place in forms other than the visual— knowledge, art, language— all 
are altered by the translation system so that certain pieces of information may be indexed, 
altered or excluded. In Spielberg’s film version of the near future, the systematic audiovisual 
regime is portrayed through (seemingly) interactive billboards that appear as though they can 
recognise an individual as they pass by and even respond to this recognition (much as a friend 
would call out to another friend on the street) by speaking to them in a familiar way, while 
continuing to maintain a graphically polished style. These advertisements replace the aesthetic 
cultural value of the audiovisual, because “culture” and its “distinctive outlook” are simply no 
longer considered a necessity. Once the need for individual distinction is removed, the 
citizens under Precrime may find that relying on the dreams of others is an acceptable choice, 
and will choose this over making their own moral decisions. 
Caché carried a warning about the effects of distanciation; now Minority Report 
shows us some of the potential consequences of excessive interaction (interfacing) with 
machines. Driving home a problematic set of dualities, Rodowick addresses the notion of 
apparent or assumed interactivity, (such as thinking that a billboard is interactive when in 
reality; it is being only reactive), in his chapter, “An Uncertain Utopia —Digital Culture”: 
                                                 






    
This is a question not simply of what happens on the screen (cinematic, 
televisual, or computer) but of how these technologies serve to define, regulate, 
observe and document human collectivities. The goals of interactive 
computing and communication that are in the vanguard of research on new 
electronic media, while genuinely utopian, must nonetheless be questioned, for 
the dream of the individual’s absolute control over information is 
simultaneously the potentiality for absolute surveillance and the reification of 
private experience. The deciding factor involves political questions concerning 
the controls over centralization and access. (RF: 72 
 
 
A false intimacy is created by the use of personal data accessed through advertising 
technology, reinforcing the ethos behind the Precrime programme which is that the state 
knows better than you, by accessing precognitive proxies whether or not you will commit 
murder. If the general public accepts that categorised shopping habits are capable of being 
invisibly resourced as a way of “knowing” a person, why should anyone mistrust the 
capabilities of all-knowing, all-seeing visions of three mystics known as Pre-Cogs?  
Spielberg admits that this film is obsessive about looking and seeing. He presents the 
panoply of references to visuality in general, often using duality relationships to support them. 
We are presented with vision versus visions, what is seen and what is revealed, relationships 
between subjects; the eyes and “I” of the individual, and then the eyes of the state, constantly 
surveilling and bio-tracking human eyes, leading to the categorisation of the collective “I’s.” 
However, these relationships of duality also connect to all of the major plot developments in 
the form of “interfacing.”  
The general population of near-future Washington DC, and one assumes, all across 
America, is recognised by eye scanners referred to somewhat neologically and in familiarity 
as “eye-dents.” Under the guise of its user-friendly nickname the eye-dent is a biometric tool 
for facial recognition, honed to identify any human subject via the iris of their eye. This is 
how billboard advertisers “know” their subject by employing the eye-dent to identify the 
person who looks at their advertisement. Having once been referred to as “the widows of 






    
data stream of personal information and, in the Foucauldian manner, may be used for 
identifying, sorting, categorising and ultimately controlling the population. 
Just as the eye-dent activates a pre-set but seemingly “individualised” advertising 
pitch by referencing the person’s name (and therefore identification) to the subject in the hope 
that such personalised attention will evoke a purchase from the respondent, the central 
authority of the state also has access to this information. The glittering displays of commerce 
are meant to act as a secret conduit to the state system of categorising its citizenry. Outwardly, 
these displays distract and distance the populous from contemplating these notions, and also 
help to reduce the connection between the reality of living people and the consequences of the 
purchases they make 
 
 
Argus Panoptes, Christ and the Oracle: Longing for the eye of God in the Regime of 
Visibility 
 
In The Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt explains the concept of what was originally 
called “natural law” in medieval times, as “positive law:” 
 
 
By lawful government we understand a body politic in which positive laws are 
needed to translate and realise the immutable ius naturale or the eternal 
commandments of God into standards of right and wrong. Only in these 
standards, in the body of positive laws of each country, do the ius naturale or 
the Commandments of God achieve this political reality. (OT: 464) 
 
 
“The eternal commandments of God” are hinted at in a scene before Anderton has been 
identified as the next murderer, in which Witwer, Anderton and other members of the 
Precrime police force engage in a theological discussion about the Pre-Cogs while observing 
them as the trio float serenely in their opaque bath of what is described as “image enhancing 
photon milk.” Witwer sounds almost wistful when he speaks of the Pre-Cogs: “In a way, they 
give us hope of the existence of the divine. I find it interesting that some people have begun to 











Chief John Anderton and Detective Danny Witwer discuss politics and theology in the holding chamber of 
the Pre-Cogs, referred to as “The temple.” Note the design pattern on the walls behind appear as crosses 
with lights shining through the centres making a reference to Christian symbolism. 
 
Played by the actor and Irish native Colin Farrell, the character of Danny Witwer is 
also conveniently Irish by designation. This ethnic heritage of origin and the slight Irish lilt in 
Witwer’s accent is used in a way that I found both stereotypical and somewhat hackneyed to 
introduce a decidedly Christian theme to the film. Witwer opines, “Science has stolen most of 
our miracles,” as he gazes heavenward within the domed house of the Pre-Cogs referred to as 
the “temple.” At least on one level, we can surmise that God is sorely longed for by many in 
the society envisioned in Minority Report. The Pre-Cogs are shown floating in their tank in 
the manner of a three-chambered unmistakeable trinity. They have been previously described 
as having a “hive-mind,” which we learn is crucial to their premonition and is threatened with 
extinction should they ever be separated into three individuals. Numerous Christian references 
and references to other deities are inserted into the text of Minority Report creating what 
appears to be a fabulation of immanence among many of the lesser characters. In this society, 
where there is no need for a conscience, there is still a desire for something beyond specified, 
humanly channelled premonitions to replace it, and perhaps God or even “the gods” are the 
replacements. It could be that the concept of being under constant surveillance is a comfort, 






    
god-like being. Hardened by a personal trauma which precludes his belief in God, Anderton 
snaps back sarcastically, “Pre-Cogs are a pattern recognition filter, that’s all.” Witwer, who is 
prone to theism, regards the Precrime system as extremely suspect, and without giving too 
much away about what he really thinks, seems to combine the elements of both arguments to 
explain why they might be defied: “The oracle isn’t where the power is, anyway. The power 
is with the priests, even if they had to invent the oracle.”  
Other awkwardly theistic tropes are employed throughout the film, including one of 
the Precrime police making the gesture of the cross over his chest as he is whooshed up a 
futuristic pipe to the awaiting helicopter. Other members of the force are heard exclaiming, 
“Oh my God!” One rather unscrupulous character, named Rufus Riley (an Irish surname), is 
moved to shout in amazement, “Jesus Christ,” upon discovering that he is in the presence of a 
real Pre-Cog, as he simultaneously drops to his knees, as if in supplication. He then proceeds 
to “confess his sins” to Agatha, who removed from her safe world of photon milk is now 
disoriented and confused. When safe in the “temple,” the Pre-Cogs are filmed in an ethereal 
light, and dressed like wingless angels. As soon as a criminal is captured, they are kept 
subdued by a kind of mechanical mind- stunning contraption encircling their head which is 
referred to as “being haloed” (or hallowed). Furthermore, when the future criminal is captured, 
they are “stored in the Hall of Containment,” where the occupants are physically in an almost 
cryogenic state, but as the biblically named character Gideon, the gate keeper of the Hall says, 
“on the inside, [referring to their minds] they are busy, busy, busy.” We are allowed glimpses 
of the endless loop of hellish thoughts playing and replaying on their transparent containers, 
and we can equate this to being trapped in a purgatorial place; their own murderous minds. 
These references, and many more like them, do not weave together to make a whole cloth of 
Christian overtone, rather, they are slotted in at moments, sometimes ill-fittingly. It is as 
though they have been placed within the dialogue, but not in the plot in order for Spielberg to 






    
The manner in which these Christian cues are presented could be taken as a negative 
comment on the Christian epistemological system, but perhaps Spielberg employs the 
mention of Jesus Christ in reference to the New Testament identification of the arrival of the 
true Messiah to contrast to the Old Testament’s version of seeking the true Messiah who has 
not yet come. Other New and Old Testament themes are also clearly present  such as the Old 
Testaments’ “eye for an eye” version of vengeful justice coupled with Spielberg’s heavy use 
of visual iconography, versus the Christian ethos of forgiveness and the appearance of motifs 
of the Trinity. Despite the references to these two doctrines, what the characters seem to sense 
is that something else is missing. With an almost complete elimination of murder, even 
though the world may now feel safer, it does not somehow, feel natural. 
The proliferation of talking billboards with their identification capabilities is 
reminiscent of Argus Panoptes, the hundred-eyed guardian monster of Greek mythology. The 
Judeo-Christian God of omnipotence, omniscience and judgement still exists in the thoughts 
of many, but the Precrime system and all of the spaces hollowed out and left open by pre-
emptive methods of state control have made surveillance the replacement god of these people. 
On a much deeper and more pertinent level to the concern of the present analysis, Spielberg 
seems to make over-arching religious and mythic historical connections between themes of 
prediction, seeing, and the all seeing. When Anderton discovers that there is the possibility of 
a minority report, and hence, the chance for an alternate future, he exclaims, “Jesus Christ, 
why didn’t I know about that?” The answer to this is that Anderton’s ability to take 
perspective has been dulled by his pain and his self-medication. Here I define “perspective” as 
“healthy surveillance,” issuing from within, based in the conscience, with the ability to view 
in duo. The way one personally sees something, and the way in which others might see that 







    
 
 
Agnes and Anderton, locked in the pose of the two heads of a Janus coin, one looking backward and one 
looking forward in time, and also being able to see both sides of a situation, thereby gaining perspective. 
 
 
Ideology versus Perspective; the Discrepancy between Legality and Justice52 
If one event is prevented from happening, what will happen in its place instead? In 
Caché, besides being reminded of our deepening immersion in the increasing enormity of our 
digital visual culture, we are also brought to a precarious tipping point; where we imagine the 
inability to distinguish between audiovisual culture and what has become audiovisual regime. 
In Minority Report, the ability to identify the audiovisual regime is no longer salient, all that 
matters is security, by whatever means the state decrees — provided that the state creates a 
palatable ideology to support its actions, and as long as crimes of murder have been 
statistically reduced to nil. However, as Arendt points out: “Ideologies are known for their 
scientific character: they combine the scientific approach with results of philosophical 
relevance and pretend to be scientific philosophy” (OT: 468). In Arendt’s view, a crime-free 
society does not necessarily mean a healthy society. In concept, the prevention of murder as a 
security measure by way of surveillance emanating from predictive human nightmares 
interfacing with technologically has become less of a practical crime deterrent and more of a 
political movement. To prevent a crime on the assumption that it is destined to happen is 
                                                 






    
eventually destined to remove “all opposition” to the measures that the state is willing to take 
against its citizens under an ideology of “safety as freedom.” Arendt explains: 
 
Just as positive laws, though they define transgressions, are independent of 
them — the absence of crimes in any society does not render laws 
superfluous but, on the contrary, signifies their most perfect rule — so terror 
in totalitarian government has ceased to be a mere means for the suppression 
of opposition, though it is also used for such purposes. Terror becomes total 
when it becomes independent of all opposition; it rules supreme when 
nobody any longer stands in its way. If lawfulness is the essence of non-
tyrannical government and lawlessness is the essence of tyranny, then terror 
is the essence of totalitarian domination (OT: 464). 
 
 
The society portrayed in Minority Report is ruled by law not as the last recourse, meaning it is 
not a system called upon and adhered to in reaction to a crime, but rather law as a state 
security system using technology backed up by omnipresent surveillant systems, not only of 
precognition, but active surveillance in the form of mechanical robotic “spyders” that seek out 
people in surveillant identification to separate them into suspects and innocents. There is no 
permission sought for cooperation, and unlike the characters in a typical film noir narrative, 
the citizens are not asked to “come downtown for questioning.”  Surveillance here foregoes 
any pretence of political correctness; the acquiescent subjects are located behind bathroom or 
bedroom doors. Here is the proof of the “essence of totalitarian domination” that Arendt 
speaks of. They know to stand still at attention while their eyes are pried open and inspected 
for purposes of bio- identification. 
The citizens of Washington DC in 2054 fully believe that the law in the guise of a 
designated security system is infallibly trustworthy, because they have been convinced that 
the Pre-Cogs are never wrong. Therefore, it follows that any decisions made by the law must 
also be trusted. In opposition to their unshakable belief in the inevitability (and correctness) of 






    
Burgess still have the capability of exercising free will, which we see in their incredible 
displays of self- control later in the film. 
Writing on ideology,  such as on the catch phrase, “that which keeps us safe keeps us 
free,” Arendt concludes that: “Ideologies always assume that one idea is sufficient to explain 
everything in the development from the premise, and that no experience can teach anything 
because everything is comprehended in this consistent process of logical deduction” (OT: 
470). The paradox is that both Anderton and Burgess are able to break free from ideologically 
based “logical deductions.”  
At a crucial point in the film when Anderton faces Leo Crow, who is an alleged child-
molester and the man he has been predestined to murder, Crow also claims to be the murderer 
of Anderton’s son, Sean. Nevertheless, Anderton manages to prevent himself from 
intentionally killing Leo Crow. How is this possible? Apparently the Pre-Cog Agatha is either 
able to convince Anderton to make a choice other than the one that she has envisioned for him, 
simply by saying, “You can choose,” or Anderton manages to call forward his “free will,” 
thus cancelling out (what was found to be false) “determinism.” This presents the first 
assertion in the narrative of free will over determinism, because what Agatha means when she 
says, “You can choose,” is what Arendt maintains is the key to breaking free from the 
“tyranny of logicality,” it is to “start thinking.” Arendt says that thinking is “the freest and 
purest of all human activities [and] is the very opposite of the compulsory process of 
deduction” (OT: 473). As we saw near the beginning of Minority Report, Anderton had 
become a lonely and isolated man, a predicament which in Arendt’s view is “the common 
ground for terror, the essence of the totalitarian government and for ideology and logicality, 
the preparation of its executioners and victims” (OT: 475). 
What is odd here is that Anderton has spent the last six years of his life completely 
convinced that the Pre-Cogs are never wrong in their visions and that they don’t know what 






    
actually autonomous agents of our own destiny, gifted with the ability to make independent 
and individualised decisions. Even Burgess, in the penultimate scene where he stands in a 
classical face-off with Anderton, resists the overwhelming urge to shoot him, and instead 
manages to turn his gun armed with the “golden bullets symbolic of peace”53 upon himself, 
thus ending his life. 
The irony is that both Anderton and Burgess have been the most vehement proponents 
of Precrime based on precognition, and yet each demonstrate through their sheer force of will 
that they can choose alternative forms of action based on their individual decision making. 
However, neither man is put in the position of not having the liberty to make a choice, in 
other words, unlike the other people under the rule of Precrime, Anderton and Burgess have 
access to the luxury of deciding to go against what has been foretold, or in Burgess’ case, 
choosing his own consequence based on his admitted guilt—only after being publicly 
revealed through another visual display. 
A desperate Anderton is caught in the middle of another typical film noir scenario54 of 
the wronged man trying to escape prosecution, and at the same time being compelled to find 
the real criminal (or clue) that will exonerate him and restore justice to his dire situation. And 
so, after a daring car chase55 and escape, Anderton lands just inside the property of genetic 
scientist Dr. Iris Hineman, who is the only person who can give him answers. Her placement 
in the middle of the film is used to facilitate a way of explaining to Anderton (and the 
audience) that it is possible for the Pre-Cogs to make a mistake, but that this fact is hidden 
                                                 
53 At his retirement party, Lamar Burgess is presented with an antique gun and golden bullets, as a parting gift 
from his secretary. Burgess then explains to his guests the significance of the gift by telling them that in the old 
Civil War days, when war had ended, the troops presented commanding Generals with guns loaded with gold-
plated bullets, symbolising the end of the war and destruction. 
54 See: Robert G. Porfirio, Film Noir Reader, “No Way Out, Existential Motifs in the Film Noir.” “Set down in a 
violent and incoherent world, the film noir hero tries to deal with it in the best way he can, attempting to create 
some order out of chaos, to make some sense of his world” (2001, 92). 
 
55 The car chase scene is preceded by what I argue is a series of scenes created in reference to the concept of 
“Man merging with technology.” First, there is a shoot-up scene using weapons of the future that only blow huge 
gusts of air which is played out in a completely robotically automated car factory. Anderton miraculously 
escapes Witwer and the Precrime police by actually being built right into the car that he drives off the factory 






    
through Burgess’ pragmatic decision to omit making public information about the existence 
of a “minority report.” The minority report is a record of an alternative vision (and therefore 
an alternate version) of the future experienced by one out of the three Pre-Cogs. Hineman tells 
Anderton that the minority report is “stored, but not declared.” Because Anderton is 
convinced that he is innocent of any future murder, he desperately wants to know where the 
minority report is. She tells him that the place where it is stored is actually within the Pre-cog 
who predicted it. I interpret the report as being not only the immediate rendition of the vision, 
in the way that the negative is authentic to the photograph, but again, like the conscience, 
which is “stored within” and is authentic to each individual. 
Here, in the location of a Hineman’s greenhouse filled with genetically modified 
plants gone somewhat mad, we learn of her previous partnership with Lamar Burgess and 
how the Pre-Cogs came to be. Hineman thus provides Anderton with his own alternative view 
of the Pre-Cogs as real, suffering people and far beyond the mere “pattern recognition filters” 
he has seen them as until now. He also sees Lamar Burgess as being less than the altruistic 
father-figure he had always seemed to be, as he learns that there are imperfections in the 
system that he and Burgess have both upheld as the indisputable truth. It is at this point in the 
film that Anderton begins to gain what I argue is surveillance in its most positive human form, 
and that is as perspective. 
In order to obtain his own minority report, Anderton must kidnap Agatha from 
the Temple (dislodging her from her dream world), and after undergoing the surgical 
removal of his eyes, he must have them replaced by the eyes of different person, 
dislodging his detectable identity from his body. Agatha, the Pre-cog with the greatest 
“seeing power,” who is also searching for someone to bring her mother’s (Anne 
Lively) murderer to justice, becomes Anderton’s “guide.” In this case, Spielberg 
chooses a male Asian identity, as if to point out an example of living as “the other,” 






    
in order to seek justice, or, as Hineman muses poetically, “Sometimes in order to see 
the light, you have to risk the dark” — but not too much risk, as Anderton cleverly 
insists on keeping his original eyes for future use. 
The ocular-centric theme in Minority Report is displayed most graphically in a 
scene where Spielberg pays homage to both the play Oedipus Rex, and to Stanley 
Kubrick’s film, A Clockwork Orange (Warner Brothers Pictures, 1971) when 
Anderton voluntarily has his eyes surgically removed in order to escape detection by 
the cities seemingly inescapable eye-dents.  Like the character of Alex in A Clockwork 
Orange, Anderton is tied down and his eyes are forcibly pried and propped open. 
Anderton thinks he will be able to prove his innocence by finding the alternative or 
the possibility of a different outcome in the “minority” view of the future. In his haste 
to do so, however, we can see that he continues to rely on the potentiality in the 
premonition of another, (just as Oedipus, once blinded, must rely on a guide) over his 
own decision-making until later, when  his ultimate realisation is that his future will 
be based on certain choices that only he himself can make.  
 
Conclusion: “Irreversibility and the Power to Forgive; Unpredictability and the Power 
of Promise”56 
 
The character of Anderton’s ex-wife Lara becomes prominent towards the conclusion 
of Minority Report as the long-suffering yet loyal and forgiving mother-figure. Her somewhat 
unusual reason for divorcing Anderton was not because she blamed him for losing their little 
boy, but because her husband reminded her too much of her son. This leaves her in the 
faultless position of having loved her son so much that the memory of him, caused by the 
nearness of someone else she also loved, was simply too painful for her to endure. Lara is 
presented as a film photography artist who, by 2054 would probably be considered as an artist 
working with a rare, antique medium, and, as Spielberg is noted for his resistance to shooting 
                                                 






    
movies using digital technology, this resistance is his homage to the medium, perhaps his 
hope that this “authentic medium” will never die out or be completely replaced. More 
importantly though, is the fact that here photography seems to be touched on as Spielberg’s 
trope of authenticity and a connection with a happier past, bringing us back to Lara, the 
(previously) loving wife and the mother, and also the hope for Anderton’s “authentic” future 
to appear at the end of the movie. 
Spielberg delivers a privileged and somewhat exalted view of Lara when Witwer visits 
her to try and ascertain John Anderton’s whereabouts during his escape. At first, she is 
presented as a dignified and charming hostess, offering coffee to Witwer and asking him if he 
“takes anything with it.” Witwer answers, “Cream and sugar.” At this point, Lara says that she 
doesn’t have any cream, but turns to retrieve the sugar. When Witwer reveals why he is 
actually there, which is to probe her for information about Anderton whom he hopes to 
capture and send to the Hall of Containment for the murder he has been predicted to commit, 
Lara becomes indignant. She shows it by refusing Witwer sugar for his coffee, and then she 
curtly asks him to leave. This is Spielberg’s conventional way of accomplishing two 
important tasks to advance the plot. The first is to show the empowerment of Lara, (who must 
boldly rescue Anderton in the next few scenes). The second is to inform us that she is still 
fiercely loyal to her ex-husband (giving her the proper motive to rescue him), whom we now 
begin to regard as “John,” rather than as “Anderton.” It is as if Lara’s increasing feelings of 
“closeness” to her ex-husband draw us in as well. 
It is at this pivotal point in the film that the crucial concept of forgiveness is 
introduced. When Witwer paints a crude version of why Lara may have left John, by moving 
in quite close to her saying, “I heard it’s because he got lost in Precrime instead of you,” she 
stands her ground and refutes this self-centred version of why she left John by explaining to 
Witwer: “It wasn’t his fault” (that Sean was lost), and “every time I looked at him, I saw my 






    
there is no blame, or rather, when the choice not to blame is voiced, the opportunity for 
vengeance is removed. The emotion in her voice tells us that she still loves John, (whom she 
never blamed in her heart in the first place), and he is now officially forgiven. Vengeance is 
replaced by forgiveness, and its replacement occurs only through the personal choice that 
Lara makes. Lara is able to choose forgiveness because she is able to take perspective: she can 
see outside herself and she can see how others see.  
Later, when Anderton shows up with Agatha at Lara’s cottage, Agatha is miraculously 
able to tell John and Lara what Sean’s alternate future would have been had he lived. She 
begins by saying, “Dr. Hineman says the dead don’t die, they look on and help.” Apparently, 
the ability to envision being looked upon by Sean is the first step for John and Lara to take in 
the healing process of their relationship. Then, in poignant detail, Agatha muses dreamily 
about the different stages of Sean growing up, describing his fondness for running, his 
engagement to a girl named Claire, (referencing Clarity), and so on. By this time, Lara and 
John are quietly sobbing together in the background, indicating that because of their 
continuing love for one another, their forgiveness of each other and John’s forgiveness of 
himself can at last be complete. Forgiveness is necessary as the final step towards supplying 
Lara with the motivation to risk danger in order to rescue John from the Hall of Containment. 
When he is haloed and placed in his containment cell, we are shown that his particular cell is 
labelled, “John Anderton, 1109,” undoubtedly Spielberg’s evocation of September 11th, 2001. 
Besides being a futuristic answer to the world’s insecurity about failed security, the reference 
to September 11th concerns the dangers of reacting without thinking, and seeking vengeance 
in a pre-emptive strike against unproven enemies to prevent future crimes. 
The end of Minority Report contains the message that one should choose forgiveness 
over vengeance, and that forgiveness is possible only through love, that imperfect, 
unpredictable and therefore authentic action. In The Human Condition, near the end of the 






    
If it were true, therefore, as Christianity assumed, that only love can forgive 
because only love is fully receptive to who somebody is, to the point of being 
always willing to forgive him whatever he may have done, forgiving would 
have to remain altogether outside our considerations (242-243) . . . here, as in 
action and speech generally, we are dependent upon others, to whom we 
appear in distinctness which we ourselves are unable to perceive. Closed 
within ourselves, we would never be able to forgive ourselves any failing or 
transgression because we would lack the experience of the person for the sake 
of whom one can forgive (243). 
 
 
In the film’s final voice-over, John Anderton tells us that when it was discovered that Lamar 
Burgess had murdered Agatha’s mother in order to keep Agatha as the most gifted Pre-Cog, 
Precrime was effectively eliminated and “all prisoners were pardoned or paroled, although 
police kept watch on many of them for years to come.” The audience’s desire for revenge is 
satisfied, not by Anderton killing Burgess and saving the day, but by Burgess’ own hand.  
In the scene where he and Anderton are pressed against each other in their mutual 
struggle to gain control of Burgess’ antique gun with the gold-plated bullets, Burgess shoots 
himself in response to Anderton’s half-taunting and half-lecturing him about “making the 
right choice.” The choice is to shoot and kill Anderton, which would mean that Precrime 
didn’t work, or to let Anderton live while Burgess ends up in the Hall of Containment for the 
crime of murdering Agatha’s mother. When the gun goes off, Burgess says his final words to 
Anderton: “Yes, I made a choice. Forgive me, John, forgive me, my boy.” 
Burgess chose to end his own life rather than face the consequences or take 
responsibility for his actions, proving that the society that was forming under the Precrime 
system of security through surveillance, was indeed on its way to becoming a totalitarian 
regime, and, as I argued earlier, doomed to fail. Meanwhile, in the final sequences, John and 
Lara Anderton are shown standing together, contented, because Lara is visibly pregnant. This 
underscores Arendt’s concept of natality: “The miracle that saves the world . . . the new 






    
supports the notion that faith in an unpredictable future will be chosen over having no choice 



































Introduction: Das Leben der Anderen / The Lives of Others57  
A “Web of Human Relationships”58 
 
Written and directed by German filmmaker Florian Henckel von Donnersmarck,59 the 
story in Das Leben der Anderen60  is set in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the 
capital city of East Berlin, in the year 1984. In this film von Donnersmarck portrays the 
presence of surveillance as being imbued with an almost human physicality, a treatment that 
corresponds with Arendt’s phenomenological examination of political life as a lived 
experience, predicated on human action. Surveillance plays an integral part in an entire 
political system in which constant, mass surveillance permeates the population. The fear of 
being seen, heard or caught doing something the State does not approve of is ever-present. 
Although located in the genre of the surveillance film, Das Leben der Anderen is at 
times more akin to being an “anti-surveillance” film that is thematically focussed on the 
ethical redemption of the Stasi operative, Hauptmann Gerd Wiesler. As an unknown overseer, 
Wiesler has a privileged view because only he is capable of having an almost complete 
awareness of the wide scope of activities surrounding the people he is surveilling. While it is 
his duty to report certain activities, it is also his personal choice whether or not to do so. 
                                                 
 
57The Lives of Others,  (2006), GR, AU, FR, GB, and USA. Written and directed by Florian Henckel von 
Donnersmarck. The film was the winner of the 2007 Academy Award (USA) in the “Best Foreign Language 
Film of the Year” category, and also garnered seven “Lola” awards, (Germany’s version of the Oscar Awards) 
for Best Film, Best Director and Best Screenplay. 
 
58 Hannah Arendt. HC: 184. 
 
59 From here on in, he may also be referred to as “von Donnersmarck.” 
 






    
Wiesler has not been coerced into being the surveillant of the other characters in the film, in 
fact, the idea to watch and listen to these people in particular was originally his own. Thus, 
known only to him and other Stasi operatives, Wiesler finds himself a “newcomer” in the 
lives of others, with the unexpected result that his voyeuristic surveillance becomes the 
ground for a revelatory self-reflection, which brings this film to its culmination.  
The consequences that occur as the result of his surveillance stem from the specific 
actions he chooses to apply to an already “existing web of human relationships” (Arendt) 
which are his subjects: the actress Christa-Maria Sieland (Martina Gedech), her lover, 
playwright Georg Dreyman (Sebastian Koch), and by association, their various friends within 
the theatre and literary network of East and West Berlin. My aim in this chapter is to examine 
how the device of surveillance, which is designed to enforce totalitarian control of artist’s 
lives in fact, undermines these same pretensions when its chief perpetrator, Wiesler, 
undergoes an ethical transformation. 
As in Minority Report, a system of surveillance enforces a totalitarian government 
based on an ideology of state-sanctioned mistrust. In contrast to Caché, the other surveillance 
film I have considered, the action of surveillance by the “lonely figure” of Gerd Wiesler 
serves to create a web of intimacy within the human relationships between the characters, 
rather than an isolating, mechanical distance. It is the manner in which such a web of intimacy 
is created that I wish to call attention to this chapter. 
In The Human Condition, Arendt’s discussion of modernity includes some of 
Benjamin’s hermeneutic strategies for re-connecting the break or the “rupture” from the past 
by identifying moments of deracination in history. Her aim is to reinvigorate the significance 
of traditional Western philosophical concepts and thus recover the “aura” Benjamin spoke of, 
and find its relevance for the future. In Arendt’s version, the process of thinking enables us to 
dissolve our fixed thoughts, behold our accepted rules of conduct, and thus prepare the way 






    
It is through Wiesler’s act of reflecting, as in becoming conscious of his thinking that 
he is led to making a judgement on what action to take in this particular situation, and so 
finally, he is able to break through the hermeneutic bubble of his loyalty to an unjust system. 
When he develops his perception to see how others see, he is thus able to turn his mechanistic 
system of surveillance away from harming his subjects, and instead, use it as a means of 
protecting them. Just as John Anderton came to realise the humanity within the three Pre-cogs 
in Minority Report (no longer seeing them as mere “pattern-recognition filters”) contrasting 
with a new way of seeing Lamar Burgess (less of a kindly, altruistic father-figure and more as 
a controlling cog in the wheel of the state machinery), Wiesler becomes aware of the 
existence of the individual conscience within each of the people he is listening to, the more 
his own conscience is revealed to himself. 
The turning point of the film occurs when the usually stoic Wiesler consciously 
decides to anonymously alert Dreyman in such a way that he enables him to “discover” an 
illicit relationship that exists between Christa-Maria and a powerful party member. The 
evidence he views occurs on the street nearly right outside their door. Wiesler presses two 
wires together with an uncharacteristic energy bordering on glee, and by choosing to connect 
these wires, he and his action become a catalyst for an event by causing the doorbell to ring in 
the apartment below, which Dreyman assumes is a neighbour who has forgotten their key. It 
is when he goes to answer the door that he becomes privy to the activities in the street. He 
does not reproach Christa-Maria; instead, he hides from her, keeping her secret. Wiesler 
disapproves of what is going on between Christa-Maria and the party member but, powerless 
to take any real action to stop the incident, he reveals what is happening to Dreyman. Is he 
trying to hurt Dreyman or somehow correct the poor behaviour of a higher up in the Socialist 
Party by exposing him and “the truth”? Although completely alone, it is in this cruel moment 
that Wiesler chooses to remark aloud, “It is now time for some bitter truths.” His role as a 






    
observer and then only a reporter. Instead, he becomes a catalyst within the “web” of 




The disclosure of the “who” through speech, and the setting of a new 
beginning through action, always fall into an already existing web where 
their immediate consequences can be felt. Together they start a new process 
which eventually emerges as the life story of the newcomer, affecting 




Wiesler’s act of connecting the two wires occurs at the same time that he disconnects from his 
previous mode of action, which seems to have been based on a stale, unconscious loyalty to a 
corrupt and immoral state system. This disconnection serves to awaken Wiesler; his 
conscience, previously buried under years of dogmatic habits begins to be revealed. As a 
result of this, Wiesler becomes increasingly self-aware and so begins to question what was 
once the unquestionable — his duty to the State. Almost immediately after this scene, we find 
Wiesler in his own apartment, and again, the sound of a doorbell almost identical to 
Dreyman’s rings as if to serve up another “bitter truth” — reinforcing the personal truth of 
Wiesler’s lonely and empty existence, when a prostitute arrives at his door for a pre-arranged 
visit. Arendt argues that when one engages in the act of self -dialogue, they realise that their 
ultimate duty is to be able to live with their own deeds, and that they will come to this 
conclusion: “I am my own witness when I am acting. I know the agent and am condemned to 
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Hauptmann Gerd Wiesler, a Stasi agent and a master at surveillance. 
 
Wiesler watches a television monitor that shows the outside entrance of Georg and Christa-Maria’s front  
door. Next to the monitor is an authentic piece of Stasi surveillance equipment. 
 
 
This shot of Georg and Christa-Maria lay in bed reminds us that someone is above them listening to their 







    
“The Web of Relationships and the Enacted Stories”62 
Von Donnersmarck portrays the streets of Berlin as noticeably empty of automobiles 
which shows a lack of prosperity and the signs of a dwindling population. As surveillance of 
one kind or another is perpetrated by the Stasi who have thoroughly mastered their craft, its 
presence is perceptibly felt or simply assumed to be invisibly present as it monitors the 
population of East Berlin. Pedestrians react by hurrying past one another, never making eye 
contact and protectively pull their coats tighter to their bodies as they pass. Distrust and fear 
permeate the avenues, yet von Donnersmarck’s portrayal of the constant intrusion 
successfully establishes surveillance as being efficiently quotidian and almost perfunctory, 
much like the performance of daily bodily functions.  
In a scene where the installation of surveillance equipment in the apartment of 
Dreyman and Sieland is carried out by Stasi agents, they employ Teutonic efficiency with 
careful but jarring abruptness. The acts of drilling into locks, the rough yet delicately precise 
insertion of microphone wires becomes visceral when a muffled tearing sound emits from 
behind the wallpaper. Visually, the wires to appear almost like veins growing beneath flesh. 
The attic above the apartment holds elaborate and historically authentic63 recording 
equipment, which is impressive with its display of dials, switches and knobs that invoke a 
loose representation of the brain or central nervous system of the surveillance operation. 
Finally, Dreyman and Sieland’s apartment, which is filmed mostly in warm golden tones, 
appears warm and safe, like a cocoon surrounding “the soul” of their home. 
Outside there is little evidence of “democracy” at that time in the German Democratic 
Republic’s system of government. Indeed, the citizens of East Germany are equal, but only in 
their likelihood to be monitored by the State. The act of surveillance and its repercussions 
(from the information gleaned in observation and reported to authorities) are shown as having 
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the capacity to influence their future through destruction or redemption. The possibilities for 
either outcome are mirrored in the choices that three main characters must make when they 
are faced with the personal and political dilemmas that von Donnersmarck sets out for them in 
the film.  
Wiesler’s surveillance of Sieland and Dreyman enables him to listen to their music 
and their love-making and their conversations. This seems to spur him further into a 
surveillance of personal curiosity. He thoughtfully inspects their belongings, reads their books 
and looks longingly at their bed. These personal actions result in two pertinent developments 
to his character and also to the story; his recognition of their humanity, and his emerging 
respect for them. Somewhat more astonishing is the fact that he also reveals an aspect of 
himself which he did not know he possessed — the ability to consider life outside his own 
self-imposed wall of political ideology, instrumentality, and consequent indifference to others. 
Surveillance has forced Wiesler to confront another world view based on his recognition of 
others. Wiesler must make a choice between the potential imprisonment of himself or his 
subjects. Informing his superiors about the politically subversive artistic activities of his 
subjects would result in their imprisonment. On the other hand, should it ever be discovered 
that Wiesler is in fact protecting his subjects by not reporting their true behaviour; it is he 
who will be punished in some way by the Stasi. 
 Christa-Maria must choose between enduring the sickening and unwanted sexual 
advances of her extortionist in exchange for continuing her own and Dreyman’s career. 
Refusing his advances means being blacklisted or arrested, removing all hope of furthering 
their careers in the theatre. Her dilemma occurs in triplicate. If she redeems herself, their 
careers are destroyed; if she chooses instead to save their careers, she also destroys her self-
respect and her worthiness as a person for — as she later puts it, “getting into bed with them.” 
Her resolve is unsteady and further weakened by a drug addiction that both enables yet also 






    
Georg Dreyman is Christa-Maria’s lover and partner, and has attempted to live a 
double life to please both the political regime and his colleagues in the radical theatre crowd. 
He experiences a profound emotional impact upon learning of the suicide of his old friend, the 
once famous and respected theatre director, Jerska, who finally hangs himself in despair ten 
years after the SED64 has blacklisted him from his position amongst the cultural elite. 
Although his blacklisting came as the result of Stasi informers reporting his oppositional 
ideals long ago, Georg feels somehow responsible. Dreyman longs to redeem himself by 
justifying his friend’s existence to the world. But he compromises his own safety and 
comfortable position within the “acceptable” East German artistic circles by writing a 
subversive article for West Germany’s politically charged Der Spiegel magazine.  
Dreyman is finally inspired not only by Jerska’s suicide, but also by his friends and 
lover pushing him to “act” somehow against an increasingly restrictive and punishing GDR 
regime. Written anonymously Dreyman’s article uses Jerska’s suicide as an introduction and 
then exposes the way suicide statistics in the GDR have gone unreported after growing 
alarmingly high. The risk of being discovered as the author of such an article would mean at 
the very least a long jail sentence. Dreyman is only able to take that risk because unknown to 
him, Wiesler, who is aware of what is taking place, comes dangerously close to turning him in 
to the authorities, but in the end, makes the choice not to do so. By observing his Stasi 
comrades in action, Wiesler becomes painfully aware of the moral corruption and systemic 
decay within the regime of the GDR. He is made aware of what will happen to Dreyman if he 
is sent to prison, and, even worse than physical torture, the result of his imprisonment would 
be the destruction of his creative soul, something Wiesler can no longer be a party to.  
But the motivation for the main character in this film to engage, in these “smallest 
acts” is to be found elsewhere in Arendt’s work. In her essay, “The Crisis in Culture,” she  
puts forward her ideas on judgement from a political point of view, based on Kant’s concept 
                                                 






    
of “the ability to see things not only from one’s own point of view, but in the perspective of 
all those who happen to be present.” 65 She refers to this as the ability that the Greeks called 
“insight” or “common sense.” Arendt is building up to her conclusions on “thoughtlessness” 
which came to her in the form of a question she asked herself as she was reporting on  the trial 
of the Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem: 
 
 
Could the activity of thinking as such, the habit of examining and reflecting 
upon whatever happens to come to pass, regardless of specific content and 
quite independent of results, could this activity be of such a nature that it 




Thus the themes and the “aura” of Das Leben der Anderen centre on redemption through 
self-sacrifice, an ethical act committed in secrecy, and survival as a result of artistic 
experience. By listening to and observing his subjects during his surveillance, Wiesler 
discovers both their humanity and his own. 
 
Voices from the Outside 
The English playwright William Congreve’s famous lines of 1697: “Music hath 
charms to soothe a savage breast / To soften rocks, or bend a knotted oak,”67 are echoed in 
von Donnersmarck’s claim that his original inspiration for writing the script and making the 
film Das Leben der Anderen  stems from the romantic notion of art triumphing over evil.  In 
an interview with Emanuel Levy, von Donnersmarck refers specifically to Lenin’s comments 
to his friend, the writer Maxim Gorky. Gorky notes that Lenin is described as being 
enraptured when listening to Beethoven’s sonatas to the point of finding it difficult to 
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concentrate on the business of carrying out a violent revolution. As von Donnersmarck cites 
Gorky’s reflections on how he recalls Lenin remarking: 
 
 
“I know of nothing better than the Appassionata and could listen to it every 
day. What astonishing, superhuman music! It always makes me proud, 
perhaps naively so, to think that people can work such miracles!” [Then,] 
Wrinkling up his eyes, he smiled rather sadly, adding: 
“But I can't listen to music very often, it affects my nerves. I want to say 
sweet, silly things and pat the heads of people who, living in a filthy hell, 
can create such beauty. One can't pat anyone on the head nowadays; they 
might bite your hand off. They ought to be beaten on the head, beaten 
mercilessly, although ideally we are against doing any violence to people. 
Hm-what a hellishly difficult job!”68 [Gorky’s punctuation] 
 
 
This impressed von Donnersmarck: “It showed me how much the ideologue has to be 
at war with his own humanity to pursue his ideological goals.”  He reasoned that, if such an 
impression could be left on him — that beauty and art could subvert someone from their 
original intentions — why not explore more deeply the potential of their effects on those who 
are trained to be ruthless?  Von Donnersmarck continued, “I thought; let’s see if I can find a 
way of telling a story where a Lenin figure would be forced to listen to the Appassionata just 
as he was getting ready to smash in someone’s head.”  
In examining the director’s inspiration for creating the film and conceptualising the 
main character’s motivation to act, I am bound to concur with the idea that listening to the 
music and the voices coming from the people Wiesler is surveilling could produce the effect 
of arousing his conscience. By listening in on Dreyman’s telephone call and discovering that 
Jerska has committed suicide, he hears Dreyman play the “Sonata for a Good Man” on his 
piano. He also knows, from snooping around the apartment, that the music he is playing was 
Jerska’s birthday gift to Georg. The music, which emanates from outside his natural realm, 
causes Wiesler to experience an emotional epiphany and a revelation of sorts.  
                                                 
 






    
Von Donnersmarck’s use of Wiesler as a “Lenin figure” is, however, simplistic and 
somewhat absurd. It makes little sense to compare a mere cog in the gigantic GDR 
dictatorship in the form of a rather emotionally repressed Stasi agent who is  quickly 
overpowered by sentiment, to Lenin, the mass executioner and tyrant. Wiesler has his political 
principals, dislikes arrogance, and is fiercely loyal to the ideology behind Socialism. Gareth 
Dale, an academic and author who is an expert on the rise and fall of the GDR, also finds the 
Lenin comparison a gross political misrepresentation. In his recent article in Debatte, on the 
GDR in German Cinema69, Dale acknowledges the veracity of von Donnersmarck’s realistic 
settings and authentic atmosphere. When he argues against certain aspects of what he says the 
media has “unfailingly presented . . . as good, true and brave,” however, Dale dismisses the 
notion of any “bravery” brought in the director’s portrayal of Wiesler as a Lenin figure: 
 
Von Donnersmarck’s film is, patently, anything but brave: There has been no 
shortage of denunciations of the Stasi, not in 1990, not today, nor at any point 
in between. Although it does not join any witch-hunt—its heroes, after all, are 
both communists—neither is it a trailblazer in highlighting the Stasi’s 
nefarious ways. In this, it follows the mainstream. Nor is its didactic 
motivation especially courageous: Attacking Lenin is unlikely to antagonise 
establishment opinion, while the substance of the attack, von Donnersmarck’s 
advocacy of “feelings over principles,” is simply an affirmation of standard 
Romantic fare. It won’t attract criticism but it should, for von Donnersmarck 
grossly misrepresents Lenin. In the “sweet nothings” quote, Lenin agonises 
over his situation and voices his abhorrence of violence. For him, the worlds of 
“art” and “feelings” are essential parts of the humanity that he passionately 
wishes to see flourish; it is tragic that a humane society could only be achieved 
via social conflict, even civil war. It is, moreover, absurd to model Wiesler on 
Lenin, whose principles were antithetical to those of East Germany’s 
“communist” leaders. The latter, in 1984, were agonising not over the 
dilemmas of violence in revolution and civil war, but over the soaring price of 
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Heinous consequences can result when there are no artistic or even reasonable “voices” 
present to reveal the miracle of humanity during the times when making such judgements is 
crucial. In Eichmann in Jerusalem; a report on the banality of evil (1963), Arendt reported 
that what resulted from the very absence of any “voices from the outside to arouse 
[Eichmann’s] conscience” was chilling (EJ: 112). The voices that might have caused him to 
examine his actions were “missing,” according to Adolf Eichmann. The result of this in part 
was that Eichmann’s “murderous zeal” for killing Jews in Germany was so easily carried out 
during his twelve years in the Third Reich. In other words, Eichmann claimed that nothing 
and no one was heard to tell him that he was wrong.  
What Eichmann is saying is that his total lack of perception that he was committing 
evil acts can be blamed on the silence of others. The consequences of silence for such actions 
could be Eichmann’s excuse for committing the acts he did, or for allowing the acts of others 
under his command to go unchecked. Arendt makes the case that Eichmann was the product 
of his environment, and by this she does not mean bad parenting, but rather, the entire 
German society during the reign of the Third Reich. His own faculties for thinking and 
therefore his ability for possessing the necessary insight for making humane judgements were 
developed in a world of mendacity: 
 
Eichmann needed only to recall the past in order to feel assured that he was not 
lying and that he was not deceiving himself, for he and the world he lived in 
had once been in perfect harmony. And that German society of eighty million 
people had been shielded against reality and factuality by exactly the same 
means, the same deception, the same lies and stupidity that had now become 
ingrained in Eichmann’s mentality. . . But the practice of the self-deception 
had become so common, almost a moral prerequisite for survival, that even 
now [1963] eighteen years after the collapse of the Nazi regime, when most of 
the specific content of its lies has been forgotten, it is sometimes difficult not 
to believe that mendacity has become an integral part of the German national 
character. (EJ: 47) 
 
In Wiesler’s case, living in a place and time where one would assume they are under constant 






    
literally depend on how you were seen and heard to behave. Wiesler lived under 
circumstances that were the consequences of the political worlds that Lenin and Eichmann 
created and fell prey to. I contend, however, that part of Wiesler’s “arousal of conscience” 
stems from listening to the music and voices of Georg and Christa- Maria. It was this arousal 
that spurred him to protect his subjects, and their humanity, which is an extremely 
uncharacteristic action for a typical Stasi agent to take. Quite unexpectedly for Wiesler are 
the “seeds of boundlessness” sown in the voices and music when he hears them. Even if they 
were unintentionally spoken and not played for his benefit, the rupture that occurred as a 
result of his response to them creates a “change in every constellation” (HC: 190). 
 
The Motives of Others 
We can view Das Leben der Anderen with the understanding that von Donnersmarck’s 
entire life has been lived beyond the real shadow of World War II, which precipitated the 
creation of East and West Berlin, the Berlin wall and the Cold War. As an artist, he is 
undoubtedly talented and creative, but it is important to note here that he is still a relatively 
young director in terms of taking on a project set in the Cold War epoch of East Berlin. Yet 
because the historical background of the Stasi is so well documented and is now readily 
accessible, the film succeeds in conveying the feeling of a lived experience. 
 Von Donnersmarck’s background is German. He was born in Cologne, West 
Germany, in 1973, but his father worked for Lufthansa Airlines and his family moved to New 
York City when he was only two years old. His father’s work, which centred on travelling, 
enabled knowledge of East and West Berlin to be introduced to him first in 1981 when he 
moved back to Germany with his parents. Quite precocious at the age of eight, he reported 
that he found Germany to be “crass.” After subsequent moves with his parents, first to 
Frankfurt and then to Brussels, his views became broadened, but his age at the time of the fall 






    
Russian language in Leningrad, and then economics, philosophy and politics at Oxford 
University. He also enjoyed what he called Oxford's “visual self-containment, the fact that 
you live within specific aesthetics, as if in a film”70 so much so that after Oxford, he studied 
Film at the Academy of Television and Film in Munich. What von Donnersmarck may lack in 
genuine experience of the GDR he most certainly has made up for in his attention to 
authenticity in all of the details in the composition of this film. He and his production crew 
did everything within their power to create the sense of living in the time and space of East 
Berlin in 1984. Original furniture, fixtures and equipment were researched and used, from 
Stasi filing cabinets to authentic manual typewriters. Contemporary graffiti had to be painted 
over on a daily basis to reconstruct the reality of the stark, blank greyness of the Berlin 
buildings.  
Unlike Caché, which was utterly devoid of any musical sound track, music in DLA is 
almost always present, either foregrounded as the plot motivator for the characters or played 
in the background to convey the popular music of the time. Presented here is an artistic work 
that is well within the surveillance film genre and which therefore merits further critical 
analysis. 
Benjamin’s discussion of art in the age of mechanical reproduction with regard to 
cinema might be applied here. Even though film, in the first place is already a reproduction of 
the lived experience, film remains a useful tool for rendering lived experience.  As Benjamin 
puts it: 
 
Evidently a different nature opens itself to the camera than opens to the naked 
eye —if only because an unconsciously penetrated space is substituted for a 
space consciously explored by man (WMR: 238). . . . The film is the art form 
that is in keeping with the increased threat to his life which man has to face. 
Man’s need to expose himself to shock effects is his adjustment to the dangers 
threatening him. (WMR: 252)  
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Benjamin defends film on the grounds that through film, the “social transformations” that 
occur from historical events can be understood in the contemporary mind using a 
contemporary medium. He defends any “decay of the aura” from the reproduction of an 
historical event on film, because “it is possible to show its social causes” (WMR: 224). 
 Von Donnersmarck’s comment on visual self-containment is demonstrated in his 
approach here to portraying self-reflection for the GDR Cold War epoch by using 
contemporary visual culture’s film as his medium. His perspective, I argue, is still culturally 
located from a predominantly mediated view. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why having 
won seven major German film industry awards and the American Academy Award, the film 
enjoys a wide, international popularity. Das Leben der Anderen may well carry a familiar 
voice that many of today’s contemporary film audiences recognise from their own 
predominantly mediated lives. 
 
“The adjustment of reality to the masses and of the masses to reality is a process of 
unlimited scope, as much for thinking as for perception” 71 
 
Within the GDR, it was the Stasi that enabled the State to monitor the citizenry. On 
February 8, 1950, with the assistance of the Soviet intelligence community, the East German 
government established the Stasi. Set up to maintain and preserve the communist regime in 
the GDR, the methods used to carry out this task operated outside the law, involving 
widespread networks of up to 200,000 civilian informants as well as 91,000 employed staff 
members.72 The original Stasi agents were trained by Soviet KGB agents but by 1984, the 
period portrayed in Das Leben der Anderen, the main character, Wiesler, is a native of the 
GDR, and is now expert enough in his own role as a Stasi agent and highly successful 
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interrogator to be training other young students for the same position. Wiesler’s character has 
the ability and is routinely given the opportunity to be ruthless.  This is portrayed in his 
character by his coldly self-controlled, physically stiff and slightly robotic appearance, 
combined with his didactic manner of speech. The film invites us to assume the worst of this 
man until we are introduced to other characters, who at first may seem more familiar and 
almost warm to us in their comparative informality to Wiesler but soon after are discovered to 
have a deep, cold, core of self-serving corruption at the heart of their existence. 
Although the historical documentation about the Stasi organisation reports that at least 
one-third of the East German population was victimised by Stasi surveillance, arrest, 
detention or torture,73 Wiesler’s potential for fictional redemption is made possible through 
certain potentially malleable characteristics that he possesses. He is a man who may have 
initially been driven by his loyalty to the highest ideals of the “Enlightenment Marxist,” and 
the concepts held within the Communist Manifesto; the destruction of bourgeois society via 
the expropriation of private property, its centralization in the hands of the state, the 
dismantling of the bourgeois institutions, and faith in the leadership of the Communist party 
that possesses the laws of history.74  With the passing of time however, one’s beliefs may be 
watered down to become habit, rather than a continuously burning passion. As Dale explains 
further in his Debatte article on the GDR in German Cinema regarding Stasi agents: “If 
their—and Wiesler’s—loyalty was to ‘principles’, then these involved little more than 
securing the power structure of which they were well-maintained components” (161). Such 
original loyalty, however, can be sourced from an inner wellspring of a passion that is 
unrealised in any other sense of the word, and, like Lenin’s professed natural, human (and yet 
shunned) reaction to Beethoven’s Appassionata, this passion  may be subverted in another 
direction, perhaps one that is more compassionate, even romantic, rather than ruthless.  
 
                                                 
 
 






    
The Shield and Sword 
There are several other characters who display a much deeper and truly ruthless side. 
On the surface, Oberstleutnant (First lieutenant) Anton Grubitz, (played by Ulrich Tukur) the 
character who is Wiesler’s boss and former school mate, appears somewhat like the wolf in 
sheep’s clothing. Grubitz is always looking for ways to place his actions, whether moral or 
immoral, in order to promote his career. Without a trace of guilt or formal acknowledgement 
to his cohorts, he uses the more learned shoulders of students and comrades as rungs in a 
ladder to advance his own position amongst the more powerful members of the Central 
Committee.  
Grubitz does have one redeeming feature, and that is his honest admission about his 
lack of intellectual prowess, a lack which he further concedes is made up for by his acts of 
cleverness. Early in the film we are introduced to him entering Wiesler’s classroom at the end 
of the lecture applauding at Wiesler while leering at the female students as they leave. Grubitz, 
who is the Head of the Department of Culture brags to Wiesler about being promoted to 
professor in the school where they both train Stasi agents. He confesses easily to the now 
lower-ranked Wiesler that back when they were classmates he had advanced himself by 
copying Wiesler’s work. This is Grubitz’ unabashed version of a compliment to Wiesler! It 
becomes apparent through a number of exchanges between Grubitz and Wiesler, that in these 
dark and suspicious times, the two of them have a relationship that passes as a friendship. 
Wiesler, however is trained to be especially suspicious and distrustful, and assumes there is 
another reason for Grubitz to come visiting, so he asks him, “What’s up?” Because Grubitz is 
aware that Wiesler knows him quite well, he admits almost transparently his penchant for 
ulterior motives by replying with a self-mocking defensiveness, “Why do you always think I 
am scheming?” He then invites Wiesler to attend the theatre as his guest. Wiesler, who 
considers that an outing at the theatre is grossly uncharacteristic of Grubitz, says with 






    
Grubitz admits that his motive is to make an appearance at the theatre in order to be 
seen by his boss, Minister Hempf (Thomas Thieme), who is also attending the play. Situated 
above Wiesler and Grubitz in rank and power, Minister Hempf’s character embodies the 
physical and psychological perversion of totalitarian power, by employing his guiltless tactics 
of abusive manipulation on the vulnerable. We soon discover that many of the film’s plot 
activities and the consequences derived from them are driven by Hempf’s desire to possess 
one of his targeted sexual interests, the lone female character in the film, Christa-Maria 
Sieland.  
 Von Donnersmarck provides a mise-en-scene in the theatre that is both creative and 
concise as it serves several key purposes in the film. First, the point of view is seen from 
above, corresponding with the translation from its French origins, “surveillance” which means 
quite literally, “seeing from above.” This places the movie schematically within the 
surveillance film genre. It is also in this scene that we are introduced not only to a majority of 
the characters in the film, but also to their salient characteristics. From their balcony box, 
Grubitz specifically points out both Minister Hempf and Georg Dreyman to Wiesler, 
explaining Hempf’s political power by saying, “He used to be in State Security. He really 
cleaned up the theatre scene.” We learn from the playbill that the production is entitled, 
“Gesichter der Liebe” /“Faces of Love,” written by Sieland’s lover, Georg Dreyman. Up until 
this point in time, Dreyman has been seen by Grubitz as being beyond reproach by the Stasi, 
for the lack of subversive material in his work.  He emphasizes Dreyman’s presumed loyalty 
to the State by telling Wiesler that Dreyman “is the only non-subversive writer who is also 
read in the West” — a rather unusual compliment coming from someone who is supposed to 
be loyal to the ideals of East Germany’s Socialist system. 
But it is from Wiesler’s point of view through his opera glasses that we visually sweep 
the area from above. Layer upon layer is peeled back to reveal the complex strata of 






    
on the stage, and then moves down to the audience, where we are allowed to briefly observe 
the porcine Minister Hempf engaged in some nervous activity. He is fuelled it seems, by 
watching Christa-Maria onstage, and the appearance of him fanning himself with his play 
programme, is unpleasantly like the motions of masturbation. Seated next to him is a guard or 
aide who continually swivels his head to see if anyone is watching them. Through Wiesler’s 
surveillant gaze we also observe Dreyman as he openly enjoys watching his own play, 
basking in the applause of the audience, and receiving the hand-shake of admiration from his 
friend and writer Paul Hauser, who we come to discover, is considered to be a more 
“subversive type.” The final tribute we see Dreyman enjoy comes from the loving adoration 
of Christa-Maria as she rushes to hug and kiss him immediately after leaving the stage. 
Dreyman is the only character in the film to receive nothing but positive reinforcement from 
everyone around him, which almost seems to be why his future trouble begins. 
Wiesler’s reaction to this outpouring of genuine love is an intuitive assignation of guilt 
to Dreyman, by way of a surprising proclamation to Grubitz that Dreyman seems “arrogant.” 
Wiesler senses that there is something which he cannot really define or name, as he refers to 
Dreyman as being “arrogant, the kind I warn my students about,” and that he warrants “a 
closer look,” meaning he should be under Stasi surveillance. In other words, he passes 
judgement on Dreyman without thinking, perhaps based on his assimilated experience from 
the past, or simply out of habit. We are not expressly told but it appears that he uses his 
intuitive reaction to guide him, possibly originating from deeply buried ulterior motives that 
even he is unaware of.  
At first Grubitz reacts to Wiesler’s condemnation of Dreyman by clucking in the 
writer’s defence, claiming that he has always been supportive of the GDR and that all of 
Wiesler’s teaching must have dulled his “intuition.” Minutes later, however, when he 
completes his original mission, which was to appear before Minister Hempf as a dutiful 






    
Dreyman to be monitored, and although the Minister’s reasons are not yet completely clear to 
the ever- scheming Grubitz, he knows the reasons why are not necessary for him to know at 
this point, however being agreeable to Hempf is always in his best interest. For him, making 
use of Wiesler’s keen intuition to further his own gains is as good a tool as any, and there is 
certainly no personal gain (and therefore no need) for mentioning to Hempf that Wiesler 
originated the idea.  Joining Minister Hempf in the seat next to him, Grubitz introduces 
himself to Hempf and refers to himself as being “the party’s shield and sword” when it comes 
to defending Socialism’s ideology from “subversive creative types.” When Hempf asks 
Grubitz’ opinion of Dreyman, he pauses, gauges his timing and says haltingly, “Maybe.”  We 
know that Grubitz is well aware of Wiesler’s intellectual superiority, and so it seems entirely 
plausible when we hear him repeating Wiesler’s suggestion to Minister Hempf that, “Maybe 
Dreyman is not as clean as he looks.” Hempf seizes the moment to compliment Grubitz, and 
then order the surveillance to be carried out before a party he somehow knows that Dreyman 





Grubitz and Wiesler watch the audience as much as they do the play and in this way we also become 











Grubitz introduces himself to Minister Hempf as “the party’s shield and sword,” and then quickly 
surmises a way to ingratiate himself to Hempf (suggesting that Georg Dreyman might be a good candidate 
for surveillance by the Stasi),  in the hopes of advancing his career, regardless of  how his actions might 
impact Georg and Christa-Maria in the process. 
 
 
I propose that what Wiesler detects emanating from Georg Dreyman is not true 
arrogance. Instead, what he senses is a kind of “dishonesty” lurking underneath the false 
cover of arrogance. Dreyman’s form of dishonesty is not dishonesty in terms of the system or 
the State, or towards his lover, but rather, with himself. Georg Dreyman demonstrates a 
different manifestation of the same loyalty to the ideals of Socialism that Wiesler has, but his 
passion is manifested in the plays and articles that he writes, in his compassion for his friends 
and the romantic love that he shares with Christa-Maria. Because so far Dreyman has had 
none of the hideous experiences that many of his friends have had, he carries the confidence 
of the uninitiated. He has picked up the habit, albeit unintentionally, of automatically saving 
his own skin, perhaps by being forever the “nice guy.” His dishonesty, therefore, is located in 






    
friends, those within “Party Circles,”75 and finally, his lover, Christa Maria. Wiesler detects in 
Dreyman that which he abhors and tries to deny within himself, the withering of his own 
convictions. At this point however, neither one is remotely aware of this or their commonality 
in sharing it. 
Wiesler has only his intellectual convictions, the depth of his professionalism in his 
work. His “passions” have no other outlet than fuelling his perfectionism is his work-related 
tasks. It appears as though both Wiesler and Dreyman have been satisfied with their lives just 
as they are, right up until the point in time where their lives artificially converge through the 
imposition of Stasi surveillance. This convergence causes the “rupture” that sets in motion 
some of the key features of Arendt’s theory of action, which she connects most closely to 
“natality,” meaning the possibility that each birth expresses the “startling unexpectedness of 
new beginnings.” According to Arendt, “the fact that man is capable of action means that the 
unexpected can be expected of him, that he is able to perform what is infinitely improbable” 
(HC: 177-178). 
 
Action and Natality, Beginning at Georg Dreyman’s Birthday Party  
The action of surveillance had begun in earnest on the night of Dreyman’s fortieth 
birthday party, with the equipment having been installed earlier that day. During the twenty-
minute installation, Dreyman’s neighbour, Frau Meineke spies on the Stasi agents from the 
peephole in her door. She is discovered by Wiesler who threatens to remove her daughter 
Masha, (whose first name he eerily knows) from her place at the university if she exposes the 
operation. When she complies, cowering in fright, he tells another agent to make sure he 
sends her a gift for her “cooperation.” This is Wiesler at his worst.  
That night, when Dreyman asks Mrs. Meineke to conspire with him in his ruse to 
prove to Christa- Maria that he can tie a neck-tie, we see how charming he truly is. Frau 
                                                 







    
Meineke, looking quite frightened, ties his tie perfectly, and when he asks her in a whispered 
voice, “You can keep a secret, can’t you?” Wiesler’s face, as he listens in to Dreyman’s voice, 
almost seems to wince. At this point, we do not know if it is in annoyance at her presence and 
the potential threat of being found out, or if it is his first pang of guilt, for putting an innocent 
in harm’s way. 
The birthday party, like the scene in the theatre, introduces us to the secondary 
characters and furthers our understanding about the primary three. Here we find a small 
community of creative people, whose warmth and familiarity with each other seems almost 
protective against the often hostile political environment that surrounds them. This feeling of 
community is registered in Dreyman’s reaction to the quirky yet sincere birthday gifts that he 
receives from his group of friends — he is almost moved to tears with gratitude. It is also at 
this party that Jerska (Volkmar Kleinert) gives Dreyman the fateful musical score that will 
drive Wiesler to action. Dreyman’s friend, Paul Hauser (Hans Uwe-Bauer), is shown as a 
writer who refuses to conform and whose anger at Dreyman for being so idealistic is such that 
he accuses him of almost becoming a “bigwig” himself. During the party he dramatically 
threatens to cut off their friendship if he does not act like a human being and take some action 
against the “informers and conformists” who have ruined artists lives, like Jerska’s. He shouts 
passionately at Dreyman before leaving the party early, “If you don’t take a stand, then you 
are not human!”  
We see Jerska at the party sitting alone (at his own choosing) reading a book. When 
questioned by Dreyman, he admits that, yes, he has been reading but then he says good 
naturedly, “Well it is Brecht,” as if it is an inside joke between the two, which denotes a 
familiarity that Wiesler appears to find utterly foreign when he hears its tone. The birthday 
gift that Jerska gives Dreyman is sheet music for the piano, entitled, “Sonata for a Good 
Man.” Listening to all of this and taking it in with growing fascination is Wiesler, who jots 






    
way that Dreyman and Sieland speak to each other, and when they make love. Meanwhile, we 
have also been made privy to Christa-Maria sneaking a pill from her coat pocket and then 
swallowing it in such a way that we know this is not normal prescribed medicine. 
After the birthday party, there is a scene of Wiesler at home showing in contrast, his 
solitary, vacant and loveless life, his spare apartment, and even his spaghetti sauce 
pathetically squeezed from a tube. We are reminded later of this when he is compelled to hire 
a prostitute for comfort and companionship, but she left so quickly after their sex act that it 
only heightened his (and our) awareness of how empty his life is. The contrast between his 
life and the two people he is surveilling is such that his curiosity about their personal lives is 
piqued, compelling him to enter their apartment, voyeuristically look at and  fondle their 
belongings wistfully, and even steal the book by Brecht that Jerska had been reading. 
Listening to the birthday party also makes Wiesler wonder what Jerska has done that 
is so terrible that Minister Hempf had him blacklisted for ten years. When we see him looking 
through Jerska’s file soon after at work, he is joined by Grubitz, who also informs him that 
the licence plate number Wiesler had reported from a car that had dropped Christa -Maria off 
earlier in the week, actually belonged to Minister Hempf. As the two of them walk towards a 
lunch table in the commissary, Wiesler moves to sit down at a table amongst the lower level 
agents. Grubitz reminds him that the “bosses” sit elsewhere. Wiesler, obviously annoyed at 
the discovery of Hempf and Sieland’s (forced) relationship, snaps at Grubitz, “Socialism has 
to begin somewhere” and sits down. Grubitz reasons, “So we’re helping a committee member 
get a rival out of the way,” but Wiesler counters primly, “Is this why we joined the party?” It 
is his disapproval that causes him to reveal “the bitter truth” to Dreyman. 
From the beginning, Wiesler’s character is defined very much by his intense 
repression of feelings, and, through his outward expression, he never wavers in his 
convictions. Some of the best acting in the film comes from the late actor Ulrich Mühe who 






    
Mühe’s portrayal shows Wiesler working hard at trying not to display his feelings of 
contempt for these men when their behaviour and words are ironically quite the opposite of 
the Socialist ideals they are supposed to be upholding; they disgust him. By keeping his face 
as impassive as possible in their presence, only the look in his eyes (easily detected by the 
audience) betrays his true feelings, should any of his fellow agents become less interested in 
their own gains long enough to notice. The audience begins to detect the difference in 
Wiesler’s eyes however, when he is shown listening to Dreyman play “Sonata for a Good 
Man” on the piano after hearing about Dreyman’s suicide. Ironically, both Wiesler and 
Dreyman hear the news together— by telephone, with Wiesler monitoring the line, when 
Dreyman receives the call. 
 
Red Ink, the Blood of Subversives and Bureaucrats. 
In the context of Dreyman’s plan to write a “subversive” article on suicide statistics 
after Jerska’s suicide, we also find Wiesler coming close to returning to his previous ways. 
Dreyman and his friends plan to gather at Dreyman’s apartment to discuss the article, because 
he thinks that he is one of the few among them who is somehow not under Stasi surveillance. 
His friends, especially Paul Hauser, are not convinced that this is true, and so they devise a 
plan to determine the presence of surveillance by using Paul’s Uncle Frank, who visits from 
the West every Sunday as a decoy. They discuss a false plan with the Uncle about smuggling 
his nephew Paul over the border, naming the particular crossing point as bait.  
If they were heard by any agent other than Wiesler, they would surely be reported and 
Uncle Frank would be stopped at the border and searched. Of course Paul would not be in the 
car, but the Uncle in any case would ring Dreyman afterwards to report whether or not he had 
been stopped and searched, determining whether or not anyone had heard them make the plan. 
In his protective mode, Wiesler begins to ring the border guard after hearing the plans, but 






    
but once again, says aloud only to himself, “Just this once my friend,” as if to reassure himself 
that there is still a way for him to return to his old ways if he decides to. 
Once Paul’s Uncle crosses the border without a problem, he rings Dreyman and 
reassures him that everything went ahead as planned, and that there was after all, “no real 
danger anyway.” Wiesler, who listens in on every phone conversation, misinterprets this as 
meaning that Paul Hauser has safely made it across the border, only because Wiesler did not 
alert the border guards. After hanging up, Dreyman, who is somewhat drunk, seems almost 
ashamed at the obvious ineptitude of the Stasi border police. He yells at the ceiling in an 
incredulous voice, “Who would’ve thought that our State Security was so incompetent? 
Who’d have thought they were such idiots!” Wiesler appears insulted and stung by these 
remarks, but again says to no one, “Just you wait.” He simply types in his report, “No further 
noteworthy incidents.”  
In the next scene, the editor of the West German magazine Der Spiegel arrives from 
West Berlin to discuss the article and to present Georg with a special typewriter for writing 
the article. Because every single typewriter in East Germany is registered, they must find an 
unregistered model for Georg to prevent the article being traced to him, should the original 
ever be seized. Only a red typewriter ribbon can be found for this model, an ink colour that 
might serve many purposes for the film in that it may symbolise the life-blood of creativity, 
bloody consequences should he be caught, or possible evidence for the redemptive ending of 
the film. The editor warns them of the dire consequences of anyone finding the typewriter. 
Hauser and Dreyman find the man slightly off putting, a subtlety that von Donnersmarck uses 
to explain the culturally dichotomous relationship between East and West Germany. Although 
it seems that the population of the East long to have the freedom to travel and publish in the 
West, they still take an almost snobbish pride in being East Berliners. The editor from the 






    
Soviet influenced East German both desire and eschew. The editor also tries to get Dreyman 
to politicise the article, but Georg prefers to write it from a literary point of view, and says so.  
Once the formalities, instructions and warnings are over with, the editor, in celebration of 
their partnership, pops a champagne cork, which hits a light switch and causes a painful 
feedback in Wiesler’s surveillance headphones. Already irritated by this, he is pushed over the 
edge it seems, by the editor’s toast: “To you! To letting all of Germany see the true face of the 
GDR!” 
It is obvious that Wiesler, who is the very personification of an East Berliner, thinks 
that this is going too far, and has decided that he will turn Dreyman and his friends in to 
Grubitz. In the next scene we see Wiesler, with a determined look on his face and his  report 
in hand, marching down a hallway past a protesting secretary where he finally barges into 
Grubitz’ office. He is waved in by Grubitz, who is talking on the phone, busily threatening to 
shut down a church. Before Wiesler can turn in his report, however, Grubitz wants to enter 
into a cheery discussion about prison treatments for subversive artists contained in a 
dissertation written by one of his own PhD students. 
First, he explains that although the paper is top rate, he will only be giving the student 
a “B” grade, in order to impress upon the student that getting an “A” from Grubitz is not so 
easy. While admitting proudly that the student is an extraordinary scholar, Grubitz has no 
intention of giving due credit to the student, and will most likely claim the ideas as his own — 
again, his idea of a compliment to his student — who of course will never be told about it. 
Just as Georges in Caché refuses to recognise Majid or his son, Grubitz refuses to give 
recognition to his students or to Wiesler. It is as if by denying the recognition of others, the 
men can somehow protect their own existence. Grubitz then describes to Wiesler in some 
detail the categories of artists and the corresponding methods of breaking their resistance, 
chuckling the whole way through. Referring to Dreyman in particular, he says: “No human 






    
scandals, nothing they could write about later.” Wiesler, seeing where the discussion is going, 
hides his own report in his lap. Grubitz gaily continues the description of treatment, which 
amounts to isolating the artist completely and then releasing him after about ten months. He 
refers to Dreyman as a “Type 4,” the type who always needs his friends around him. Finally, 
he describes in chilling detail the eventual outcome of this treatment: “Know what the best 
part is? Most Type 4’s we have processed in this way never write anything again! Or paint, or 
anything, or whatever artists do.” It now appears to Wiesler that as he laughs aloud, nothing 
pleases Grubitz (who is after all, the Head of the Department of Culture) more than the 
thought of crushing the creativity out of someone like Dreyman, just so that he will never 
write another word — in other words, never again be recognised. Grubitz finishes, “And that, 
without any use of force- just like that! Kind of like a present.”  
His reaction to Grubitz’s ruthlessness is to change his mind about informing on 
Dreyman and his friends, because by now, although tempted to return to his previous 
unquestioning duty to the State, Wiesler has gained the insight necessary to be able to judge 
on his own and do otherwise. When he conceals the damning documentation that would have 
destroyed Dreyman, we are once again given a glimpse of who is “ruthless” and who is not. 
The small act of crumpling up the report and hiding it from Grubitz is tantamount to saving 
Dreyman’s life. But even more memorable in this act is the way in which Wiesler has put his 
own life, quite literally on the line, for someone with whom he has not exchanged one single 
word.   
 
Conclusion: Forgiveness and Redemption 
How does one explain Grubitz’ guileful mirth at the thought of destroying the creative 
spark in his fellow man as opposed to Wiesler’s emerging conscience? The ruthlessness 
meted out to its citizens by the East German government may have been born of the 






    
acceptable codes of conduct, customary standards of moral judgement, and the traditional 
categories of political thought. Arendt’s view of modernity was shaped by the heinous events 
of the Gulag and the Holocaust, both of them brutal and unredeeming, and of course, these are 
the same events that shaped the foundation of East Germany’s totalitarian regime. In The 
Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt claimed that after the institutionalisation of terror and 
violence, the phenomenon of totalitarianism had ruptured and drained of all meaning the bulk 
of traditional moral and political categories. But the result of this “break” from tradition 
should not be taken to mean the hopeless loss of any redemption. Arendt felt that by 
identifying the moments of these breaks in history, one could establish a proper perspective 
that relates to whatever the present time holds. Through our imagination we are able to learn 
from history rather than repeat it.  
When Wiesler listens to Dreyman play Sonata for a Good Man, and when he hears the 
conversations between the subjects who are under his surveillance, his imagination is sparked. 
What happens next is the emergence of his self- awareness in contrast to the corrupt and 
draconian tactics of his comrades. This is followed by the realisation of how empty and lonely 
his own life has become by merely following the rules as opposed to what he thought were 
their guiding principals, set out by the East German regime. Redemption for Wiesler follows 
but only because and only after he has undertaken the unsavoury act of the surveillance of 
others ordered by the State. Forgiveness for his previous acts of institutionalised terrorism 
against his fellow man comes in the form of having a book dedicated to him by one of his 
potential victims, the rescued victim, Georg Dreyman — the only example of someone 
Wiesler has actually saved.  
When Minister Hempf tires of “wooing” the consistently disenchanted Christa-Maria, 
he has her arrested for illegally purchasing drugs and then subsequently detained for 
interrogation in order to glean information from her about Dreyman’s “subversive” activities. 






    
determined to gain satisfaction another way by destroying the relationship she has with her 
lover. Hempf puts Grubitz in charge of the interrogation and, as he is growing suspicious of 
Wiesler’s inability to find anything wrong with Dreyman’s activities, he seizes the 
opportunity to “test” Wiesler’s loyalty by assigning him as Christa-Maria’s interrogator.  
By this time point Wiesler’s full attention has become focussed on protecting Christa-
Maria and Dreyman and on covering his own tracks while doing so. When Wiesler is begins 
to interrogate Christa-Maria, he starts with his back turned to her. He does this because he 
now understands that in their particular case, to be recognised in this system is to be doomed. 
With Christa-Maria at one end of the interrogation table and himself at the other, he slowly 
turns around to face her, allowing her the chance to hide her expression and thus feign her 
lack of recognition of him. For the moment, he successfully manages to prevent Christa-Maria 
from going to prison, but in the end, cannot save her from herself, as she quite easily gives up 
the hiding place of the typewriter that Dreyman is using to write the subversive article.  
What this shows is that the act of surveillance can reveal many things but certainly not 
all, and especially not always in the correct context. Christa-Maria, who was after all 
somewhat drug-addled, never had the clarity of vision and imagination to attain the proper 
perspective that Arendt believes is necessary to create the proper distance for impartial 
judgement. Rather, Christa-Maria is a victim of the irreversibility of the boundlessness and 
unpredictability that are the by-products of action. After the interrogation, Christa-Maria is 
released and told by Grubitz that she is now a member of the Stasi because she is considered 
to be an informant and her reward for this is to have her supply of illegal drugs returned to her. 
Meanwhile, Wiesler has raced back to Dreyman’s apartment and removed the typewriter only 
moments before Grubitz and his men appear back on the scene to search the place and “find” 
it hidden under the floorboards. Christa-Maria, who is in the shower when the Stasi agents 
arrive, emerges to find Grubitz and his men about to pry open the floorboards. At this time 






    
so that when she receives the look, the sheer power of it drives her out of the apartment and 
into the street before she has a chance to see that the typewriter has already been removed.  
When a guilt-ridden Christa-Maria walks in front of a truck (deliberately, it seems), it 
is Wiesler who arrives at her side first, reassuring her that she has done no harm to Dreyman 
by revealing where the typewriter was hidden. Oddly, it is as if Dreyman writing about 
suicide has somehow produced another suicide as an inadvertent result. Wiesler takes it upon 
himself to offer her forgiveness in that she may forgive herself before she dies. He had once 
again, as in the first time when he caused the doorbell to ring, taken the decisive action to 
remove the typewriter to prevent Dreyman from going to prison. And just as before, the 
consequences of this action within “this web of already existing human relationships” 76 were 
not at all what he had expected. 
When Dreyman finally arrives at Christa-Maria’s nearly lifeless body, he picks her up, 
and cradling her broken and bleeding body against his own, he weeps repeatedly, “Forgive me, 
forgive me, forgive me,” until she dies in his arms. This is the first in what seems like a set of 
potential endings that von Donnersmarck presents in the final moments of the film. What has 
Dreyman done that compels him to seek forgiveness? We may derive an answer from an 
earlier exchange between Dreyman and his subversive cohorts, when they advised Dreyman 
to keep Christa- Maria uninformed about their plans to write the Der Spiegel article. Dreyman, 
who seems to seek the transparent ideal whenever possible, has not understood her fragility 
(or weakness) as well as his friends seemed to. Now that he sees the terrible outcome of his 
and her own actions, he realises (assumes) that it is his thoughtlessness that has caused her 
death. 
Of course Wiesler is coming to the same realisation — that all the interference and 
attempts to steer fate, in other words, his “thoughtfulness” — actually caused the 
unpredictable and the very opposite outcome that he had wished for. Interestingly, although 
                                                 






    
both Dreyman and Wiesler share the street scene where Christa-Maria has been killed, neither 
men exchange words, now, or ever in the film. Because of their wordlessness, both Wiesler 
and Dreyman become the “lonely figures” Arendt describes, and both live unhappily for years 
under the weight of the unintentional and irreversible consequences they have triggered. 
Finally, the spell of this unhappiness is broken for both men in the film’s ending, not through 
words spoken but through printed words that are written and read by both men; the words 
written by Wiesler in his report protecting Dreyman and his friends, and in the book Dreyman 
has written after reading the report. Dreyman was so inspired by Wiesler’s actions that he 
dedicates his book to Wiesler, which Wiesler reads at the closing of the final scene. 
In The Human Condition, the chapter entitled, “Action” holds a section called, 
“Irreversibility and the Power to Forgive” (236). In it, Arendt explains “the case of action and 
action’s predicaments:” 
 
The possible redemption from the predicament of irreversibility—of being 
unable to do what one has done though one did not: and could not: have known 
what he was doing—is the faculty of forgiving. . . .Without being forgiven, 
released from the consequences of what we have done, our capacity to act 
would, as it were, be confined to one single deed from which we could never 
recover, we would remain the victims of its consequences forever, not unlike 





We see that some years later, after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, when Dreyman 
fortuitously runs into Hempf (who is no longer Minister of anything) at a theatre where a 
“new” and slightly more Western version of “Gesichter der Liebe” /“Faces of Love,” is being 
performed. We had last seen the play with Christa-Maria as the lead; this time however, the 
lead is being played by a black woman. Both Hempf and Dreyman encounter each other in 
the lobby because both had left their seats (coincidentally) during a scene that reminded them 
of Christa-Maria. Hempf now delights in mocking Dreyman for no longer writing after the 






    
under continual surveillance by the Stasi after all. This revelation piques his curiosity so that 
he goes home and performs a reverse “surgery” 77 of the surveillance wiring removal. 
Incredulous at the amount of hidden equipment and wiring he finds, he is compelled 
to visit the former Stasi headquarters, where the surveillance dossiers pertaining to the 
private lives of an enormous percentage of the (previously) spied upon East German citizenry 
are held. Dreyman wants to see what others have seen of him. The amount of material written 
about him in his file is piled high enough to both surprise Dreyman and even impresses the 
worker who brings it out to him.  The final page of Dreyman’s dossier contains the telling 
trace of the surveillant, a red-inked finger-print and some initials. Luckily, in the newly 
restored Berlin, access to the name of their persecutor is relatively easy. But in Dreyman’s 
case, he realises that his persecutor is actually his saviour, or at least he tried to be, and he 
sets out to find him. 
When Dreyman locates Wiesler, he stands off in the distance, surveilling him as it 
were, and decides not to contact him face to face, most likely because Wiesler now holds a 
low level position as a postman, perhaps considered to be demeaning and embarrassing to 
Dreyman who ironically decides to respect Wiesler’s privacy. Now it is Dreyman who is 
protective of Wiesler’s dignity, because he sees Wiesler as a “good man.” Dreyman, as 
Hempf had noted in their earlier contemptuous conversation, hadn’t written anything (a 
personal predicament somewhat foreshadowed by Grubitz’ description of how to destroy an 
artist’s creativity), since the fall of the Berlin Wall. But now after discovering Wiesler’s act of 
compassion, he is suddenly inspired to write a novel entitled, Sonata for a Good Man.  
The final sequence of Das Leben der Anderen shows Wiesler two years later, reading 
the fly leaf of the book which is dedicated to him by Dreyman. Here is the forgiveness and 
redemption that Wiesler, Dreyman, and the audience seek in order to recover from the 
                                                 
77 This scene is extremely reminiscent of a well known scene in the 1974 film, The Conversation, (American 
Zoetrope), written and directed by Francis Ford Coppola, in which the main character, Harry Caul an audio-
surveillant professional played by Gene Hackman, frantically tears his apartment to shreds looking for audio 






    
consequence of Christa-Maria’s untimely death, and perhaps it fulfils a promise that situations 
in life can eventually work out for the good of someone, (apparently) if one’s heart is in the 
right place. But beyond forgiveness and redemption is the recognition given to Wiesler by 
Dreyman, by recognising that Wiesler is the one who “bore witness” to their lives. Arendt 
also speaks of “promises:” both forgiving and promising also affect the temporality of the 
world of action. Forgiving supposedly “serves to undo the deeds of the past,” while promising 
“serves to set up in the ocean of uncertainty, which the future is by definition, islands of 
security without which not even continuity, let alone durability of any kind, would be possible 
in the relationships between men.”78  
We see the possibility of what the future may hold in the “islands of security” set up in 
the Minority Report, but the promise behind the set up of those islands is false; it is the 
promise of safety in exchange for glittering totalitarianism. Perspective is gained when John 
Anderton realises that there is the possibility of an alternative outcome depending on how one 
chooses and how one chooses to judge. The future really should be an “ocean of uncertainty” 
rather than a predictable place of “safety.” Conversely, in Caché perspective is denied by 
Georges Laurent, even when it is patiently laid out before him to take up. When he denies the 
past, he also denies forgiveness both of himself and by any others as well as foregoing any 
promises for the future. Gerd Wiesler and Georg Dreyman never meet face to face or speak 
with each other which is pertinent because not “seeing” everything becomes the link to 
recognition. 
Surveillance serves as the conduit for action and relationships in Das Leben der 
Anderen, and the action undertaken is unpredictable because Wiesler chooses to use 
surveillance as a way to protect his subjects rather than reveal them. The more he covers up 
their activities, the more he seems to reveal about himself to himself. As with the character of 
Georges in Caché, parts of himself that he had forgotten or had never before comprehended 
                                                 






    
are revealed through his action. Unlike Georges, who wanted only to protect himself, cut off 
any relationships resulting from surveillance and rebury the revelation of his actions, in the 
case of Gerd Wiesler in Das Leben der Anderen, that which is revealed through his protection 
of others on the basis of a conversion to ethical principles, serves to shed light upon and so 
advances his humanity. 
 
 
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Georg Dreyman is somewhat astonished to see the large amount of once 
closely guarded surveillance files (made available to anyone who wishes to read them) that had been kept 
















In this thesis, I have attempted to make a contribution to our history of visual culture. 
In doing so, I have postulated the existence of the surveillance film genre — a special class of 
film which reflects on our current audiovisual regimes. This audiovisual regime is defined 
through the manipulation of appearances. Each of these films I have chosen initiates the 
surveillance point of view as a controlling type of subjectivity. The surveillance film conflates 
audiovisual culture with audiovisual regime. 
I have used Benjamin’s critique of the aura and Arendt’s theory of action to articulate 
critical perspectives against audiovisual regimes and to show how they are destructive of 
‘auratic’ subjectivity, defined as the capacity to ‘bear witness.’ These audiovisual regimes 
also fail to generate a position of ethical awareness from which a theory of action in Arendt’s 
sense might emerge. At first glance, the characters in each of the films discussed in this thesis 
seem to undergo some type of transformation as a result of their involvement in either 
surveilling or being surveilled. What I have shown however, is that by peeling back the 
mediated layers of surveillance within each film, what is revealed is how these 
transformations also reflect the ideological constraints operating on individuals portrayed in 
the times and places presented. 
The ideas of Foucault and Rodowick are also pertinent to my discussion of the 
surveillance film genre. By tapping into their concepts and engaging in a contemporary 
critique of visual culture, I have argued that a sense of ethical meaning although applicable, is 
not always visible within a surveillance society when revealed through the manipulation of 
digital visual culture. I have shown how the possibilities of what Rodowick referred to as a 






    
I have mentioned Foucault’s important view on the disappearance of authenticity from the 
original when it is replaced by similitude. I explored the manifestation of our growing 
separation from the aura and, as a result of our audiovisual culture, our acceptance of the 
inauthentic image within our increasingly digital, visual culture. As our distance from the real 
increases, our experience of viewing becomes increasingly mechanical.  These films show 
how the further disconnected position of surveillance is created and exists within what is fast 
becoming an audiovisual regime. 
What I have argued in this thesis, then, is that the surveillance film and the 
surveillance film genre must be accompanied by a broader critical reflection on social and 
cultural themes. Beyond this, however, my aim was to uncover the core of that form of 
surveillance that operates within our own being, that is, our conscience. In fact, I have 
endeavoured to examine the possibility of our conscience being the original surveillant in our 
lives.  Perhaps from this vantage point, we can begin to look at how our acceptance of 
surveillance in our everyday lives should be taken not only from the panoptic viewpoint, but 
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